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THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PROTECT
CHILDREN AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS: DESHANEY IN CONTEXT
LAURA ORENt
After years of abuse by his father, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney
entered a hospital emergency room in a deep coma that left him perma-
nently paralyzed and brain damaged. The child protection agency in
Winnebago County, Wisconsin had intervened in Joshua's family before
and had known for more than two years the history of abuse and the
continuing serious risk the boy faced. Joshua and his mother filed a civil
rights suit against the caseworkers and the agency, alleging that their
failure to protect the child from his father violated the boy's substantive
due process rights. The United States Supreme Court in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services held that Joshua
and his mother had no cause of action, reasoning that the government
had no constitutional duty to protect anyone from harm unless the state
first deprived that person of liberty by placing her in its custody.
In this Article, Professor Laura Oren criticizes the Court's due pro-
cess analysis. She questions the Court's embrace of an abstract philoso-
phy about constitutional duty for "'government services" and its adoption
of a bright-line test based on custody. Using insights about context and
power garnered from feminist scholarship and the domestic violence
movement, Professor Oren places DeShaney back into the specific con-
text of family violence and child protection from which the Court ab-
stracted it. She explains that historically the state has treated children
at risk from their parents' behavior differently from other victims of vio-
lence and has decriminalized child abuse, promoting a therapeutic, pre-
ventive treatment instead. Every state centers responsibility for child
abuse in social service agencies that are the sole protectors of these chil-
dren. Professor Oren powerfully argues that because the state placed
Joshua in a special legal status, increased his isolation and vulnerability
to abuse by his father, and left the boy only one avenue of protection-
the social service agency-the agency bore fourteenth amendment re-
sponsibility for his life and bodily integrity. Finally, she proposes a solu-
tion to the "razor's edge" dilemma of child protection workers who, if
DeShaney were overturned, might have to strike a precarious balance
between constitutional liability for improper intrusion in the parent-child
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relationship and for failure to intervene promptly enough to protect a
child at risk
I. INTRODUCTION
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1979 and first encountered the power of the
state when his parents were granted a divorce, and his father granted custody, in
1980.1 The state of Wisconsin first learned of possible child abuse by Joshua's
father in January 1982 when the police department, as it was required to do by
state law,2 notified Winnebago County Department of Social Services' Child
Protection Unit that it had received a complaint that the toddler was being
abused.3 The Department of Social Services (DSS) had the sole authority to
investigate a neglect or abuse report.4 As in many other states, by the 1980s
Wisconsin law imposed a mandatory duty to initiate such investigations within
twenty-four hours of receiving the complaint and to conduct the investigation
pursuant to certain guidelines. 5 The DSS had sixty days to conclude whether
the abuse was indicated, 6 and it was the only agency that could take action,
including referral to court, if it found cause to believe abuse had occurred. 7
After receiving the first report, the protective services unit interviewed
Joshua's father, Randy DeShaney, who denied the allegations. 8 Protective serv-
ices did not see the child, despite their statutory duty to do so within twenty-
1. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1989).
2. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (West Supp. 1989). Wisconsin's law imposed mandatory
child abuse reporting duties on a variety of persons, particularly police, educators, health care pro-
fessionals, and social workers. Id. Nationally, the first mandatory child abuse reporting laws were
enacted in the 1960s. Within five years of the development of model legislation by the United States
Children's Bureau, all 50 states had enacted some form of reporting act. Davidson, Successful State
Child Abuse Legislation-Creating a More Effective Legal Framework, in CHILDREN AND THE LAW
1-2 (1988).
3. Brief for Petitioners at 4, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct.
998 (No. 87-154) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
4. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)l (West 1987); Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 27.
5. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)l; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 26.
The passage of the 1974 federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. 93-247, 88
Stat. 4 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), "encouraged" all the
states to amend their laws in the 1970s. The changes generally broadened the class of mandated
reporters, expanded the types of reportable maltreatment, and designated specialized child welfare
agencies rather than the police to be the "sole legal recipient of reports." Davidson, supra note 2, at
3. In addition, the statutes typically established time limits for completion of protective services
investigations, added confidentiality provisions, and adopted 18 as the age limit for the protection of
children under the abuse and neglect laws. Id. at 2-3.
Other reforms in the 1970s included abolishing privileges such as doctor-patient or husband-
wife, as they related to child abuse, and established specific legislative standards for emergency re-
moval of children. Further changes have been made in the 1980s, for example, the creation of
multidisciplinary teams to manage child abuse cases, such as the one that made the decision to
return Joshua DeShaney to his father. See generally Davidson, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing recent
state legislative developments).
6. Agency reports are classified as "indicated" or "unfounded." "Unfounded" (by reason of
insufficient evidence) cases are purged from the agency's records after being transmitted to a central
registry. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c). If a case is "indicated," however, the suspected person is
notified and has a right to request a hearing to contest the finding. Id. § 48.891(3)(d).
7. Id. § 48.981(3)(c)4; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 26-27.
8. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
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four hours. 9 The state agency then closed its file. 10 In January of 1983 the local
hospital emergency room saw Joshua, identified him as a victim of child abuse, "
and reported this to DSS, as they also were required to do by state law. 12 In
response, DSS placed Joshua in the temporary legal custody of the hospital
while they investigated the complaint.' 3 A multidisciplinary team consisting of
physicians, a child psychologist, nurses, police officers, and the DSS caseworker
and supervisor, together with the county's civil attorney, met to determine the
state's further action. Despite indications of abuse, the county civil attorney was
unwilling to bring the case to court for any level of child protection, for reasons
that are not clear from the record.14 The DSS, however, noted in an internal
report that child abuse was strongly suspected. The caseworker in charge there-
fore recommended that the charges be dismissed "at this time" but that DSS
refer the case back to the court if there were any further injuries to Joshua of
unexplained origin.' 5
Although the state returned Joshua to his father's custody, DSS also en-
tered into a contract with Randy DeShaney fo his son's benefit. The father was
to receive counselling, remove an allegedly abusive girlfriend from the home,
and enroll Joshua in Head Start so that DSS could monitor the child outside of
the isolation of his parent's home.16 This agreement, plaintiffs later alleged, was
ignored as soon as it was made, yet no action was taken by DSS. 17 Over the
course of the next fourteen months the child was seen repeatedly in hospital
emergency rooms for suspicious traumatic injuries. 18 On November 20, 1983,
the hospital filed a written child abuse report on Joshua, but DSS neither inter-
viewed the family nor observed the boy. 19 A Head Start worker, still trying to
enroll Joshua pursuant to the agreement, found the four-year-old alone at home
and phoned DSS three times without results. 20 The caseworker responsible for
Joshua visited the home only intermittently.2' She did not insist on seeing
Joshua on those rare occasions when she visited the home, and she accepted his
father's excuses for why he could not be interviewed. 22 Even after one visit in
which she saw Joshua and observed cigarette burns on him, the caseworker did
nothing to protect the child. 23 The worker, however, repeatedly documented in
her casefile her continuing belief that Joshua was in danger, that she did not
believe the excuses proffered by the adults for the frequent injuries to Joshua,
9. Id.; see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)1.
10. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
11. Id.
12. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (West 1987).
13. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 4-5.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id.




22. Id. at 7.
23. Id.
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and that she was extremely worried about him.24
Finally, on March 8, 1984, Joshua was taken to the hospital where emer-
gency surgery saved his life but could not reverse the effects of longstanding
trauma to the brain. 25 He lost nearly half the tissue in his brain and is now
substantially paralyzed, profoundly and permanently retarded, and brain dam-
aged. During this whole period the caseworker knew the natural mother's Wyo-
ming address but did not contact her until it seemed that the child was dying.
When Melody DeShaney arrived to see her son, the caseworker told her, "I just
knew the phone would ring some day and Joshua would be dead. '" 26
Notwithstanding the compelling factual allegations, the United States
Supreme Court held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services 27 that the state of Wisconsin's failure to protect four-year-old Joshua
DeShaney from his father's serious and continuing abuse did not violate the
child's substantive due process rights.2 8 The Court therefore affirmed the trial
court's summary dismissal of Joshua's lawsuit.29 The DeShaney majority con-
sciously resisted any impulse of'sympathy evoked by the little boy's plight.30
Instead, they insisted that there was an insurmountable obstacle to recognizing a
constitutional violation based on the state's unwillingness or inability to take
action to protect the child.3 1 The DeShaney majority adopted a highly "for-
mal" 32 constitutional analysis and confined the state's duty to protect individu-
als to "certain limited circumstances."' 33 The Court held that a constitutional
duty to assume some responsibility for a person's safety and well-being arose
only when the state held someone in custody against that person's will.3 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained the rationale for this restriction:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and
24. Id. 6-7.
25. Id. at 7-8.
26. Id. at 8.
27. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
28. Id. at 1001. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dis-
missed the lawsuit on defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). In this posture, disputed facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam),
29. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002. Joshua and his mother filed suit under section 1983. Section
1983 provides a civil cause of action against those who violate federal rights while acting under color
of state law:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
30. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007; id. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1007.
32. Id. at 1012 (Blackmun, f., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1004-05.
34. Id. at 1005.
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at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses
the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause. The affirmative duty to protect arises not
from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. In the substantive
due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-
which is the "deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the
Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests
against harms inflicted by other means. 35
In contrast to this narrow custodial exception, the Court declared that the
general rule was that the state has no obligation to provide its "citizens" mini-
mal levels of safety and security or to protect them from the violence of "private
actors."136 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, therefore, portrayed the guaran-
tees of the due process clause as essentially negative: government must refrain
from inflicting harm itself through oppressive action, but the framers allegedly
left the decision to step in and protect citizens from the violence of others solely
up to the "democratic political processes." '37
In DeShaney the Court decreed that the state did not violate the Constitu-
tion even if it wholly and arbitrarily38 denied helpless children protection from
the violence of their parents. Little more than a month earlier, however, a unan-
imous Court acknowledged in a different context that the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, 39 the predecessor to the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was a rem-
edy "against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law."'4 The "paradigmatic section 1983 claim in
1871," Justice Marshall wrote, "involved a victim of violence or harassment who
sued state officials for failing to prevent the harm."'4 1 It would seem, therefore,
that there is nothing in the civil rights statute itself, nor in the fourteenth amend-
ment, which it was designed to enforce,4 2 that necessarily bars the cause of ac-
35. Id. at 1005-06 (citations and footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 1003.
37. Id.
38. Because the DeShaney case was dismissed by the trial court on a motion for summary
judgment, no conclusion was reached about the merits of the lawsuit. Id. at 1002. The dissent
argued that in this posture, Joshua and his mother would never get the chance to prove whether the
state's inaction was arbitrary and wholly irrational. Because the purpose of the due process clause
was "'to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,'" the three
dissenting Justices would have permitted the petitioners to proceed with their lawsuit. Id. at 1011
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
39. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 99, § 1, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
40. Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573, 581-82 & n.l1 (1989) (section 1983 action in a state with
more than one statute of limitations is governed by the residual or general personal injury statute of
limitations, rather than a statute of limitations for enumerated intentional torts) (citing Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961)).
41. Id.
42. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 grew out of an urgent message sent to Congress by Presi-
dent Grant requesting legislation to combat lawless conditions in some states that made life and
1990]
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tion that the DeShaney Court refused to recognize.
Judging by the attention given DeShaney in both specialized legal publica-
tions and the popular press, the case has touched a sensitive nerve in the current
debate over child abuse policies.43 DeShaney raises questions about our chang-
ing notions of the place of children in 'the family, the place of the family in
society, and the role of the state in the family. The decision also provides signifi-
cant insight into the current Court's philosophy of substantive due process and
into the shortcomings of its approach.
Part II of this Article discusses the background of liability for the state's
failure to protect children. It recounts the history of child protection in the
United States, from the anticruelty societies of the 1870s through the develop-
meit of the child protection system now in place in every state. It also examines
the genesis and development of the pre-DeShaney lower court cases that had
derived a constitutional duty to protect children from the "special relationship"
created by state child protection laws and from the particular facts and circum-
stances that gave the state notice of the danger to the specific child at risk.
Part III analyzes the DeShaney decision and its due process methodology.
In DeShaney the Court firmly repudiated the earlier emphasis on special rela-
tionships and instead adopted a bright line based solely upon "custody." 44 That
property insecure due to the depredations of the Klan. Correction of these evils was, in President
Grant's words, "beyond the control of State authorities," and he therefore invoked the federal
power. 1 J. COOK & J. SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS AcTiONS 1.27 (1989); see Oren, Itninunity and
Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 935, 939 n.18
(1989).
43. E.g., Reidinger, Why Did No One Protect This Child?, 74 A.B.A.J., Dec. 1988, at 48; For the
Record: Constitutional Physics, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, at BI 1, col. 5 [hereinafter Constitutional
Physics] (excerpt from 43rd Annual Cardozo lecture at the City Bar Association in New York by
Laurence Tribe, who discussed DeShaney in the context of the "still-reigning paradigm of constitu-
tional law," which ignores the pervasive relationship between subject, the state, and object, the citi-
zen); High CourtShields States in Abuse Suits, Houston Post, Feb. 23, 1989, at A23, col. 5; Court
Says State Intervention in Child Abuse Isn't Mandated, N.Y. Times, Feb, 23, 1989, at I, col. 2; High
Court Ruling on Child Abuse Rejects Liability of Local Officials, Wall Street J., Feb. 23, 1989, at B8,
col. 1; Glaberson, Determined to Be Heard: Four Americans and Their Journeys to the Supreme
Court, N.Y. Times, October 2, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 32; Nightline: Child Abuse (ABC television
broadcast, May 9, 1988).
44. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006. At the same time that the Court affirmed the DeShaney
dismissal, it also denied certiorari to Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F,2d 791 (11th Cir.
1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989), a case in which the Eleventh Circuit reinstated
a section 1983 suit against Georgia protective services personnel and agencies for placing a child in a
foster home where the two-year-old was so badly abused by her foster mother that she was rendered
permanently comatose. See id. at 800. Although the denial of certiorari itself may not be meaning-
ful, the Court had held the Taylor petition for an unusually long time before rejecting it. In Taylor
the Eleventh Circuit also emphasized the element of "custody" in its decision, holding that a child
involuntarily placed in a foster home is in an analogous position to a prisoner in a penal institution
and a child confined in a mental health facility. Id. at 795-97.
In conjunction with the dismissal of DeShaney, the disposition of Taylor, therefore, leaves un-
clear under what circumstances the state's failure to protect a child might give rise to a constitutional
cause of action. The question whether foster care placement is the kind of "custody" upon which
the DeShaney Court grounded its bright line, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
More recently, the Court denied certiorari to a Fourth Circuit decision denying section 1983
liability for abuse by foster parents when the child was "voluntarily" placed in the foster home
pursuant to a contract between the parents and a Maryland social services department. Milburn ex
rel. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
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approach followed from the Court's due process methodology: Chief Justice
Rehnquist founded his conclusion about child protection in particular on an
abstract syllogism about governmental protective services in general. Part III of
the Article reexamines that logical syllogism and assesses the Chief Justice's em-
brace of an abstraction.
Part IV places DeShaney back into the specific context of family violence
and child protection from which the Court has abstracted it. It considers the
significance for a due process analysis of the state's differential treatment of chil-
dren, with its policy of decriminalization of child abuse and its model of thera-
peutic prevention. Insights garnered from feminist scholarship and from the
domestic violence movement, and from study of the history and practice of child
protection teach us why the Court was wrong, and why a due process right was
at stake in DeShaney.
Part IV also examines the razor's edge dilemma of child protective workers
who, if DeShaney were to be rejected, arguably would be precariously balanced
between the threat of constitutional liability for intervening too vigorously in an
abusive family, and liability for acting too slowly and failing to protect. This
section suggests a solution to the razor's edge predicament. In the Conclusion,
the Article addresses policy concerns raised by child protection professionals
who fear additional liability.
II. LIABILITY FOR THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PROTECT CHILDREN:
BACKGROUND
A. History of Child Protection
Child abuse, along with other forms of family violence, is not a new social
phenomenon. The American perception of the problem and our response to it,
however, has a history that only recently has become the subject of serious
scholarly attention.45 In her study of the history of family violence from colo-
nial times to the present, Elizabeth Pleck found that the contemporary concern
with family violence was predated by two earlier reform periods in American
history.46 Between 1640 and 1680 the Puritans of colonial Massachusetts en-
acted the first laws "anywhere in the world" regulating wife beating and " 'un-
natural severity'" to children; between 1874 and 1890 there was another period
of interest in family violence, marked by the establishment of societies for the
prevention of cruelty to children (SPCCs).47
Historian Linda Gordon studied the Massachusetts SPCC, one of the earli-
45. See, e.g, L. GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE; BOSTON 1880-1960 (1988); E. PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF
SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1987); cf.
G. BEHLMER, CHILD ABUSE AND MORAL REFORM IN ENGLAND, 1870-1908 (1982) (English re-
sponse to child abuse). Earlier American studies focused on the invention of juvenile delinquency
and juvenile courts. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
(1977); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
46. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 3-4.
47. Id. at 4.
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est and most influential of the anticruelty societies. 48 She found that child abuse
was "discovered" as a social problem in the 1870s, and by the end of the decade
there were thirty-four SPCCs in the United States and fifteen elsewhere in the
world.49 The Boston anticruelty society began as the work of upper-class white
Protestant charitable elites who were concerned about social control of the
Catholic, ethnic, and immigrant working-class families in urban Boston.50
Child protection grew out of more general child-saving charitable activity earlier
in the century and out of women's reform and philanthropic energy, influenced
by the nineteenth century feminist interpretation of social ills.51 "The Cruelty,"
as it was called by its working-class clientele, at first aggressively searched the
streets seeking abuses to correct, but very soon acted mostly in response to com-
plaints, chiefly from family members.52 The Society obtained legislative authori-
zation to initiate prosecutions and to remove children temporarily, pending
action by the courts. 53 The SPCCs' legislative influence, however, waned after
the first decade of rapid takeoff.54
During the Progressive Era, around 1900 to 1920, child protection work
became professionalized and integrated into the developing social work profes-
sion and the new field called "child welfare." 55 In this period, which also saw
the establishment of special juvenile courts throughout the United States, 56 the
reformers' emphasis became child "neglect" rather than "maltreatment," and
they began to preach a preventive rather than punitive set of solutions.57
Gordon argues that this Progressive transformation developed principles and
practices that still form the basic system of state regulation of child raising in
place today.58 After the 1920s child protection lost its influential place in the
child welfare establishment, partly, Gordon argues, because of the decline of
feminism with its scrutiny of family relations.5 9 By the 1930s psychoanalytic
theory with its sexual understanding of family violence affected the way perpe-
trators were treated, and the psychiatric model of "treatment" became increas-
ingly more important. 60
Child abuse was rediscovered as a significant social problem in the 1960s,
through the "pediatric awakening."'6' The medical discovery of child abuse was
initiated by pediatric radiologists studying x-rays of children who suffered frac-
tures or blows to the skull.62 Dr. C. Henry Kempe presented the findings of his
48. L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 12.
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 28-29.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 37-38.
53. Id. at 50-51.
54. Id. at 63.
55. Id. at 60-61.
56. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 126.
57. Id. at 126-30; L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 60-61, 69-77.
58. L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 60.
59. Id. at 79-80.
60. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 146-56.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id. at 166.
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pediatric colleagues to a conference of the United States Children's Bureau in
1962, and his landmark article on "The Battered-Child Syndrome" later ap-
peared in the prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association. 63 Pub-
lic response, both professional and lay, was immediate, and by 1965 ninety
percent of adults in a national survey had heard of the problem of child abuse.64
The legislative response was similarly swift. The first models for mandatory
child abuse reporting laws were issued in 1963 and 1965 and, through the work
of the Children's Bureau and the American Humane Society, were taken up
rapidly by state legislatures.65 The last two decades have seen an enormous
growth in the number of cases of child abuse reported. In 1963 150,000 children
were the subject of reports of suspected abuse or neglect.66 By 1972 an esti-
mated 610,000 children were reported a year; and by 1979, 1.1 million. 67
In the nearly three decades since the pediatric reawakening, the new infor-
mation and the renewed legislative sensitivity to the problem of child abuse have
produced a complex state system of child protection. The interjection of federal
funding legislation, beginning with the 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment Act,68 helped to spur the enormous expansion of programs to prevent
child abuse and neglect.69 The expansion initially meant a substantial rise in the
63. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemuller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J.
A.M.A. 17 (1962).
64. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 167-68.
65. See Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 710-12
(1966).
66. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, 17
FAM. L.Q. 151, 151, 154 (1983).
67. Id. at 154. It is difficult to evaluate this figure. Douglas Besharov, first director of the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, feels that there is both substantial underreporting of
abuse, and, at the same time, overreporting of incidents which are later determined to be "un-
founded." The figure, of course, includes reports of neglect as well as abuse. Id. at 161-63.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
69. The federal statute established the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect within the
Children's Bureau. Id. § 5101. It provided federal assistance and grants to public and private orga-
nizations and to the states for the identification, prevention, and treatment of child abuse and ne-
glect, and required states seeking funding to comply with various conditions, for example, the
establishment of a confidential reporting system and the instigation of prompt investigation of re-
ports. Id. §§ 5101-5106. Subsequent amendments extended the federal program to cover sexual
abuse of children, and added other provisions. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and
Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-266, 92 Stat. 205 (1978) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5111-5113, 5115 (1982)). The Family Violence Prevention and Services program was first
enacted in 1984. See Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106, 5111-5113, 5115, 10401-10412) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The
1988 amendment for the first time included a provision of grants for the investigation and prosecu-
tion of child abuse cases. Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1988, 102
Stat. 102 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106(c) (West Supp. 1989)).
Between 1960 and 1980 federal funding for child protection services went up from a few million
to $325 million annually. Besharov, Protecting Abused and Neglected Children: Can Law Help So-
cial Work?, in MALPRACTICE AND LIABILITY IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 31 (1984). Funding
and staffing for child protection programs, however, have not kept pace with the ambitious state
child protection structures erected in every state, or with the rising numbers of reported cases. See
Besharov, supra note 66, at 163-64; see also Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of
the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEo. L.J. 1745, 1767-68 (1987) (discussing the relationship between
insufficient resources and failures in child protective services); Horowitz, Improving the Legal Bases
in Child Protection Work-Let the Worker Beware, in MALPRACTICE AND LIABILITY IN CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES 25 (1984) (describing centers for reporting child abuse where therapy, not
punishment, is the ultimate goal).
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number of children placed in foster care. In recent years, however, there has
been more emphasis on providing services while leaving the child in the home, in
the wake of mounting criticism of the effects of the "limbo" of long-term foster
care.
70
The modem approach to child abuse is characterized by an effort to avoid
criminal prosecution in favor of treatment for the family, preferably with the
voluntary cooperation of the parents, including the abuser. 71 Douglas Besharov,
an attorney who was the first director of the National Center on Child Abuse
and Neglect, aptly describes the current approach:
As a society, we have adopted a predominantly therapeutic-or, in the
vernacular, a "social work" response to the problems of child abuse
and child neglect. Almost all reports of suspected child maltreatment
are made to child protective agencies. Even in states where the law
still permits reporting to the police, most reports are made to these
specialized agencies. (If the police receive a report, they usually for-
ward it to the child protective agency. In rare situations, they perform
a parallel or joint investigation with the child protective agency.) 72
At the same time, the therapeutic process works within a framework of the legal
power to coerce parental cooperation. 73 We have developed an elaborate system
of child protection over the last twenty-five years. All states have laws that
funnel abuse reports to specialized social service agencies that have very specific
mandatory duties of oversight and protection for children at risk. The philoso-
phy behind the operation of this program is a therapeutic one that emphasizes
family autonomy and integrity.74 Parents are primarily responsible for the pro-
tection of their children. 75 Children at risk because of parental behavior are
treated differently from other citizens in need of protection.76 Their fate is not
in the hands of the police; they are to be protected instead by specialized state
agents in child welfare agencies. State intervention inevitably treads on politi-
cally sensitive ground because it raises issues about the appropriate relationship
70. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), amended the Social Security Act
and changed the structure of financial incentives in order "to lessen the emphasis on foster care
placement and to encourage greater efforts to find permanent homes for children either by making it
possible for them to return to their own families or by placing them in adoptive homes." S. REP.
No. 96-336, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1448, 1450. As a result of this
and other changes inspired by a new philosophy of minimum intervention, the number of children in
foster care declined substantially between 1977 and 1982. Garrison, supra note 69, at 1760. The
result is that more children at risk remained in their own homes instead of being placed in foster
care. In the absence of sufficient alternative services, this may have increased the dangers for chil-
dren who were not in the legal custody of the agency. Id. at 1760-61. The 1980 Act provided federal
grants for foster care and required the development of a case reView system for each child in the
state's foster program. S. REP. No. 96-336, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS at
1451-53; see also E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 178-79.
71. See, e.g., D. BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER: LIABILITY FOR SERVING
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 51 (1985).
72. Id. at 76.
73. Id. at 77. Child welfare work, however, has been criticized for not living up in practice to
the therapeutic ideal of reuniting families. Garrison, supra note 69, at 1757.
74. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
75. D. BESHAROV, supra note 71, at 77.
76. See infra notes 354-62 and accompanying text.
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of family and state, and about conflict within a family that may otherwise be
viewed as a single unit.77 The construction of the elaborate child protection
structure out of state and federal law also necessarily provoked questions about
the circumstances in which government officials will be held responsible for fail-
ing to perform the new protective duties.
B. Estelle, Martinez and Youngber" The Basis of Federal Liability
As the statutory child protection structure grew, state78 and federal 79
courts grappled with liability questions that arose out of alleged state failures to
perform the new duties. The doctrinal development that led to DeShaney, how-
ever, is based on something other than the common law of tort. Rather, the
question is whether the duty to protect children created by the statutory scheme
also implicates constitutional rights. How does the state's failure to act to pro-
tect a child deprive the infant of protected liberties and violate the Constitution
of the United States? Before the recent DeShaney decision, the answer had been
suggested by three Supreme Court cases that did not concern abused children
directly, but upon which the lower federal courts had built their child protection
rulings. In 1976 the Court held in Estelle v. Gamble80 that an inmate's eighth
amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment could be violated
by the state's failure to act when government agents were consciously indifferent
to the serious medical needs of the prisoner.8 1 In 1980 the Court seemed to
acknowledge in dicta in Martinez v. California 82 that persons harmed by a re-
leased felon might be able to complain of the state's failure to warn or protect
them if a special relationship could be shown between the victim and the gov-
ernment and the problems of proximate cause could be overcome. 83 Finally,
Youngberg v. Romeo,8 4 decided in 1982, recognized a constitutional claim by an
involuntarily confined man with a mental age of an eighteen-month-old child to
safety and protection from assaults by other mental patients.8 5 These cases en-
couraged lower federal courts to conclude that the state's failure to protect chil-
dren through inaction could violate constitutional guarantees;86 ironically, they
77. See infra notes 403-14 & 455-56 and accompanying texts.
78. See, eg., Hanson v. Rowe, 18 Ariz. App. 131, 133-35, 500 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1972); Elton v.
County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 1056-59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27, 29-31 (1970); Florida First Nat'l
Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19, 21, 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Vonner v. State, 273
So. 2d 252, 255-57 (La. 1973); Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 71-74, 251 N.W. 866, 870-71
(1977).
79. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey ex reL Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506-07 (3d Cir.
1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 192-94 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985);
Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 786-88 (2d Cir.) (Doe 1), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 864 (1983); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141-46 (2d Cir.
1981) (Doe 1).
80. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
81. Id. at 106.
82. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
83. See id. at 285.
84. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
85. Id. at 309, 315-16.
86. See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1981)
(Doe I); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 787-91 (2d Cir. 1983) (Doe II)
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were also used by the Court in DeShaney to draw a bright line based on
custody.87
Although there were earlier cases in which the state's failure to protect the
plaintiff from the violence of others formed the basis for constitutional tort lia-
bility,88 the child protection cases drew more directly on the rationale of the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Estelle.8 9 In that case, a Texas Department of
Corrections inmate sued various prison officials, alleging that they had subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth (and fourteenth)
amendments by failing to provide him with adequate medical care for injuries he
sustained while performing a prison work assignment.90 Although conceding
that the primary concern of the drafters may have been to proscribe torture and
other barbarous methods of punishment, the Court found that the scope of the
eighth amendment was broad enough to prohibit other punishments that were
incompatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society." 91 These evolving standards, the Court concluded, could be
violated by omission as well as commission. As the common law and modern
statutes have recognized, inmates who are deprived of their liberty cannot care
for themselves and must rely on prison authorities who have an obligation to
care for them.92 The Estelle Court found that a failure to fulfill that affirmative
obligation, through "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prison-
ers," constitutes the kind of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" that is
prohibited by the eighth amendment. 93 The constitutional violation was not
simply medical malpractice committed against a victim who happened to be an
inmate. 94 In order to state an eighth amendment claim, the prisoner had to
allege omissions that were "sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indiffer-
ence to serious medical needs." '95
Following Estelle, dictum in another case further contributed to an emerg-
(Youngberg v. Romeo does not change result in Doe 1), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Jensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 192-94 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Estate of Bailey ex
rel. Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509-10 (3d Cir. 1985) (relying in turn on Doe I & Jensen).
87. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
88. See, eg., Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943) (deputy sheriff could
be prosecuted under the civil rights statute for his failure to stop the detention and mistreatment of
Jehovah's Witnesses by a mob); see infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
89. See Jensen, 747 F.2d at 190; Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 141. For a discussion of the development of
the special relationship doctrine, see Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 926-
27 (8th Cir. 1987).
90. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98, 101 (1976).
91. Id. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S 86, 101 (1958)).
92. Id. at 103-04.
93. Id. at 104.
94. Id. at 106.
95. Id. After Estelle, lower courts concluded that the eighth amendment proscription of cruel
and unusual punishment applies when prison officials unreasonably fail to protect inmates from
violence at the hands of other prisoners, or even from suicide by their own hand. E.g., Stokes v.
Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1125 (5th Cir. 1983) (jail administration created risk of harm of as-
saults). The Supreme Court approved that eighth amendment development in DeShaney, See
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005 & n.5; Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: Constitutional Protection
from Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 101, 109-34 (1985-86); Note, Defining the Scope of Due
Process Right to Protection: The Fourth Circuit Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith Immunity, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 940, n.83 (1985); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982)
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ing doctrine of affirmative government duties to protect certain individuals
under special circumstances. Plaintiffs in Martinez brought suit against Califor-
nia parole board officials who released a man with a violent criminal history,
who had been committed to a state mental hospital as a mentally disordered sex
offender not amenable to treatment, and who thereafter was sentenced to a term
of imprisonment with a recommendation that he not be paroled. 96 Five months
after release, the parolee tortured and killed a fifteen-year-old girl. The four-
teenth amendment, the Court held, protected the victim's life only from "depri-
vation" by the state.97 Even if the parole board had a duty to avoid harm to the
victim, or if it could be shown that the parole decision proximately caused her
death, the Court ruled that there was no state action involved. 98 Her life was
taken by the parolee, some five months after the release, and he was not an agent
of the parole board in any way. Moreover, the parole board was not aware that
this particular girl, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special
danger.99 In dictum that was to become important for the future development
of the child protection cases, the Court went on to say that it was not deciding
that a parole officer could never be held liable for a decision which resulted in
loss of a life, but was concluding only that under these circumstances the vic-
tim's death was too remote a consequence of the parole officers' actions to trig-
ger civil rights liability. 100
In Youngberg v. Romeo 10 ' the Court addressed the substantive rights of
involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 10 2 The profoundly retarded plaintiff was committed to Pennhurst State
School and Hospital where he suffered many injuries, inflicted both by his own
uncontrolled violence and by the actions of other inmates. 10 3 The Court un-
equivocally held that "[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted
criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the invol-
untarily committed-who may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions." 104
In other words, the Court recognized Romeo's "historic liberty interest" in
safety and personal security, which is protected substantively by the due process
(rationale extended beyond the prison setting to hold that substantive due process requires the state
to provide involuntarily committed mental patients protection from themselves and others).
96. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 279 (1980).
97. Id. at 284-85.
98. Id. at 285.
99. Id.
100. Id. In its child protection case, the Fourth Circuit's gloss on Martinez was that the decision
rested on the narrow grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish proximate cause, but that it left
open the issue of whether the murdered girl had a constitutional right to protection under the four-
teenth amendment. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194 (4th Cir. 1984) (abused children have
fourteenth amendment right to protection by the state if a "special relationship" exists between them
and the state).
Martinez also held that the sovereign immunity statute of the state of California, which denied
all remedy to anyone injured by acts of the parole board, did not thereby deprive the plaintiffs of any
liberty or property interest. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 283.
101. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
102. Id. at 314.
103. Id. at 309-10.
104. Id. at 315-16.
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clause.' 0 5 In determining whether this right had been violated, however, the
Court ruled that liability should not be based on the eighth amendment's delib-
erate indifference standard as articulated in Estelle.10 6 Involuntary mental pa-
tients, the Youngberg Court held, "are entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement
are designed to punish."' 1 7 The appropriate standard, however, must also bal-
ance the relevant state interests, 10 8 not unduly burden the operation of a state
institution like Pennhurst, and show the proper deference to the judgment exer-
cised by the qualified professionals in charge.10 9 Consequently, the state should
not have to show a compelling or substantial necessity to justify conditions of
less than absolute safety. Rather, professional judgment enjoys presumptive va-
lidity, and liability follows only when the decision is such a "substantial depar-
ture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment." 110
C. The Child Protection Cases Before DeShaney
Estelle, Martinez, and Youngberg suggested that under the right circum-
stances the state has an affirmative obligation to protect a child and that its
failure to do so may deprive that child of a liberty interest in safety and personal
security in violation of the fourteenth amendment. This theory was developed in
two opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deal-
ing with a foster child,"' and in decisions of the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fourth and Third Circuits in cases concerning children not
currently in state custody." 12
The Second Circuit cases, both styled Doe v. New York City Department of
Social Services (Doe 1113 and Doe 11114), concerned Anna Doe, who was placed
into foster care at the age of two along with her sister, in legal custody of the
105. Id. at 315. Although the Court asserted that as a general matter a state has no constitu-
tional duty to provide substantive services to persons within it and cautiously took no position on
any general right to treatment, it did agree that Romeo had a protected interest in receiving enough
training so that he could be kept safe and free from undue restraint. Id. at 318-19.
106. Id. at 312 n.11.
107. Id. at 321-22.
108. Id. at 321.
109. Id. at 322.
110. Id. at 323.
111. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (Doe 1); Doe
v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 786-77 (2d Cir.) (Doe H1) (sustaining foster
child's 1983 action against the agency that failed to supervise placement with a foster father who
sexually abused her over a period of years), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
112. Estate of Bailey ex reL Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510 (3d Cir. 1985) (com-
plaint that alleges agency returned abused child to mother without adequately investigating whether
abusive boyfriend had gone from the home states a civil rights claim); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d
185, 194 (4th Cir. 1984) (state and county officials entitled to good faith immunity in suit by repre-
sentatives of children who died after brutal beatings by their guardians because, at the time of the
beatings, right to affirmative protection not yet clearly established).
113. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (Doe 1).
114. Doe v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.) (Doe 11), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 864 (1983).
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New York City Commissioner of Welfare and under the supervision of their
agents, the Catholic Home Bureau.' 15 She remained for more than thirteen
years in the foster home, where from the age of about ten she was regularly and
frequently beaten and sexually abused by her foster father. 116 Over the years the
agency's supervisory visits fell off and they failed to discover the longstanding
abuse. The foster father was allowed to resist agency supervision and the agency
did not act on a number of warning signals. 117 Even after their own psychiatric
expert reported a finding of sexual abuse, the only action the agency took was to
require the doctor to delete those references from her report." 8 As further evi-
dence of the abuse piled up, the agency continued to drag its feet, even omitting
from required annual reports all information about the suspected problem.
119
Drawing on Estelle, the Doe I court concluded that government officials
might violate the Constitution by failing to do what was required of them as well
as by engaging in overt unlawful and harmful activity. 120 Estelle demonstrated
to the Second Circuit panel that government is "sometimes" charged by the
Constitution with affirmative duties to those in its custody or under its care.'
21
That conclusion answered the constitutional question, but the Second Circuit
also addressed a causation issue that arose out of the statutory requirements of
the Civil Rights Act, section 1983.122 The civil rights statute itself does not
create any substantive rights; 123 rather it provides a civil remedy for depriva-
tions of federal rights that arise from the Constitution or from certain federal
statutes.' 24 In order to prevail, a plaintiff must satisfy both the elements of the
115. Doe I, 649 F.2d at 137.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 138.
118. Id. at 139.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 141.
121. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
123. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986); West v. Town of Bristol, 712 F. Supp. 269,
274 (D.R.I. 1989).
124. Several child protection cases also raised the claim that various federal statutes, most nota-
bly the 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), or other amendments to the Social Security
Act impose mandatory standards, such as case plan review for children in foster care, as a condition
of federal aid, see eg., L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 816 (1989).
If federal law creates a private right of action that Congress does not intend to be the exclusive
remedy, these statutory rights may also be enforced through section 1983. See Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987) (remedial devices in federal
housing statute not sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude a
section 1983 action); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1981) (comprehensive enforcement mechanisms in federal environmental laws preclude
enforcement directly under section 1983); Pennhurst St. School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
20 (1981) (remanded for consideration whether the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act creates a private right of action enforceable through section 1983); Maine v. Thibotout,
448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (violations of the Social Security Act are enforceable under the "and laws"
provision of section 1983). A number of child protection cases raise federal statutory claims. See,
e.g., Massinga, 838 F.2d at 120-22 (sustaining preliminary injunction and denial of immunity claim
in class action suit by foster children in Baltimore's federally funded foster care program who were
the victims of physical and sexual abuse and medical neglect); see also Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp.
325, 342-43 (D. Mass. 1982) (injunctive relief under 1983 Social Security Act provisions requiring
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underlying constitutional violation and the statutory elements of section
1983.125 Those statutory elements include causation, proof that the particular
defendant, such as the agency or the city in Doe I, has itself subjected or caused
someone to be subjected to a deprivation of rights. 126 In deference to the causa-
tion requirement of section 1983, the Doe I court required that the inaction actu-
ally must have caused the denial of rights.1 27 The omissions must be "a
substantial factor leading to the denial of the constitutionally protected liberty
or property interest." 128
The Doe I court also concluded that in order to satisfy the statutory ele-
ments of a section 1983 action against a child welfare agency in its supervisory
capacity, the agency's failure to act must be a result of a sufficiently culpable
mental state, that is, "deliberate indifference."' 129 Before Doe I, the Supreme
Court generally held that the civil rights statute did not incorporate the doctrine
of respondeat superior and did not impose any form of vicarious liability on ordi-
state welfare officials to provide children in foster care with service plans and periodic review of their
cases). But see Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 1987)
(Social Security Act does not create a private right of action for money damages or enforceable
rights).
125. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332; West, 712 F. Supp. at 274.
126. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1975); see Kritchevsky, Or Causes to Be Subjected:
The Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187 (1988).
127. The court relied on a general citation to Rizzo. In Rizzo the Court reversed a class action
against Philadelphia's mayor, police commissioner, and others, alleging a pervasive pattern of illegal
and unconstitutional police mistreatment of ininority citizens in particular and Philadelphia resi-
dents in general, which resulted in a broad-ranging district court order governing police procedure
for handling citizen complaints. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 369-70.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Rizzo, criticized the district court for, among
other errors, mistaking the kind of causation required for civil rights liability, and consequently for
any form of relief against the police department and the city itself. Id. at 370-71. Plaintiff class had
shown that a number of individual police officers who were not named as parties to the action
violated the constitutional rights of particular individuals. According to Justice Rehnquist, how-
ever, they had failed to establish any "affirmative link between the occurrence of the various inci-
dents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by [the mayor of Philadelphia, the
police commissioner, and others]--express or otherwise--showing their authorization or approval of
such misconduct." Id. at 371. Instead, the "sole causal connection" found by the District Court was
that unless the police disciplinary procedures changed, similar incidents were likely to recur affecting
other members of the plaintiff classes. Id. at 371. Justice Rehnquist found this to be an insufficient
basis to hold defendants responsible for any constitutional violations or to order them to change
police procedure in order to avoid further infringements of the rights of citizens of Philadelphia. Id.
at 373-77.
Justice Rehnquist also rejected the argument that mere official failure to act in the face of the
statistical pattern is the equivalent of the active policy approving or authorizing misconduct found
actionable in other cases. Id. at 376. Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the plain words of the
statute impose liability and authorize relief only for a defendant's conduct which "subjects, or causes
to be subjected" a plaintiff to a deprivation of a federal right. Id. at 370-71.
128. Doe , 649 F.2d at 141.
129. Id. This requirement is imposed as a matter of section 1983 law. By contrast, Estelle held
that the eighth amendment was not violated unless prison officials displayed the mental state of
deliberate indifference to known serious medical needs of the inmates. It is not surprising that the
eighth amendment claim, which is posited on the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, would incorporate this requirement. The value protected by the eighth amendment
proscription is the commitment of civilized societies to impose appropriate punishment for appropri-
ate penal purposes only. "Unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain for its own sake, however,
does not meet the evolving penal standards of a civilized community. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103 (1976). Thus, the mental state, the purpose that animates prison officials' acts or refusals to
act, lies at the heart of an eighth amendment claim.
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nary agency principles. 130 Governmental entities were liable only for the execu-
tion of their own policies and could not be held vicariously liable for the acts of
their employees; 131 supervisors were not individually liable for the misdeeds of
those that they supervise if they were not personally responsible for the conduct
in some way. 132 In order to establish the requisite direct responsibility, there-
fore, the Second Circuit applied a standard that held supervisors liable if they,
or, in the case of an agency, its "top supervisory personnel" 133 exhibited deliber-
ate indifference "to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty, and their
failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the risk or injury was a proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's deprivation of rights under the Constitution."
134
Evidence of specific statutory duties imposed by New York law was highly
relevant to the culpability of the agency's supervisory default.' 35 The Second
Circuit noted that the agency had a mandatory duty to report suspected child
abuse.136 Dereliction of this duty could be evidence of deliberate indifference on
the part of the agency-indifference either to the statutory duty to report (as-
suming that a report would have triggered an investigation and ended the
abuse), or as another instance of indifference to Anna's welfare in general. 137
The Second Circuit believed that the more specifically a statute or regulation
clearly mandates a particular action, the greater its value as evidence of deliber-
ate indifference. Whereas another failure to act may be fairly attributed to the
exercise of judgment on how best to handle the situation, nonfeasance of a man-
dated duty cannot be explained in that way.
138
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the Doe I case to be tried
again using the approved jury charge on supervisory liability; 139 the result in
130. Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at
371.
131. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95; Oren, supra note 42, at 987-90 (describing the unfortunate
results of this construction).
132. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95 (municipality); see also Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1220
(5th Cir. 1988) (supervisor); Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981) (supervisor).
The Supreme Court finally has held unequivocably that a city's failure to train its police force
adequately may give rise to a cause of action against the municipality itself for any constitutional
violations that are caused by that default. The plaintiff must prove, however, that the omission is the
product of the city's deliberate indifference to the need for police training. City of Canton v. Harris,
109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203-05 (1989).
133. Doe I, 649 F.2d at 145. This may no longer be good law. The Supreme Court recently held
that high-level supervisors do not automatically constitute final decisionmakers who make policy for
the municipality and whose actions, therefore, may bind the governmental entity. Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that as a matter of state law those high-level officials possess final policymaking author-
ity in the particular area which is the subject of the lawsuit. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108
S. Ct. 915, 924-26 (1988). For a discussion of the development of municipal liability-final authority
doctrine and of Praprotnik, see Oren, supra note 42, at 995-1000 & nn.245-65.
134. Doe I, 649 F.2d at 145. The Doe I court disapproved jury instructions that charged that
agency supervisors were not liable unless they actually knew of Anna's mistreatment and encouraged
or condoned it. Id. at 144.
135. Id.
136. Id. This is a feature displayed by all the modern child protection statutes. See supra note 5
and accompanying text.
137. Doe I, 649 F.2d at 146.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 144-46.
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Doe II was a large verdict that the district court refused to enter in judgment. 140
On the second appeal, the argument subtly shifted ground. Instead of centering
on the state of mind required to establish supervisory liability, the opinion ad-
dressed the separable issue of the state of mind required to prove the underlying
constitutional violation.' 41 In Doe I the Second Circuit required deliberate in-
difference in order to satisfy the statutory elements for supervisory liability, and
did not give much consideration to the state of mind element that the Supreme
Court imposed in Estelle as a matter of eighth amendment law. 142 In the in-
terim between the two appeals, however, the Supreme Court decided Youngberg
v. Romeo, 143 which the Doe I1 defendants claimed had altered the applicable
constitutional law. 144
In Doe I1 the Second Circuit denied that Youngberg changed the result.t 45
It treated Youngberg's test of "a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice or standards" as the equivalent of a gross negligence
standard.' 4 6 Conceding for the purposes of argument that the Youngberg test
applied outside of the institutional setting, the court of appeals nonetheless reaf-
firmed the validity of the jury's verdict. 147 Because the Supreme Court appar-
ently intended Youngberg to be a more generous standard than the deliberate
indifference that must be shown to prove an eighth amendment violation, the
Doe H jury instructions were, if anything, too strict. 148
In large part, the Doe opinions framed the terms of subsequent analysis of
constitutional liability for the failure to protect foster children that followed." 49
140. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 783 (2d Cir.) (Doe 11), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). On appeal for the second time, the Second Circuit again reversed and
remanded the case for reinstatement of the $225,000 jury verdict. Id. at 792.
141. The issues of the underlying constitutional cause of action and of statutory causation each
involve an independent state of mind inquiry. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)
(although section 1983 contains no general state of mind requirement, the fourteenth amendment
cannot be violated by merely negligent conduct).
142. In Doe 11 the Second Circuit said that the deliberate indifference standard stemmed from
Estelle. Doe I1, 709 F.2d at 790. In Doe I, however, the Second Circuit clearly relied instead on the
line of cases that considered what kind of action or inaction by supervisory officials justified impos-
ing individual liability upon them under the civil rights statute. See Doe I, 649 F.2d at 141-42 (citing
Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.) (Turpin II1), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); Turpin v.
Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (Turpin I1)).
143. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
144. Doe 11, 709 F.2d at 789-90. Defendants also claimed that Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981), decided after Doe I in 1981, had altered the applicable law. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44
(existence of adequate state remedy for negligent loss of prisoner's hobby kit meant he had received
all the process that was due and could not bring a section 1983 action). The Doe II court dismissed
that argument by pointing out that Parratt dealt with only the negligent loss of a prisoner's property.
Doe II, 709 F.2d at 790 n.8.
145. Doe II, 709 F.2d at 789-90.
146. Id. at 790.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. There was an earlier district court opinion, Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), that followed a somewhat different tack. A class of parents whose children alleg-
edly had been abused and neglected while in New York state foster homes argued that children in
the custody of the state had a constitutional right to at least humane custodial care. Id. at 795. In
effect, they were seeking to establish a variant of the "right to treatment" litigated with respect to
state treatment of institutionalized citizens.
In 1976 a federal court in Louisiana entered an elaborate order requiring appropriate treatment
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After 1983 it seemed clear that children could complain that their fourteenth
amendment rights were violated when the state failed to protect them from their
foster parents and the official inaction met the standard of deliberate indiffer-
ence. The more hotly litigated cases, however, concerned children who were not
legally in state custody. This raised the additional issue suggested by Martinez:
what kind of "special relationship" might justify extending fourteenth amend-
ment protection to a noncustodial infringement of the liberty interest in
safety? 150 Jensen v. Conrad 151 was one of the first of the noncustodial child
protection cases. In Jensen the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit confronted claims that the South Carolina Department of Social Services
and others had failed to intervene and protect the lives of Sylvia Brown, a seven-
month-old baby girl, and Michael Clark, a three-year-old toddler, two children
who died at the hands of their guardians. 152
The Brown baby first came to the attention of county social workers when
she was admitted to the hospital at the age of four months with a fractured skull.
A healing subdural hematoma was found by x-ray; hospital authorities actually
witnessed Mrs. Brown's boyfriend slapping the infant during a visit to the hospi-
tal. The hospital reported the case to the County Department of Social Services
and requested a child protection investigation. 153 As in all states, South Caro-
lina made such reporting mandatory.' 54 After their initial review of the case,
the Department apparently reached an agreement with the mother that required
her to live with the child at the grandmother's home, subject to "intensive fol-
low-up and in-home supervision."' 155 Mrs. Brown was warned that if she failed
to comply with the terms of this agreement, the baby would be placed in the
custody of the Department.15 6 In other words, although the child was not tech-
nically in the legal custody of the Department, that was true only by virtue of
the alternative plan for intensive supervision. The Department failed to super-
for Louisiana mentally retarded, physically handicapped, and delinquent children who had been
placed in out-of-state institutions (largely in Texas). Gary W. v. State, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La.
1976). The district court ruled that civil commitment of any person-restraint of liberty in an insti-
tution-can only be justified by a quidpro quo of rehabilitative treatment. When rehabilitation is not
possible, the district court required minimally adequate habilitation and care, beyond the subsis-
tence-level custodial care that would be provided in prison. Id. at 1216. Perhaps because of the
noninstitutional setting of most foster care, or because of the decision in Youngberg in 1982, this
analysis did not become central to the child protection cases. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982).
Youngberg involved two claims: an alleged right to safe conditions of confinement and a
broader right to treatment. The Supreme Court had no difficulty with the first one, derived from
Estelle, and found a right to safe conditions of confinement. Id. at 316. The Court was more reluc-
tant, on the other hand, to recognize any broad ranging right to treatment. The Court held that the
state was obligated to provide minimally adequate training that was sufficient to ensure Romeo's
safety and freedom from undue restraint. Id. at 319. It would not go beyond that, however, claim-
ing that the issue was not squarely presented by the case and its record. Id.
150. See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285.
151. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 187.
153. Id.
154. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
155. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 187-88.
156. Id. at 187.
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vise the family and carry out the terms of this agreement, however.1 -7 On their
only two visits to the house caseworkers found that the baby was living alone
with her mother, in violation of the agreement, but the Department took no
action. Within three months Sylvia was brought dead on arrival to the hospital.
An autopsy revealed that brain hemorrhaging had occurred three times in the
previous three weeks, the last only minutes before the child died.I58 The Fourth
Circuit denied any recovery for the Department's failure to protect baby Sylvia,
on the ground that the defendant officials enjoyed qualified immunity.15 9
The story of the life and death of Sylvia Brown contains many features
typical of other child protection cases. It demonstrates that in child protection
work the line between legal custody and noncustodial supervision by the agency
can be very artificial. The Department's supervisory agreement with Mrs.
Brown reflects prevailing policy in the treatment of child abuse and is typical of
a predominantly therapeutic response that emphasizes treatment and the preser-
vation of the family. 60 Use of such an agreement also is consonant with the
trend to avoid foster care placement whenever possible. 16 1 The Brown facts also
demonstrate the existence of the iron fist beneath the velvet glove. In the final
analysis, the Department's authority to provide social work services is sanc-
tioned by the coercive power of the state to remove the child. 162 Finally, the
Brown case illustrates how assaults on children by their own families, unlike
other crimes against the-person, have been largely withdrawn from the criminal
justice system. Mrs. Brown was not criminally charged for the earlier injuries to
Sylvia. Criminal charges were brought against her only after the child died. 163
The story of three-year-old Michael Clark, the other child denied a remedy
in Jensen,164 is typical of child abuse cases in its own way. It is a compelling
157. Id. at 188.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 195. In section 1983 lawsuits individual defendants enjoy immunity from suit for
money damages whenever the constitutional law they have violated was not clearly established at the
time of their action. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Since the cases that the Fourth
Circuit found established a possible right to protection were decided after the Brown and Clark
children were injured in 1980, the defendants were immune. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 187. The Fourth
Circuit further held that the law as it affected these defendants was not clearly established in 1980
because there still were no specific guidelines about what constitutes a "special relationship," and
because of the "particularly 'close'" nature of the factual cases at issue. Id. at 195. The court did
not decide whether the state had in fact created a special relationship with the children under the
circumstances alleged in Jensen. Id.
160. See, ag., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-480 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (the purpose of the law is "to
safeguard the well-being and development of endangered children and to preserve and stabilize fam-
ily life, whenever appropriate."); D. BESHAROV, supra note 71, at 76 (as a society we have adopted a
predominantly therapeutic, or "social work" response to the problem of child abuse).
161. See, e.g., Besharov, supra note 66, at 160.
162. D. BESHAROV, supra note 71, at 77. The warning to Sylvia Brown's family that without a
voluntary agreement the department would take the baby into custody was issued despite a statutory
instruction that the protective agency should not threaten such action in order to coerce cooperation.
The Department was authorized to petition the family court for intervention if necessary. Jensen,
747 F.2d at 189 & n.5; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(i) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
163. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 188; see infra notes 359-62, 391-402 and accompanying texts for discus-
sion of the meaning of that withdrawal for the constitutional equal protection and due process analy-
sis of child protection cases.
164. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195.
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example of how a young child can fall through the cracks of the state's protec-
tion system and become a victim of the bureaucracy. The DSS first learned of
abuse in young Michael Clark's family through a report from his older brother's
school. 165 An interview with the school-age boy convinced an investigator that
a meeting with the mother was necessary, but after a number of unsuccessful
attempts to make contact the Department gave up.16 6 At the expiration of the
sixty-day investigatory period allotted in the statute, the agency classified the
Clark case as "unfounded" and officially closed the investigation.' 67 Shortly
thereafter, three-year-old Michael was beaten to death by his mother's boy-
friend. 168 The Department's decision to close out the Clark case as "un-
founded" even though it had reason to believe a child was at significant risk, is
not unusual. Staffing and budget shortages and legislatively mandated deadlines
for action lead to similar arbitrary action in other states too. 16 9 As in the Brown
case, the Clark facts also illustrate the special danger to very young children,
pre-school age, who are physically more vulnerable to abuse than older children,
and cannot help themselves or ask for outside help because they cannot commu-
nicate the problem and are isolated in the privacy of their parents' home. 170
Before 1980, when the Brown and Clark children were killed, the Fourth
Circuit had followed Estelle and decided a number of cases that imposed an
affirmative duty of care on government, but only in a prison setting where the
eighth amendment pertained and only when officials had acted with deliberate
indifference. 17 1 The Jensen court explained that the larger possibilities, which
went beyond incarceration, opened up only with the Supreme Court's refusal in
Martinez to rule out absolutely a cause of action grounded on a parole release.172
The circuit courts developed a theory of "special relationships" based upon the
1980 Martinez dictum. The circuits agreed that as a general rule there was no
affirmative duty on the part of government to protect people from criminals or
the insane. Some courts, however, qualified that proposition: the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit conceded that there might be a differ-
ent result when the state actively placed victims in danger from private persons
and then failed to protect them-when the government was "as much an active




169. See, e.g., Child Protective Services in Texas: Staff Report to the Senate Committee on Health
and Human Services 16 (Feb. 1989) (Texas Senate) (report on the system-wide problems in the State
of Texas) [hereinafter Texas Senate Committee Report].
170. For the significance of the age of the child victim, see Brief of the Massachusetts Committee
for Children and Youth at 9-10, DeShaney (No. 87-154) [hereinafter Massachusetts Committee
Briefi. But see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 14 (1984) [hereinafter AAPC TRENDS] (presents evi-
dence that there is a reporting bias such that abuse of younger children is more likely to be reported).
Between 1976 and 1982 the surveyors found that children 0-2 years old show the most neglect, the
least sexual and emotional maltreatment, and an average amount of physical injury. Id. at 22-23.
171. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 191 (citing Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1980)); Withers
v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980).
172. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 191-92.
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tortfeasor as if it had thrown [the victim] into a snakepit.'" The Fourth Cir-
cuit had gone even further and had recognized there could be a constitutional
right to protection based on the fourteenth amendment if the claim arose out of
"special custodial or other relationships created or assumed by the state in re-
spect of particular persons." 174
The Jensen court concluded from these appellate court cases that affirma-
tive governmental duties existed outside of the prison walls, but only when a
special relationship was invoked.1 75 It suggested several factors that would be
relevant to any special relationship analysis:
1) Whether the victim or the perpetrator was in legal custody at the
time of the incident, or had been in legal custody prior to the
incident. 176
2) Whether the state has expressly stated its desire to provide affirna-
tive protection to a particular class or specific individuals.177
3) Whether the State knew of the claimant's plight.178
The Jensen court's second and third factors address a concern that was charac-
teristic of state law cases that involved the failure to protect children. In Anglo-
American common law there was no private action available against otherwise
suable (not immune) government officials unless they breached a duty owed to a
particular party. 179 Although law enforcement personnel, for example, histori-
cally could be sued for a number of torts, at common law their duty to protect
was owed only to the public at large and therefore could not form the basis for
tort liability to any particular individual.180 In the 1970s some state courts
found that the new child protection statutes overcame this common-law prob-
lem because they imposed mandatory responsibilities to investigate and take ac-
tion on child abuse reports, thus creating a special duty owed to the child victim.
173. Id. at 192 (citing Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (murder victim had
no civil rights claim against the state mental hospital which released her murderer)).
174. Id. at 193. The Fourth Circuit followed the Bowers rationale in Fox v. Curtis, 712 F.2d 86
(4th Cir. 1983), another case in which a dangerous parolee was released and injured a citizen. Jen-
sen, 747 F.2d at 193 (citing Fox). In Fox the Fourth Circuit qualified the general rule. Id.
175. Id. at 194-95.
176. Id. at 194-95 n. 11. The court opined that the agency defendants were unaware that these
two children, as opposed to anyone else in the public at large, faced a special danger. The Fourth
Circuit suggested that this fact, combined with the lack of a past or present custodial relationship
between the state and the perpetrators, would weigh against finding that a special relationship ex-
isted if a court had to decide the issue squarely. Id.
177. Id. The court found that this factor did not clearly point in either direction in the Brown
and Clark cases. On the one hand, it seemed unlikely that the state intended to "single out" these
particular children and place them in its own care. Id. On the other hand, the preamble ofthe Child
Protection Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-480 (Law. Co-op. 1985), clearly expressed a desire to take
affirmative steps to locate and protect potentially abused children. Id.
178. Id. The court felt that this factor was more probative of a breach of the special relationship
than a definition ofthe relationship. It conceded, however, that this factor may illuminate the extent
to which the State intended to protect or watch over the particular children involved. The State
knew that these children were being beaten. This strengthened the argument that some sort of
special relationship had been established. Id.
179. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 379 (1880). For a fuller discussion of the common-law background of
public official liability and immunity, see Oren, supra note 42.
180. T. COOLEY, supra note 179, at 379.
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When the statute created duties and public officials had reason to know of the
danger to a particular child, some state courts recognized a cause of action for
failure to protect.t8 1 The last two Jensen criteria for a special relationship in
civil rights lawsuits merely reiterate this state tort law conclusion.
The first Jensen factor (whether the child was in the state's legal custody),
however, was the one on which DeShaney ultimately turned in the Supreme
Court, and is somewhat different in kind from the other two. It is more reminis-
cent of the concerns that animated Estelle's search for a constitutionally based
duty. Unfortunately, the circuit courts never really developed a theory that
went beyond the special relationship framework to explain just what makes a
specific duty that a government agent owed to children a constitutional duty as
well. This made it relatively easy for the Supreme Court in DeShaney to adhere
rigidly to a formally drawn line based on custody. An early and thoroughgoing
discussion of the custody test for affirmative government duties, in Jensen or
other lower court cases, might have revealed the shortcomings of that approach
before the Supreme Court decided DeShaney.182
The last significant child protection case decided by the courts of appeals
before DeShaney was Estate of Bailey ex rel. Oare v. County of York. 183 In Bai-
ley county child welfare officials investigated complaints by relatives that five-
year-old Aleta Bailey was being abused by her mother's live-in boyfriend. 184
Hospital physicians confirmed the abuse and advised that the child should not
be returned to her mother unless the boyfriend was denied access to her. The
welfare agency returned Aleta to her home on these conditions, but made no
effort thereafter to determine where or with whom she was living. Within a
month the girl died from physical injuries inflicted by her mother and the boy-
181. For instance, in Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App.
1975), cert. dismissed, 339 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1976), plaintiff children sued police for failing to protect
them from their father who beat and abused them after their mother was incarcerated for passing
bad checks. The court held that the Florida Supreme Court cases abrogating sovereign immunity
imposed liability on the government under the same circumstances that the acts of an agent would
trigger vicarious liability for a private employer, provided that the duty breached was a specific one
different from that owed to any other member of the public. Id. at 21. The special duty was created
here because the police, through the statute, undertook to aid the children, and the neighbors relied
on that undertaking in reporting the abuse, but the police either negligently performed or failed to
perform those duties, with the result that these specific children, as contrasted to the public in gen-
eral, were hurt. Id. at 26.
Similar reasoning led an Arizona appellate court in 1983 to uphold a $1 million wrongful death
verdict against the state of Arizona and its Department of Economic Security. Mammo v. State, 138
Ariz. 528, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). The court held that the specificity of the child
protection statute and the duties it spelled out were clearly designed for the protection of threatened
individuals, such that a special relationship existed between the state and the vulnerable child. Id. at
1351. But see Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (federal district court,
sitting in diversity, rejected a claim that Missouri law gave rise to a specific duty to 8-year-old girl
who was so seriously sexually abused by a man to whom her mother "sold" her, that she was killed).
182. Later in this Article, I explain how viewing the due process question in the full context of
child protection and state policy toward family violence provides a sounder basis for deriving consti-
tutional rights than any theory that turns on the existence of custody. See infra notes 281-434 and
accompanying text.
183. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit reinstated this case, which was based on the
county's failure to protect a child who had been returned to her mother's custody. Id. at 511.
184. Id. at 505. Because the lawsuit was dismissed at an early stage, all allegations of the com-
plaint must be taken as true. Id. at 506.
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friend.18 5 The federal district court that heard the Bailey case balked at ex-
tending the Doe framework to a child who was not in the legal custody of the
state: it dismissed young Aleta's claim that the state's failure to protect her from
abuse violated her constitutional rights. 186 Although the court of appeals re-
versed, its analysis also did not transcend the limits of special relationship think-
ing. It simply held that this particular case fell "on the other side of the line
suggested in Martinez."187
The Doe, Jensen, and Bailey cases together introduced most of the strands
of substantive due process analysis 188 that characterized the child protection
cases by the time that DeShaney came before the Supreme Court.1 89 Following
Estelle, Martinez, and Youngberg, many of the lower courts accepted the prem-
185. Id. at 505. The complaint also alleged that in disregard of the advice of the examining
physician, the county agency treated the boyfriend as part of the family unit and failed to invoke the
state's procedures for protective custody of abused children. Id. The Bailey case therefore suggests
how far the withdrawal of child abuse from the criminal justice system can go. Apparently even the
mother's boyfriend to some degree came under the umbrella of the therapeutic family treatment
approach to child abuse. Criminal charges were brought against him and Aleta's mother only after
the girl was dead. Id. at 505 n.1. This is another good example of how the line between custody and
non-custody is often blurred by placements back in the natural family, subject to fulfilling certain
conditions of safety for the child.
186. Id. at 509.
187. Id. at 511. Although the Bailey court did not go beyond special relationship thinking, it did
cite two examples in which courts found governmental entities owed a duty of protection to persons
who were not in custody, and these two cases ultimately are more helpful than the theory of special
relationships for deriving a constitutional duty to safeguard children at risk. Id. at 510; see White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1979) (children left alone in car on busy highway in
inclement weather may bring civil rights suit against police who arrested the person who was driving
the car, and then refused to protect the minors); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521,
1526-28 (D. Conn. 1984) (wife and son stated a civil rights cause of action against police department
that failed to protect them from assault by husband and father because domestic violence was in-
volved). See infra notes 383-90, 419-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases and an
alternative theory of substantive due process and child protection.
188. Procedural due process is the other significant constitutionally based claim in these cases.
In DeShaney the Court declined to decide whether Wisconsin child protection statutes gave Joshua
an entitlement to receive protective services in accordance with the statute, an entitlement that
would enjoy due process protection against state deprivation under the Court's decision in Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2. The Eleventh Circuit
found that the Georgia statutory foster care scheme created just such a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment. Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1337 (1989).
189. Before DeShaney, lower courts disagreed whether a special relationship existed when the
child was not in the legal custody of protective services, and sometimes were reluctant to find liabil-
ity even when the child was in foster care. See, e.g., Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs.,
820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987). In Harpole the department failed to protect an infant prone to breath-
ing difficulties. It released the child back into his mother's care, even after she had demonstrated her
inability to care for this child and for her other three children, two of whom died from Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome. Id. at 924. The Eighth Circuit, however, denied liability, finding this case
distinguishable from Doe because the child in Doe was in the legal custody of the state. Id. at 925.
The court, moreover, questioned whether "special relationships" may ever exist outside of the prison
context. Id. at 926-27.
For rejection of liability in a foster care setting, using atypical reasoning, see Atchley v. County
of Du Page, 638 F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. I11. 1986). Pursuant to a state court disposition adjudicating
the child a minor in need of supervision, she was placed in a licensed foster home, where she was
allegedly raped and made pregnant. The defendant county claimed that its only involvement with
the plaintiff was to make payments for foster care ordered by the state under the Juvenile Court Act,
and that in the absence of any custodial relationship, it had no duty to protect her. Id. at 1238. The
district court relied on the Seventh Circuit's special relationship decisions, and found none here
when the county lacked statutory duties for foster care placement or regulation. Id. at 1239.
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ise that the right circumstances may create an affirmative governmental duty to
protect children, which, in turn, triggers the protections of the due process
clause.' 90 In considering the claims of abused children, courts emphasized the
mandatory responsibilities to report and investigate child abuse that were im-
posed by state law beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. 19 1 The state's creation of a
comprehensive child protection system clearly influenced the courts' view of the
constitutional issue. The lower court decisions also raised issues about the req-
uisite state of mind and sometimes distinguished between custodial and noncus-
todial cases. 192 The pre-DeShaney opinions struggled with the contours of the
"special relationship" between the state and the child it failed to protect from
violence, that the courts assumed was necessary to establish a constitutional vio-
lation. The early decisions, however, failed to develop any alternate due process
analysis that might have survived better the DeShaney Court's rejection of the
special relationship doctrine.
III. DESHANEY AND THE SUPREME COURT'S DUE PROCESS METHOD
The DeShaney majority' 93 repudiated the special relationship line of
cases. 194 Justice Rehnquist's opinion finessed the thorny questions of substan-
tive due process methodology that so divided the Court in other rulings later in
the 1988 term 195 by embracing an apparently bright line based on custody. The
decision follows from an abstract and general constitutional due process theory
and is not responsive to the specific context of child protection.
196
190. E.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (1lth Cir. 1987) (deliberate indifference stan-
dard), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
191. E.g., Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1981) (Doe
I), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
192. See id. at 141.
193. Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined the opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1000.
194. Id. at 1004.
195. Eg., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) (biological father denied due process
right to challenge California's irrebuttable presumption of a husband's paternity) (Scalia, J., an-
nounced judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and, in all but
note 6, O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.; Stevens, J., concurred in the judgment only; Brennan, J., dis-
sented, in an opinion joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.; White, J., dissented, in an opinion
joined by Brennan, J.). The divisions in Michael H. concerned questions of due process methodol-
ogy. See id. at 2343-44 & n.6 (Scalia, J.), 2346 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part), 2347 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment), 2349-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 2361 (White, J., dissenting); see also,
e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv&, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (Court drastically changed course
on a woman's substantive due process right of privacy in abortion decision, but could not agree on a
coherent rationale for doing so) (Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with
respect to Part II-C, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-B, in which White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-D and III in
which White and Kennedy, JJ., joined; O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., filed opinions concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment; Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined; Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.).
196. Certiorari was granted in DeShaney, according to the majority, in order to resolve the gen-
eral question of "when, if ever, the failure of a state or local governmental entity or its agents to
provide an individual with adequate protective services constitutes a violation of the individual's due
process rights." DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002 (emphasis added) (citing Archie v. City of Racine, 847
F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989)). In Archie, the Seventh
Circuit held that there is no constitutional liability for failing to dispatch an ambulance and giving
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A. Special Relationships and Custody
In DeShaney the Court rejected the argument that certain "special relation-
ships" created or assumed by the state with respect to particular individuals
impose an affirmative constitutional duty on the states to protect citizens. The
fallacious logic, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, went like this:
[A] "special relationship" existed here because the State knew that
Joshua faced a special danger of abuse at his father's hands, and specif-
ically proclaimed, by word and by deed, its intention to protect him
against that danger. Having actually undertaken to protect Joshua
from this danger-which petitioners concede the State played no part
in creating197-- the State acquired an affirmative "duty," enforceable
through the Due Process Clause, to do so in a reasonably competent
fashion. Its failure to discharge that duty, so the argument goes, was
an abuse of governmental power that so "shocks the conscience" as to
constitute a substantive due process violation.1 98
improper medical advice to the family of a woman who died from a health emergency. Id. Artie,
with opinions by conservative judges Easterbrook and Posner, and two dissents, is a good illustration
of the equation of the DeShaney problem with the general one of a government's liability for failing
to provide efficacious protective services. Although Archie was grounded on quite different facts and
circumstances, concurring Judge Posner and dissenting Judges Cummings and Ripple nonetheless
assumed that the forthcoming Supreme Court decision in DeShaney would provide general guidance
on the Archie issues. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1226 (Posner, J., concurring); id. at 1227 (Cummings, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1227-28 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
The amici in DeShaney who supported the government defendants' position also assumed that
what was at stake was a general rule of liability under any circumstances in which the government
undertook to provide police, fire, or other rescue services, but did a bad job. Brief of the National
Association of Counties, Council of State Governments, U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, National League of Cities, and International City Management Associ-
ation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8-10, DeShaney (No. 87-154) [hereinafter
National Association of Counties Brief]; Brief of the States of New York, Connecticut, Maryland,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20, DeShaney
(No. 87-154) [hereinafter States Brief]; Brief Amicus Curiae of the National School Boards Associa-
tion in Support of Respondents at 3, DeShaney (No. 87-154) [hereinafter National School Boards
Association Brief]. The Supreme Court's second asserted reason for taking this case was its impor-
tance to the administration of state and local governments. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
For criticism of this approach, which wrenches due process jurisprudence out of the specific
context that gives it meaning, see infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
197. Contrary to this assertion, amicus Massachusetts Committee for Children and Youth did
argue that the state played a role in increasing the risk of harm to Joshua. They emphasized that
Wisconsin's child protective services preempted any other aid that otherwise might have been ex-
tended to Joshua, and increased his isolation and the risk of harm to the child. Massachusetts
Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 27-30.
198. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
Joshua and his mother argued that the special relationship created a protected liberty interest to
receive appropriate protection when the public official charged with that responsibility has actual
knowledge of the child and his plight and actually undertakes to protect him, and that this liberty
interest was both procedurally and substantively protected by the due process clause. Petitioners'
Brief, supra note 3, at 11. The procedural claim was not reviewed by the Court because it had not
been raised at any earlier stage of the litigation. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2.
The American Civil Liberties Union's amicus brief characterized the liberty interest at stake as
a right to personal security when the state has undertaken a specific responsibility to assure a specific
person's safety. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union Children's Rights Pro-
ject, the ACLU of Wisconsin, Legal Services for Children, the Juvenile Law Center, Bay Area Coali-
tion Against Child Abuse, and the National Woman Abuse Prevention Project in Support of
Petitioners at 9, DeShaney (No. 87-154) [hereinafter ACLU Brief]. The Massachusetts Committee
for Children and Youth proposed what they considered a narrow version of the special relationship
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Dictum in Martinez was the genesis of this mistaken notion.199 The Chief Jus-
tice noted that several courts of appeals read the language of the Martinez Court
that expressly reserved the question whether a parole officer could ever be
deemed to deprive someone of life through a parole release decision as implying
such a cause of action was possible.200 Those courts therefore concluded that
once the state learns that a third party poses a special danger to an identified
victim and indicates a willingness to protect the victim against that danger, a
special relationship arises, creating an affirmative duty, enforceable through the
due process clause, to give adequate protection. 20 1
Conceding that there were certain limited circumstances in which the Con-
stitution imposed affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to partic-
ular individuals,2 0 2 the Court found that those rulings were no help to
Joshua.20 3 Taken together, Estelle and Youngberg stood for a different proposi-
tion: "[W]hen the state takes a person into its custody and holds him there
against his will, the Constitution imposes ... a corresponding duty to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." 2 4 It is only because
the state first acts to restrain "an individual's liberty" and thus takes away his
ability to care for himself that any failure to provide for basic human needs,
including reasonable safety, "transgresses the substantive limits on state action
set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause": 205
The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge
of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to
act on his own behalf.2 0
6
The Supreme Court applied this gloss on Estelle and Youngberg to Joshua
DeShaney, a four-year-old child who never had any freedom to act on his own
behalf. Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the two cases were inapplicable here
because Joshua suffered injury while in the custody of his natural father rather
than the state:20 7
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced
in thefree world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do any-
thing to render him any more vulnerable to them. That the State once
took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for when
it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse posi-
tion than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all; the
State does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's
test which would reach only children and other incompetents who are known to be at serious risk of
physical harm. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 33-36.
199. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.4 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1004-05.
203. Id. at 1005.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1005-06.
206. Id. at 1006.
207. Id.
1990]
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safety by having once offered him shelter. Under these circumstances,
the State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua. 20 8
Custody thus became the all-important factor. Without ruling on the issue,
the Court conceded that there might be a different situation, more analogous to
Estelle and Youngberg, if the state "by the affirmative exercise of its power re-
moved Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home" run by state
agents.20 9 In the absence of the undefined condition of custody, typified by "in-
carceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint[s] of personal lib-
erty,"'2 10 however, any special relationship at best created a mere common-law
tort duty, not a constitutional violation.2t1
Joshua's plight may elicit a natural sympathy from judges, but this Court
did its best to resist yielding to the impulse,212 finding that there simply was no
abuse of government power associated with Joshua's predicament.213 Instead
the DeShaney Court characterized the state's actions as, at worst, doing nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them. 214 This
inaction could be defended, moreover, in light of the risk of constitutional liabil-
ity that state agents ran if they moved too soon to remove Joshua from his fa-
ther's custody, interfering with the parent-child relationship.215 Thus, the
majority offered an apparently simple test of constitutional liability for state in-
action. All that counts as a threshold issue is whether the state has first actively
deprived the presumably otherwise capable free actor of liberty by placing that
individual in its custody, however custody may be defined. Statutory responsi-
bilities, knowledge of the danger, and special relationships were irrelevant to the
Court's inquiry.
B. Due Process and "Protective Services" 2 16
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion disposed of Joshua's claim abstractly, as
a matter of a general theory of the Constitution and the due process clause in
particular. In its construction, the argument resembles a logical syllogism 2 17-
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 1006 n.9 (citing Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989)); Doe I, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981). After holding the certiorari
petition in Ledbetter for an unusually long time, the Supreme Court denied certiorari right after
issuing DeShaney. Ledbetter v. Taylor, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
210. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
211. Id. at 1006-07.
212. Id. at 1007.
213. Id. at 1003.
214. Id. at 1007.
215. Id. Judge Posner's Seventh Circuit opinion in this case advanced this argument as well.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109
S. Ct. 998 (1989). Judge Posner called it the "razor's edge." Id.; see infra notes 435-57 and accom-
panying text (Part III B) for a critique of this view.
216. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
217. Black's Law Dictionary defines a syllogism (in logic) as "the full logical form of a single
argument. It consists of three propositions (two premises and the conclusion), and these contain
three terms, of which the two occurring in the conclusion are brought together in the premises by
being referred to a common class." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (5th ed. 1979). Syllogism may
also be defined as "a deductive scheme of a formal argument consisting of a major and a minor
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albeit a faulty one. The major and minor premises and the deductive conclusion
of the argument may be restated as follows: (1) due process liberties generally
constitute negative limitations on the state's power to act rather than affirmative
guarantees of minimal levels of safety and security from "private" violence;2 18
(2) "governmental aid," even where such aid in the form of protective services
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property, is an affirmative guarantee
voluntarily provided by the state;2 19 (3) therefore, the "State's failure to protect
an individual [child] against private violence [by his father] simply does not con-
stitute a violation of the Due Process Clause."220 Examination of the Chief Jus-
tice's premises exposes some of the errors of his conclusion. In addition to its
faulty logic, however, the DeShaney opinion's language and imagery suggest
what was wrong with the Court's analysis. In DeShaney the Court embraced an
abstraction that has very little relevance to abused children and to little Joshua's
claim.
1. The Chief Justice's Major Premise: Due Process Liberties Are Negative
and Do Not Include Affirmative Guarantees of Safety from
Private Violence
Chief Justice Rehnquist's chief premise is that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment "is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act,
not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. '22 1 While
the fourteenth amendment forbids the state itself to deprive individuals of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, the Chief Justice contended that
its language does .not imply an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that
those interests do not come to harm through other means.
22 2
premise and a conclusion (as in 'every virtue is laudable; kindness is a virtue; therefore, kindness is
laudable')." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1180 (1976).
218. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
219. Id. at 1003-04.
220. Id. at 1004.
221. Id. at 1003.
222. Id. Although the Chief Justice did not refer to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in this case,
this notion owes much to Judge Posner's assertion that "the Constitution is a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298,
301 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989); see DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizes the majority for starting their analysis from this point, rather than focusing on
the actions actually taken by the state with respect to Joshua).
Judge Posner first advanced the negative liberties argument in Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616,
618 (7th Cir. 1982), a special relationship case in which the court rejected a claim of constitutional
liability for discharging a mental patient, who, having been committed to a state institution after
being found innocent of an earlier homicide by reason of insanity, murdered a woman one year after
his release. Id. at 617. Judge Posner ruled that there is no constitutional right to be protected by the
state from criminals or the insane. However monstrous the state's failure to act may be, it simply
does not meet the requirements of the constitutional charter of negative liberties that simply in-
structs government to leave people alone and does not require it to provide any level of services
"even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order." Id. at 618.
The axiom came to be relied upon by the Seventh Circuit, as well as others, in their disposition
of other special relationship claims after Martinez. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d
1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989) (no constitutional violation when city
emergency dispatcher failed to send ambulance and rendered bad medical advise to caller whb later
died from the medical emergency); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1983)
(due process not implicated by negligent failure of city workers to save occupants from dying in
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The Chief Justice argued, moreover, that history also does not support such
an expansive reading of the "constitutional text."'223 According to Chief Justice
burning automobile), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); see also Wideman v. Shallowford Commu-
nity Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034-37 (11th Cir. 1987) (no constitutional duty to transport preg-
nant woman to hospital of her choice which had facilities to safeguard health of baby born
prematurely); Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 927-28 (8th Cir. 1987) (no
constitutional duty to protect child from injury by parents); Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811
F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987) (due process does not require the county to protect citizens from
attack by an escaped inmate); Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (prison guard injured by prisoner); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70
(9th Cir. 1986) (undercover officer failed to prevent barroom shooting); Bradberry v. Pinellas
County, 789 F.2d 1513, 1517-18 ( Ith Cir. 1986) (swimmer drowned because of inadequately trained
lifeguard); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23 (1st Cir.) (claim of woman murdered
by furloughed inmate), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 88-89 (2d
Cir. 1986) (wrongful death claim of county highway department employee killed when supervisor
failed to follow safety rules).
For scholarly commentary on this idea, see C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 207 &
n.1 (1987) (a feminist critique of the negative liberties concept, considered by MacKinnon to be the
cornerstone of the liberal state); Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON FREEDOM 121-
22 (1970); Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986); Wil-
son, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork Posner, Easterbrook
and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1171 (1986); Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liabil.
ity for Failure to Act, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1048 (1986).
Judge Posner has acknowledged in another context that the classical libertarian philosophies of
Hobbes, Locke, and more recently, Nozick, paradoxically may lay the theoretical foundation for
inferring a constitutional duty to provide services. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Docu-
ment, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 24 (1987). If the social contract exchanges liberties enjoyed in the
state of nature for the state's guarantees of internal and external security, what is the result if the
state provides only ineffectual police services, as is so often the case today? Although he opposes the
conclusion that there is a constitutional duty to provide minimal security, Posner seems aware in this
discussion that the classical expression of negative liberties seems to support rather than to negate
the state's duty to provide basic services. Id. I am indebted for this point to my research assistant,
Jim Essig.
223. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003. The Chief Justice emphasizes the negatively phrased lan-
guage of the Constitution and makes assertions about history and the intent of the framers. Id.
These methods are hallmarks of an interpretivist model of constitutional jurisprudence. This mode
of reading the Constitution assumes that the framers of the Constitution made a binding choice of
which fundamental values (rights and liberties) it protects. The sole legitimate role of thejudiciary,
therefore, is to implement in its decisions those choices that already have been made. This view was
taken by Justice Black in his years on the Supreme Court, and has returned to favor in some aca-
demic and judicial circles. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 703-06 (1975).
Proponents of pure interpretivism, such as the conservative jurist Robert H. Bork, believe that if
the constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no other "princi-
pled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971). The chief argument in support of this position is a
democratic one: the Constitution allows the will of the majority to be overruled by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 3. The only legitimate basis for the exercise of this nondemocratic power, therefore, is
if the Justices are not merely enacting their own will, but are instead faithfully adhering to constitu-
tional values chosen in the original Madisonian compromise between majority rule and minority
protection. Id.
Noninterpretivists criticize the assumptions of the intentionalist model on a variety of grounds.
Professor Thomas Grey, for example, observes that courts routinely "resort to bad legislative history
and strained reading of constitutional language to support results that would be better justified by
explication of contemporary moral and political ideals not drawn from the constitutional text."
Grey, supra, at 706. This is because there is some feeling that the noninterpretivist mode is somehow
not legitimate. Id. In some of the most significant decisions of our history, however, courts also
have appealed openly to values beyond those expressly stated in the constitutional text for the con-
tent of the substantive principles they were invoking to invalidate legislation. Id. at 709. The legiti-
macy of this view of constitutional adjudication rests on the notions either of natural law or of a
living Constitution, adaptable to the evolving standards of our civilization. Id. Grey argues that
many of our most cherished decisions involving fundamental rights would be inconceivable under
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Rehnquist, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, one of the civil
war amendments that reconstructed the federal-state relationship after the Civil
War,224 reflected the same framers' intent as the corresponding clause in the
fifth amendment: the purpose was to protect the people from the state's affirma-
tive abuse of power, and "not to ensure that the State protected them from each
other."'225 The framers assertedly left that job to the democratic political
processes.226
It is, of course, not accurate to say that the framers of the fourteenth
amendment were unconcerned with the state's failure to protect its citizens from
the violence of third-party private actors. In another recent opinion, the
Supreme Court unanimously accepted as a matter of courtroom history that the
paradigmatic claim under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,227 the predecessor
statute to section 1983,228 was that of a victim of private violence or harassment
who sued state officials for failing to prevent the harm.229 Prominent scholars
and historians of the Reconstruction era also would agree that Congress and the
courts were concerned about serious problems of private coercion, intimidation,
and violence directed against citizens. In their well-respected book Equal Jus-
any variant of the interpretivist model. Id. at 710-13. Other scholars have demonstrated that
problems arise even if one agrees to focus on the text itself. What is the text? And what role does
the reader have in actively creating rather than passively understanding the predetermined meaning
of that text? See, eg., Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 376-89 (1982) (discussing
"weak" and "strong" textualists).
Clearly, I am critical of Chief Justice Rehnquist's tendency to "slip-shod history," to borrow a
phrase from Grey. Grey, supra, at 706. I do not believe, however, that the'DeShaney opinion is a
good example of interpretivist constitutional adjudication. It would be hard to argue that personal
security is a value that was never intended to be addressed by the Constitution. Rather, DeShaney is
an exercise in the application of abstract logic to an assumed first principle-that our Constitution is
a negative charter and guarantees no minimal levels of government "services."
224. Historians disagree how thoroughgoing a revolution in federal-state relations the framers of
the Reconstruction Amendments and statutes intended to enact. See, eg., H. HYMAN & W.
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875 386-88
(1982); Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship and Civil Rights after the
Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 47 (1987). It seems clear, however, that provisions inspired by the
Civil War and by white Southern intransigence after the war, did not leave existing relationships
untouched. See generally A. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND
SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971) (history of the Klan and federal response to outbreaks of pri-
vate violence in Reconstruction era); W.E.B. DuBols, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA:
1860-1880 (1935) (classic history demonstrating intention of white Southerners to deny black freed
people basic civil rights). The contemporary resuscitation of Section 1983, originally the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, is founded on that premise. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961)
(section 1983 passed to afford a federal right in federal courts because state officials were not enforc-
ing their laws to protect the enjoyment of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment), overruled in part, Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
225. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)); Dan-
iels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring in the result)).
Constitutional scholars have criticized the Chief Justice's historicism, used in the service of his
philosophy of state autonomy at all costs, as a "sham" because it ignores everything that happened
after 1787, including, most importantly, the Civil War. See Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist
Court, NEW REPUBLIC, March 10, 1982, at 14, 20 (written before Justice Rehnquist was elevated to
the Chief Justice position).
226. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
227. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 99, § 1, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
229. Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573, 581 n.ll (1989).
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tice Under the Law: Constitutional Development 1835-1875,230 legal historians
Harold Hyman and William Wiecek explained that congressional sponsors ini-
tially intended or assumed that the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments
would have a more expansive reach than the courts later gave them.231 In 1866
Republican abolitionists in Congress asserted that the nation had to supply se-
curity for person, property, and society if the states did not. Sometime after the
adoption of the amendments, however, some of the original framers themselves
becaie unsure and oscillated between a broader view that the amendments
reached both public and private conduct and a narrower position that the enact-
ments encompassed only positive state acts.2 32
Historian Robert Kaczorowski studied the operation of federal courts in
the South between 1866 and 1876.233 He found that in those years many federal
judges, particularly those exercising primary jurisdiction over criminal cases al-
leging conspiracies to deprive citizens of their civil rights, accepted a constitu-
tional theory based on national citizenship rights that could be enforced against
private parties. 234 The federal judiciary's willingness to take jurisdiction over
cases that involved crimes committed by private parties, however, held sway for
only a short time. Supreme Court decisions in 1873 and after, such as Bylew v.
United States, 235 the Slaughter-House Cases,23 6 and United States v. Cruik-
shank,237 soon made that an untenable position.238
230. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 224.
231. Id. at 403-72.
232. See id. Professors Hyman and Wiecek convey the "nineteenth-century sense of 'civil
rights'" through a pyramidal diagram. Id. at 395-96. By 1865 the substantive content of the rights
that distinguished slaves from the now freed people was well-known "at least in terms of the re-
sponses needed to the limitations on freedmen the southern states were imposing in the Black
Codes." Id. The very first stratum of rights after slavery, denominated "civil rights" in this dia-
gram, included the rights of contract, property, marital/parental rights, juridicial (party and wit-
ness) rights, locomotion, and state protection from private violence. Id. at 396. The sources of these
civil rights are shown as the fourteenth amendment, section 1, with its guarantees of citizenship,
privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection; together with the state emancipation
amendments; the thirteenth amendment; and the 1866 civil rights act. Id. Political rights and social
rights occupied higher, less basic, and more controversial, strata in this pyramid. Id. at 397.
233. R.J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985).
234. Id. at 8-9.
235. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872). In Bylew the Supreme Court decided that the federal district
court did not have jurisdiction over a murder case in which a white man killed a black woman, all
the witnesses were black, and the state (Kentucky) did not permit black witnesses to testify against
white defendants. Id. at 595. It arrived at this result through a technical interpretation of the lan-
guage granting jurisdiction over causes "affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the
courts or judicial tribunals of the State, or locality, where they may be, any of the rights secured to
them by the 1st section of [the 1866 Civil Rights Act]." Id. at 591.
236. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Slaughter-House drastically narrowed the scope of the four-
teenth amendment privileges and immunities clause to only a few selected rights of national citizen-
ship. Id. at 79-80. According to Robert Kaczorowski, this case "undermined the constitutional
theory that permitted federal legal officers to interpret their powers so broadly," and many judges
thereafter limited their jurisdiction to cases involving state action. R.J. KACZOROWSKI, supra note
233, at 192.
237. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). In Cruikshank the Court dismissed criminal indictments that grew out
of a mini-civil war in Louisiana during which a Ku Klux Klan army representing a rival governor
stormed the parish courthouse occupied by armed Republicans on behalf of their candidate. Id. at
559. The indictment was held to be faulty for attempting to punish the defendants for infringing
rights that the national government could not directly protect, and because it failed to charge that
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I do not offer the conclusions of professional historians in order to reopen
the "state action" debate or to promote a counter-history239 that will prove
something about the intent of the framers and therefore about the scope of the
due process clause today. Rather, this scholarship demonstrates the inadequacy
of the Chief Justice's major premise, which relies on the categorical and histori-
cally suspect statement that the framers never intended there to be any such
right to state protection against private violence.24°
Closer to our time, courts have recognized civil rights claims against state
agents who did not protect citizens from private actors, such as a deputy sheriff
who failed to protect Jehovah's Witnesses from mob violence,24 1 officials who
did not protect victims from racial violence,242 police officers who did not pro-
tect a white middle-class family from private harassers who were related to a
member of the police force, 243 and an entire police department that failed to
protect a woman and her son from the violence of her estranged husband.244
Concededly, these cases all allege intentional discrimination in violation of the
equal protection rather than the due process clause.245 Reckless or deliberately
indifferent conduct, however, can be viewed as equivalent to the kind of inten-
tional behavior that was alleged in these equal protection cases. 246 I will argue
the offenses had been committed with the intent to deprive victims of their rights because of their
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Id. at 555; see R.J. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 233, at
183.
238. See R.J. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 233, at 138-92 (discusses the Supreme Court's disman-
tling of effective civil rights enforcement). The immediate result of the retreat from enforcement was
renewed white violence in 1874. Id. at 188-90.
239. See Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical
Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741, 783 (1987) (analysis of what the author views as an equally plausible
"counter-history" to the official version used by the Court in determining immunity issues in section
1983 litigation).
240. The Chief Justice did not even attempt to look at historical sources. Instead, he simply
cited recent cases that are themselves equally innocent of professional history, but that reflect a
concern of his-the need to limit the number of section 1983 lawsuits. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at
1003 (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the result)).
241. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943).
242. Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 870 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (relying on legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act which reveals that Congress was concerned with the inaction of state and local
governments in the face of whippings, robbery, and murder to find cause of action on behalf of black
man beaten by racists). But see Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 35-36 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (law
enforcement officer not liable, because he acted in good faith in attempting to persuade interracial
band to leave town; he felt unable to protect them from racial violence of townspeople and his
actions played no role in their ultimate decision to leave).
243. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972).
244. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
245. The DeShaney Court specifically reserved any equal protection claim. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct.
at 1004 n.3.
246. This may be particularly true when the recklessness involves an omission to act to protect a
child. In the Texas Penal Code, for example, a person commits a felony of the first (intentionally or
knowingly) or third (recklessly) degree if she "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that causes to a child who is 14 years of age or
younger... serious bodily injury; serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment; disfigurement
or deformity." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 1987). This offense concerning children is
one of the few under the Texas code that criminalizes an omission to act and also criminalizes some
form of negligence. Other provisions generally require at least a reckless culpable mental state. Id.
§ 22.04 Practice Commentary.
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later, moreover, that there is an element of equal protection in the due process
claims of child-victims of family violence who, unique among other assaulted
citizens, are consigned by law to the mercies of child welfare agencies.
247
2. The Chief Justice's Minor Premise: "Governmental Aid" in the Form of
Protective Services is an Affirmative Guarantee That the State is
Not Obligated to Provide
The Chief Justice's secondary premise is that generally there is no constitu-
tionally protected affirmative right to governmental aid, even when such assist-
ance may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests. 248 For this
proposition, he relied on Harris v. McRae,249 in which the Court upheld the
Hyde Amendment's 250 restriction on the use of federal Medicaid funds for any
abortion except those meeting certain narrow qualifications.251 Even though
freedom to make the abortion decision clearly was protected from government
interference by the due process clause,252 the Harris Court found that this did
not entitle indigent women to federal subsidies in order to take advantage of that
freedom. 25 3 Congress could decide freely which medical services it wished to
fund without violating the due process clause.254 The government could make
that decision because it was not responsible for creating the poverty that bur-
dened a woman's constitutionally protected reproductive choice. The govern-
ment's refusal to fund abortions left a poor woman in no worse a position than
she would have occupied if Congress had chosen not to subsidize health care
costs at all.255 The Court insisted that any other ruling would impose an affirm-
ative funding obligation on Congress, which would constitute a drastic change in
our understanding of the Constitution. 256 The Harris majority in effect treated
247. See infra notes 391-402 and accompanying text.
248. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (federal
government has no obligation to fund abortions or other medical services under due process clause
of fifth amendment); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (due process clause of fourteenth
amendment does not confer obligation to provide adequate housing)).
249. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
250. Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (Dec. 9, 1977).
251. Harris, 448 U.S. at 302-03.
252. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Although this liberty interest remains in place for
the time being, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), a divided court
called into question the framework established by Roe and made it clear that many significant state
regulations of abortion that once might have been considered invalid as burdening the basic right
will now pass muster. In Webster this included a Missouri prohibition on the use of any public
facilities or personnel for abortions, and a requirement of viability testing at 20 weeks. Id, at 3047.
253. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-18.
254. Id. at 318.
255. Id. at 317.
256. Id. at 317-18. Constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has argued in criticism of Harris that
even though rights in our system tend to be individual, alienable, and negative, sometimes the Con-
stitution gives rise to affirmative governmental duties to facilitate the exercise of certain kinds of
rights at public expense. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HAMY. L. REv. 330, 331-33 (1985). Although the gov-
ernment is ordinarily free to leave the provision of most goods and services to the vagaries of the
private market, he argues that abortion funding is not one of them. Id. at 338. Because the abortion
right is relational, that is, it implicates a woman's subordinate relationship in this society and her
ability to exercise basic power over her own reproductive role and life, and inalienable, the state may
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the specific political, religious, and moral context of abortion funding as irrele-
vant to the constitutional analysis. 257
By similarly portraying protective services for children as part of a larger
class of governmental aid, the Court situated DeShaney in a line of cases that
considered and rejected potentially broad claims of social justice for the poor.2 5 8
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez,259 for example, the Court upheld Texas' method of
financing public schools even though the system created gross disparities in
levels of education based upon wealth.260 The DeShaney Court's statement that
there is no general right to government aid reflects the Rodriguez doctrine and is
part of a dispute over what has been defined as welfare rights.2 61 The political
context is the war on poverty in the 1960s and the federal funding retrenchment
that followed by the early 1980s, 262 and the general legal issue is whether a
not withhold funds from a woman who medically needs an abortion but is too poor to purchase it in
the private market place. Id. at 335-36. Tribe contends that government may not use its legal rules
to exploit the special vulnerability of women-their capacity for pregnancy-in a way that reinforces
their subservience to men and their lack of fully autonomous and equal roles in social and political
life. Id. at 338.
The issue of parental child abuse can also be said to be relational. It implicates the child's
legally enforced subordinate relationship to her parents in this society.
257. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. This seems like an exercise in wishful thinking. Abortion is an
extremely political issue, with enormous religious and moral significance. More recently, we have
witnessed the Court squabbling about whether they can insulate themselves from the politics of
abortion, and whether the view that life begins at conception is religious in nature. See Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
258. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
259. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
260. Id. at 54-55.
261. See Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969) (although equal protection may not
require an attack on economic inequality per se, it may mandate intervention to protect against
certain hazards endemic in an unequal society). In an article written before the decision in Rodri-
guez, Professor Michelman elaborated his theory of social justice, minimum protection against eco-
nomic hazard, and argued that certain kinds of "goods" cannot be distributed solely as the market
dictates, and that decisions of the Supreme Court on voting and poll tax, or a criminal defendant's
right to representation or to a trial transcript should be understood in that context. Id. at 24-26.
For an example of a conservative attack on later developments in Professor Michelman's "wel-
fare rights" constitutional thinking, see Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare
Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695 (reply to Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Consti-
tutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659). More recently, Professor Peter Edelman has consid-
ered anew the more radical proposition of the existence of a constitutional right to some form of
minimum income. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:- Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987). Professor Edelman acknowledged that the present Supreme Court
has essentially rejected the views he expressed. Id. at 3.
The contextual argument developed in Part III of this Article does not directly address eco-
nomic power in our society. This does not mean, however, that I reject its significance for constitu-
tional law. Inequalities of wealth, after all, also form the social context of our legal system. There is
an association between poverty and reported child abuse. See AAPC TRENDS, supra note 170, at 24.
There is also an association between poverty and the placement of neglected and abused children in
foster care. Garrison, supra note 69, at 1752.
262. See AAPC TRENDS, supra note 170, at 40 (discussing the decline in federal funding in the
early 1980s and its impact on state child welfare agencies); Besharov, supra note 66, at 169-71
(growth and retrenchment of federal funding for child abuse programs). See generally R. FISHER,
LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE: NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZING IN AMERICA 121-52 (1984) (discussion
of increased corporate conservatism in response to economic difficulties of the 1970s); F.F. PIVEN &
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minimum of some good or service is ever required by the Constitution.2 63 Far
from being the product of immutable constitutional principle, the position taken
in DeShaney (and perhaps in Rodriguez before it) is the result of the changes that
produced a more conservative Court after the Warren years. 264 Because it
placed child protection in the general class of governmental aid, the DeShaney
Court could use law that is well settled, although not universally accepted. This
in turn made little Joshua's case easier to dismiss out of hand.
3. The Chief Justice's Conclusion: The State's Failure to Protect an
Individual [Child] Against Private Violence [by his Father] Does
Not Violate the Due Process Clause
In DeShaney Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that because the due pro-
cess clause does not require the state to provide its citizens with government aid
in the form of protective services, it therefore cannot be held liable under that
clause for any injury that could have been averted had it chosen to provide
them: "As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State's failure to protect
an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of
the Due Process Clause." 265
Even granting the truth of the original premises, however, as does Justice
Brennan's dissent,2 66 the conclusion does not follow necessarily. If the majority
has begun its argument from the wrong starting point, and if child abuse statutes
do not really belong in the general category of governmental aid or in the even
narrower class of protective services,267'the syllogism fails. 268 Justice Brennan
conceded that the due process clause as construed by the Court's prior cases
creates no general right to basic governmental services. 269 He also noted that no
participant in the DeShaney case asked the Court to announce as a general rule
R.A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971) (analysis
of the War on Poverty of the 1960s as another example of expansion of welfare programs in order
better to control the poor during times of increased protest and disorder); F.F. PIVEN & R.A.
CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS CON-
SEQUENCES (1982) (political analysis of the war on poverty and the attack on welfare programs
mounted by the Reagan administration in 1980).
263. Professor Tribe describes the Burger Court's reshaping of Warren Court decisions which
suggested that equal access to justice was required, into a philosophy of minimal access. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16-51 to 16-59 (2d ed. 1988). According to Professor Tribe,
the change was marked by an increased Supreme Court reluctance to tell the states how to spend
their scarce resources, and by more willingness to tolerate pejorative characterizations of the poor.
Id. § 16-58.
264. Id.
265. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
266. Id. at 1007-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. The class of protective services presumably includes the law enforcement, fire, and emer-
gency medical services at issue in many of the earlier special relationship cases. See cases listed in
Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220-23 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (cited in
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002).
268. Justice Brennan considered the majority's starting premises irrelevant to the inquiry. They
served no function except perhaps to preordain a certain result. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 1007-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that the Constitution safeguards positive as well as negative liberties. 270 Neither
proposition, however, seemed to Justice Brennan to be the relevant starting
point.
Justice Brennan would not begin by focusing on the state's inaction, seen in
relation to the state's unquestioned right to refrain from offering any protective
services in the first place.27 1 Rather, his dissent emphasized the action that the
state had taken with respect to Joshua and children like him, a method he be-
lieved was followed in both Estelle and Youngberg.272 As a result, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion offered a different and less "stingy" reading of those cases than
that advanced by the DeShaney majority.273 The relevant state action, he found,
was not simply the restraint of liberty imposed on the prisoner or on the institu-
tionalized mentally retarded man, but that the state had cut off private sources
of aid, and then refused to render help itself.274
Justice Brennan thus found it highly relevant to his constitutional analysis
that Wisconsin had established a child welfare system that channeled all reports
of abuse to a single agency.275 State law required private citizens and other
governmental entities alike to depend on the specialized child protective serv-
ices. Indeed, that is exactly what happened in Joshua DeShaney's case.2 76 The
state cut Joshua off from any other public or private assistance, "effectively con-
fined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of Randy DeShaney's violent home un-
til such time as DSS took action to remove him," and thereby may have
endangered the boy further.277 Having actively put the child in an isolated posi-
tion and knowing of the specific danger that he faced, the state should not then
escape all constitutional accountability. 278 Justice Brennan concluded that this
kind of inaction was "every bit as abusive of power as action.... [O]ppression
can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it."'279 The
Chief Justice's deduction, therefore, was an answer to the wrong question. In-
stead, the appropriate conclusion was that the due process clause prohibits a
state from displacing private sources of protection and then turning its back at a
crucial juncture on the harm that it has promised to prevent.280
270. Id. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the posture of this case, dismissed on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, it was impossible to determine the cause of the state's default.
279. Id. at 1012 (Brennan, J., dissenting). My colleague Irene Rosenberg points out that one of
the traditionally limited situations that create criminal liability for omissions involves a defendant
who "has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent
others from rendering aid." Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
280. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court had heard an argument
that the state's actions precluded help from other sources. Amicus Massachusetts Committee for
Children and Youth contended that the structure of child abuse statutes meant that child welfare
laws "preempted" any other form of protection for children, who are vulnerable, isolated, and un-
able to protect themselves. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 35.
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C. DeShaney's Embrace of An Abstraction
The DeShaney majority claimed that despite the natural sympathy they felt
as human beings, the constitutional text and formal logic compelled them to
reach a harsh conclusion in their judicial capacity. 281 We have seen, however,
that neither text, history, nor logic constrained them.282 In a separate and very
emotional dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the Court for pretending to be a
dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by natural sympathy, thus "re-
treat[ing] into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the
facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should apply to those facts."'283
Justice Blackmun likened the DeShaney majority and its assumed helplessness
before the law to the antebellum judges studied in Robert Cover's Justice Ac-
cused,284 who denied relief to fugitive slaves on the grounds that existing legal
doctrine compelled their decisions.285
The DeShaney Court was not helpless before the law. The majority chose
to ignore the child protection context of Joshua's claim; it willfully embraced an
abstract formal argument about "governmental services" instead. The majority
opinion is filled with talk about "individual's" rights in society,286 individuals
who live in "free society" as free men able to protect themselves from the vio-
lence of "private actors" unless the state restrains their "liberty" and prevents
them from helping themselves. 287 The "individual" in question, however, disap-
peared from view in this opinion. Four-year-old Joshua DeShaney, who was
entrusted to his father's custody by a state court; who was isolated in his father's
home;288 who had no physical ability to defend himself from his father's vio-
lence; whose father had the legal right to inflict physical discipline on him as a
parental prerogative enforced by the state;289 who was in danger; who was sup-
posed to be protected by an elaborate state legislative scheme that purported to
281. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
282. See supra notes 216-80 and accompanying text; see also, Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism,
and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513-32 (1989).
283. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
284. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975),
285. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The expression "helplessness
before the law" is from Cover's discussion ofjudicial rhetoric in slave and fugitive slave cases. This
stance provided justification for judges who took a position contrary to their own morality, but in
adherence to the law. R. COVER, supra note 284, at 121. Similarly, this position may make it easier
for the majority Justices of DeShaney to discount its compelling facts.
286. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
287. Id. at 1005-06.
288. The child protective agency implicitly acknowledged the importance of isolation in abuse
cases. One of the conditions imposed by the Wisconsin agency when it returned Joshua to his fa-
ther's custody was that he be enrolled in a Head Start program that would take him out of the
complete isolation a preschooler experiences and provide some kind of public oversight. Massachu-
setts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 25. The father never fulfilled this part of the agreement,
and the state did nothing about it, even after a Head Start investigator visited the DeShaney home to
find out where the child was and reported to the agency that he found the four-year-old left all alone.
Id. at 24-25.
289. See infra notes 363-67. Wisconsin abolished parent/child tort immunity in Goller v. White,
20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). Parental conduct that is "reasonable discipline" of a child
is privileged and cannot be criminally prosecuted. State v. Teynor, 141 Wis. 2d 187, 200, 414
N.W.2d 76, 80 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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concentrate all aid to abused children within one agency; and who did not even
get the kind of judicial protection that someone assaulted by an actor other than
his parent would get,290 is virtually absent from the majority's discussion.
The majority's use of language that is redolent of classical liberalism and
the laissez-faire ethic2 91 is truly a "malversation of terminology" 292 in the
DeShaney context. The Court has misappropriated words and images in the
service of something other than the just resolution of this case. Even laissez-
faire individualism ideologues, however, have long recognized that dependent
children (and, at one time, women) do not fit the model of free agents acting in a
free market or free society.293 Indeed, the Supreme Court has justified modify-
290. See infra notes 358-62 and accompanying text.
291. The classical expression of economic laissez-faire individualism may be found in A. SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND COURSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); a more
contemporary restatement of these principles appears in M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREE-
DOM (1962). In general the theory posits a free and autonomous market. Individuals should be
equal in their relationship to the state. "The domination and subordination that accompany eco-
nomic and social inequality in civil society," however, are deemed to be natural, private matters
only, which are beyond the proper scope of state action. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497, 1502 & n.19 (1983); see also C.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 263-
77 (1962) (on the continued use in modem liberal-democratic theory of assumptions of "possessive
individualism" derived from seventeenth-century political foundations even though structure of con-
temporary market society no longer provides necessary conditions for deducing a valid theory of
political obligation from those assumptions); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 551, 561-62 (1986) (on the individualist liberalism of
Locke and Madison).
292. This term was suggested by Professor John Snyder of the University of Houston/Clear
Lake.
293. Protective labor legislation for children and women was justified on the basis that they were
weaker, dependent, and quite different from men, who needed no such protection from the market-
place. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding, during the heyday ofLochner, a
10-hour limit for women's hours because absolute liberty of contract may be limited for women, who
were thought weaker and more dependent than men). For a discussion of Muller, see Olsen, supra
note 291, at 1556-57. The Court invalidated a federal attempt to limit children's hours through
regulating the sale of the products of child labor on different grounds-the extent of the commerce
clause. The Court seems to have assumed, however, that state regulation would have been fine.
Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
In England, the home of Adam Smith, the campaign for the regulation of labor came earlier in
the nineteenth century, in the 1830s and 1840s. The parliamentary debates over the regulation first
of children's, and then of women's, hours in the factories were based on their exceptionality in a free
market society. There is evidence, however, that the working-class shorttime committees that organ-
ized outside of Parliament intended to accomplish the effective regulation of men's hours, too, by
taking the children and women who made up most of the workforce out of the factories after 10
hours. Oren, "Woman's Place, in the Factory or in the Home: Women and the English Factory
Reform Movement 1802-1855" (work in progress); see O.J. DUNLOP & R.D. DENMAN, ENGLISH
APPRENTICESHIP AND CHILD LABOUR: A HISTORY 294-95 (1912) (English workingmen manipu-
lated public sentiment on behalf of children for their own ends, and when that did not change their
own conditions, hid behind the women's petticoats in the movement on behalf of female workers);
M.W. THOMAS, THE EARLY FACTORY LEGISLATION: A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE EVOLUTION 37 (1948) (given the predominance of laissez-faire economic theories, the fac-
tory operatives knew it was futile to talk about regulating their own hours and therefore talked about
children and young persons).
On rising in Parliament to move the second reading of his bill to regulate the labor of children
in factories, Sadler emphasized that children were "not... free agents." Hansard's Parliamentary
Debates, March 16, 1832, s. 3, v. 11, 340-46. David Brook, a clothdresser and witness before the
Sadler Committee, however, admitted that he had read Mr. Marshall's The System of Social Econ-
omy, which taught that wages would go up proportionately if children's hours were limited, and
that, although his first hopes were to benefit the children, he also hoped that the legislation would
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ing procedural protections that otherwise would be due adults under the due
process clause because of the inherent difference between a free adult and a child
who is always legally in someone's custody.294 The use of abstractions about
"individuals," "free society," and "private actors," however, permitted the
Court to obscure the fact that this case is not about individuals and governmen-
tal services in general, but is about the state's failure to protect a child from
abuse by his father, after the state had good reason to know of extreme danger to
the little boy and had committed itself to help him. The words sound good
because they reverberate with all the positive associations of freedom that we
have with such terms295 and with the drawing of a line between private and
public spheres296 that is bounded by certain negative constitutional liberties that
prevent the state from breaking into our homes or beating us up.
The Court's use of the language of individualism and its embrace of an
abstract rather than a contextual mode of decisionmaking, moreover, can be
seen as an example of the differences between "male" and "female" thinking.297
In 1982 Carol Gilligan wrote In a Different Voice,2 98 a pathbreaking critique of
Lawrence Kohlberg's widely-accepted model of moral development.299 She
found that a hierarchy of moral decisionmaking that progressed from a more
specific, relational, and contextual choice to a higher justice governed by ab-
stract principle failed to account for moral development in girls and women.
benefit himself. Brook testified that adult men, too, were not really "free agents" and might require
legislation to protect their labor. REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE "BILL TO REGU-
LATE THE LABOUR OF THE CHILDREN IN THE MILLS AND FACTORIES OF THE UNITED KING-
DOM," WITH THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, APPENDIX, AND INDEX, SESSION 6, DECEMBER 1831-
16 AUGUST 1832, 1831-32 XV 59 (1968) ("Sadler Committee" report) (Irish University Press Series
of British Parliamentary Papers, Industrial Revolution, Children's Employment 2).
294. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (authorizing preventive detention of juveniles
because, unlike adults, they are always in some kind of custody).
295. See, eg., Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
16-25 (1988) (discussing the power of "naming").
296. For the nineteenth-century separation of the public from the private sphere, see M. GROSS-
BERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
3-30 (1985); Olsen, supra note 291, at 1501-07.
In a speech on pornography and the first amendment, Catherine MacKinnon criticized what
she identifies as the liberal view of negative liberties, that is, that the Constitution only begins where
law or the public order begins, and prohibits state action only. She argues that women, however, are
"oppressed socially, prior to law, without express state acts, often in intimate contexts. For women
this structure means that those domains in which women are distinctively subordinated are assumed
by the Constitution to be the domain of freedom." C. MACKINNON, supra note 222, at 207. In
other words, "freedom" depends on where you stand.
297. To assert that there are differences between male and female thinking is not to say that
these differences are biologically determined, or that all men share one mode of thought and all
women the other. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF WO-
MEN'S DEVELOPMENT 2 (1982); Sherry, supra note 291, at 579 (1986); see also Gilligan & Attanucci,
Two Moral Orientations, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S
THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION 82-83 (1988) (both men and women in
study reflected concerns with both justice and care in thinking about moral dilemmas, although
there was a significant association by gender).
298. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 297. Carol Gilligan is a Professor of Education at the Harvard
Graduate School of Education where she is associated with the Center for the Study of Gender,
Education, and Human Development.
299. See L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Ap.
proach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347-480 (1969).
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They spoke in a different voice in which there were fewer absolute and abstract
answers because more depended on the context.30° This insight has influenced
scholars in many fields, including law, and is useful here.30 1 The answers to
DeShaney's thorny substantive due process questions depend on the context of
family violence and state regulation of the family, and on lessons about the polit-
ical and social significance of child abuse gleaned from the battered woman's
movement and historians who write about women, children, and the family. 30 2
Rather than illuminating the context of Joshua's claim, the linguistic mal-
versations in DeShaney obscure the significance of child protection in the mod-
em state. They create a false equivalency between people, predicaments, and
liberties that are not truly alike. Catherine MacKinnon has criticized just such a
fallacy in Feminism Unmodified.30 3 She argues that liberals who speak of sex
discrimination only in terms of removing differences commit this error.3° 4 The
argument is that men and women are both persons, and therefore all that is
necessary is to ensure that the law treats all persons alike. MacKinnon argues,
however, that women are not similarly situated with men in our society. Instead
they live in a relation of social, economic, and political subordination to men.
300. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 297, at 18-23, 38. The newest collection of essays published by
the Center for the Study of Gender, Education, and Human Development reports three studies
undertaken in response to those critics of Gilligan whose recent research on whether men and wo-
men score differently in Kohlberg's scale of justice reasoning yielded contradictory findings. Gilligan
& Attanucci, supra note 297, at 73. Professor Gilligan and her associate Attanucci observed that the
critics have confused moral stages within the Kohlberg justice framework with moral orientation,
the distinction between "justice" and "care" perspectives. Id. Focusing on moral orientation in
evidence drawn from people's discussions of actual moral conflicts, they reconfirmed that there is a
statistically significant difference between the sexes in responding to moral dilemmas using either an
abstract "justice" or a relational and contextual "care" ethic. Id. at 73-86.
301. See, eg., Bender, supra note 295, at 18-19; Sherry, supra note 291, at 578-91. For other
disciplines, see BELENSKY, CLINCHY, GOLDBERGER & TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYs OF KNOWING:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND 7-9 (1986).
302. Contextual analysis should not be confused with insisting on a deceptive level of particular-
ity and detail, as Justice Scalia did in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989). Justice Scalia
would only recognize as fundamental those liberties that are deeply rooted in history and tradition,
in the very specific form that is asserted. Id. at 2342. So, for example, since history and tradition
considered the "unitary family," typically the marital family, sacrosanct, a liberty interest arose for
that kind of relationship only, and did not extend to a biological father who stepped forward to claim
paternity and challenge a marital family. Id. at 2342 n.3. The Michael H. opinion actually operates
on a very high level of abstraction: it is based on a universal abstraction that due process liberties
may only be defined by canvassing views that have prevailed throughout Anglo-American history.
As dissenting Justice Brennan noted, Justice Scalia garnered only two votes (his own and Chief
Justice Rehnquist's) for the full scope of this position. Id. at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at
2344 n.6. There is no context in Justice Scalia's insistence on particularity, only a bald abstract
preference for majority beliefs.
303. C. MACKINNON, supra note 222, at 32-45; see also id. at 164-65 (liberal jurisprudence,
which accepts "neutrality" as a principle of constitutional adjudication, mistakenly "equates sub-
stantive powerlessness with substantive power and calls treating these the same 'equality' ").
304. Id. at 34-39. Catherine MacKinnon also argues that the liberal "sameness" approach is
only one face of a general fallacy of "differences" theories of sex inequality. Id. at 34. MacKinnon
admits an affection for Carol Gilligan's "in a different voice" version of special benefits analysis. Id.
at 39. She rejects, however, any valuation of women's differences that does not recognize the raw
realities of power that produce such distinctiveness. She says flatly that women think in relational
terms today only "because our existence is defined in relation to men." Id. This Article, however,
draws on both Gilligan and MacKinnon. The context of young Joshua's constitutional claim to
protection is one of power in the family, as sanctioned or overridden by 'the state. See infra notes
378-80 & 403-16.
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Even-handed treatment, therefore, does nothing to address the real problem-
oppression and subordination. 305 The language used facilitates this and ob-
scures the reality of the differences.
This insight also suggests what is wrong with the DeShaney opinion and
inspires an alternative constitutional analysis. Children in our society are not
similarly situated with respect to other potential claimants of so-called govern-
mental aid or even of protective services. They are subject to family violence,
which contemporary scholars and commentators believe reflects patriarchal
family norms that traditionally have been enforced by law and to some extent
still are. 30 6 Resolving little Joshua's claim on a general basis of governmental
services, therefore, conceals what is at stake and, as a result, deforms the consti-
tutional analysis of liberty and due process.
III. DUE PROCESS IN CONTEXT
A. The State and the Family. Domestic Violence and Child Protection
This Article is not an attempt to expose a counter-history of the fourteenth
amendment, 30 7 to read a counter-text into it, or to develop an over-arching
counter-methodology of substantive due process, although respectable argu-
ments may be made for all those efforts. Rather, it explains why Joshua
DeShaney's claim unquestionably implicates values that are of constitutional
dimension. This Article, however, does not seek to revive the tort-law doctrine
of special relationships that was rejected by the DeShaney Court as an inade-
quate basis for resolving the question of constitutional duty. 30 8 The special rela-
305. Id. at 32-45. In her classic book on wifebeating, Del Martin provides another example of
how false equivalencies work. She criticized a decision by San Jose Superior Court Judge Eugene
Premo who ruled in 1975 that he could not enforce old California laws that specifically applied to
"wife-beating" because the statutes denied equal protection to men, who were not the subject of any
such special solicitude. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 100-01 (1983). Martin contended that this
was an example of male bias within the criminal justice system because the judge refused to recog-
nize that the law was created to correct an existing imbalance.
306. See, eg., D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE
UNITED STATES 10-11, 14 (1970) (use of violence against children is widespread and culturally
sanctioned); E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 8-10; L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 149 (1979);
Olsen, supra note 291, at 1505-06 (state ratifies father's control of the children, and parental rights of
physical discipline); see also P. CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND
CUSTODY 234, 517-18 n.13 (1987) (male domestic violence judicially unpunished under patriarchal
law). For ongoing research on the possible interrelationships between child homicides and the status
of women in a state, see K. STOUT, CHILD HOMICIDES IN MISSOURI 3 (unpublished report prepared
for the staff of the Missouri Division of Family Services) (on file with the North Carolina Law Re-
view) [hereinafter CHILD HOMICIDES]. My thanks to colleague Karen Stout of the University of
Houston Graduate School of Social Work for sharing her research results and her expertise in the
study of domestic violence with me.
307. See, e.g., Matasar, supra note 239, at 782-83 (history and counter-history of the fourteenth
amendment).
308. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006-07. The Court reiterated that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment,
•.. as we have said many times, does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a
constitutional violation." Id. at 1007 (citing, among others, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-
36 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981)). The sentiment that the Constitution should
not become a "font of tort law," Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544, is understandable. It has, however, be-
come a talismanic recitation whenever the Court wishes to limit § 1983 litigation. It reflects the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts' desire to control a federal remedy that is supplementary to any com-
mon-law relief that might apply under state law, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled
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tionship theory developed in state courts to overcome common-law
difficulties.3 0 9 Insofar as it requires some knowledge on the part of protective
services of danger to the child, the doctrine also is useful for making determina-
tions of causation. Abuse of government power,3 10 another way of stating the
idea of constitutional duty, however, may be found best by placing Joshua
DeShaney's claim back in the full child protection setting from which it was
abstracted by the Court, including but not limited to the special relationships
created by child welfare statutes.
It is striking that the brief submitted by amicus Massachusetts Committee
for Children and Youth (MCCY) alone began with a discussion of the pattern of
child abuse and the nature of the child protection system, rather than with gen-
eral constitutional theory of the fourteenth amendment.3 11 The MCCY ex-
plained its interest as a nonprofit organization312 that for thirty years has
in part, Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and that they perceive to be flooding
the federal courts with frivolous litigation, see, eg., Parratt, 451 U.S. at 554 n.13 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in the result). For an empirical evaluation of the flood fears, see Eisenberg & Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987). See also Oren, supra note
42, at 987-90 (discussion of the Court's attempts to limit the remedy through official immunity
doctrine).
In its eagerness to draw lines and shrink federal dockets, the Court, however, may overlook
crucial distinctions. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent to Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986), there is a vast difference between cases involving a "commonplace slip and fall,"
such as Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 227 (1986), or "the loss of a $23.50 hobby kit" such as in
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), and one involving the failure to prevent anticipated inmate
violence resulting in injury. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The challenge lies
in determining the appropriate reach of the United States Constitution, not in invoking abstract
principles that have the effect of truncating any contextual inquiry.
309. Historically Anglo-American law held government officials individually liable for their
torts, unless they fell into a select category of immune "discretionary" officers. Oren, supra note 42,
at 948-49. In order to be liable they had to owe a specific private duty to the individual harmed,
rather than a duty merely to the public at large. Id. at 948 n.53. Because discretionary officials such
as judges and legislators owed their duties to the state and not to individuals, they could not be
liable. Id. Even low-level "ministerial" officials such as police officers, who were otherwise liable for
their misconduct, were not accountable in tort for the exercise of duties, such as the duty to protect,
which they owed to the public at large, rather than to a particular individual. Id.; see, eg., Mammo
v. State, 138 Ariz. 528, 531-32, 675 P.2d 1347, 1350-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (child protection
statute created private duty); Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 666-67 (D.C. App.
1987) (cannot sue the government for failure to provide services absent a special duty); Florida First
Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. App. 1975) (government employee liable
in tort only if violates a private duty, not just a duty owed to public at large); Coleman v. Cooper, 89
N.C. App. 188, 196-97, 366 S.E.2d 2, 7-9 (1988) (violation of statutory duties to investigate, remove,
and protect children can give rise to action for negligence against county and social worker).
310. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
311. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 8-14; cf. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3,
at 11-15 (beginning with the special relationship cases, Estelle, Martinez, and Youngberg); ACLU
Brief, supra note 198, at 9-14 (beginning with the right to personal security in Youngberg); Brief for
Respondents at 11-14, DeShaney (No. 87-154) (beginning with argument that there is no general
constitutional right to protection from private violence); National Association of Counties Brief,
supra note 196, at 6-8 (beginning with assertion that there is no government duty to provide protec-
tive services in general); States Brief, supra note 196, at 6-11 (beginning with argument for quasi-
judicial absolute immunity); National School Boards Association Brief, supra note 196, at 4-9 (begin-
ning with argument that due process concerns abuse of government power and not negligence by
state employees); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8-19,
DeShaney (No. 87-154) (beginning with argument that the Constitution is not a font of tort law and
that the state did not affirmatively inflict the injury).
312. The MCCY is headquartered in Boston, which was also the home of the Massachusetts
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
worked on behalf of abused, neglected, and other vulnerable children.3 1 3 The
organization is headed by Dr. Eli Newberger, chief of the clinic at Boston's Chil-
dren's Hospital, which is responsible for treatment of cases of abused and ne-
glected children. 314 Board members come from the field of child welfare, and
the organization has itself issued studies of child abuse prevention. 315 The Com-
mittee's motion to intervene in support of the plaintiffs rested on the broad im-
plications of the Court's decision for children,316 rather than on the generalized
concerns about liability for inadequate governmental services that persuaded the
National Association of Counties, for example, to intervene on behalf of the
defendants.3 17 Listening to the voice of the MCCY, therefore, can tell us much
about the relevant context of the DeShaney case.
The MCCY explains how vulnerable children are to abuse.3 18 The help-
lessness of the abused child is magnified by her isolation.3 19 Even older children
who are verbal are often intimidated by the abuser from alerting anyone to their
plight, and toddlers like Joshua are in worse shape. They rarely have contact
with anyone outside their family, unless their parents permit it;3 20 they cannot
protect themselves; and they cannot escape. 321 Eventually, children become
conditioned to the abuse and accept it as their due.322 In response to the
problems of child abuse, every state, the District of Columbia, and all the United
States territories have established child protection systems. 32 3 In all of these
systems, child abuse reports trigger investigation by social workers and then in-
tervention if necessary. 324 There is a great deal of uniformity, partially because
federal law, beginning with the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of
1974,325 required certain programs as a condition of federal aid. 326
The MCCY told the Court that the Wisconsin child abuse reporting law
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the pioneer children's welfare society that has
been studied by Linda Gordon. See L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 12.
313. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at iii.
314. Id. at 2.
315. Id. at 3.
316. Id. at iii.
317. National Association of Counties Brief, supra note 196, at 5, 8, 13-19.
318. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 9.
319. Id. at 9-10; see also Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of
Wyman v. James, 69 MicH. L. Rv. 1259, 1306 (1971) (vulnerability of preschool age children).
320. Joshua DeShaney shared this dangerous isolation. See supra note 288.
321. 'Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 10. Although experts now question
whether child abuse occurs more frequently among very young children, see supra note 170, this
point about their greater helplessness has been made by other observers. See Redden, The Federal
and State Response to the Problem of Child Maltreatment in America: A Survey of Reporting Stat-
utes, 2 NovA L.J. 13, 23 & n.72 (1978). Abuse of very young children also may have more serious
consequences. For example, between 1980 and 1982 children age one and two were the most fre-
quent victims of child homicides in Missouri. CHILD HOMICIDES, supra note 306, at 10-11. This is
also true nationally: 64% of child homicide victims were age one or two and only 20% of the
victims were over age five. Id.
322. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 11.
323. Id. at 11-12.
324. Id. at 12.
325. Pub. L. 93-247, 88 Stat. 5 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5105-5106 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)).
326. Besharov, supra note 66, at 157-59.
[Vol. 68
DESHANEY IN CONTEXT
follows the pattern of the federal act.327 It requires DSS to respond to reports of
child abuse with an immediate investigation when there is reason to suspect that
a child's health or safety is in immediate danger. 32 8 Investigation must begin
within twenty-four hours of the report; if services are needed they must be pro-
vided. 329 The MCCY also asserted that it was both practical and feasible for a
court to review social work practice in child abuse cases. 330 Standards in the
field are sufficiently clear to allow anyone familiar with abusing families and
their children to determine that the agency's actions grossly deviated from those
principles. 331 Point by point, the MCCY brief went through the culpable de-
faults of the agency that was supposed to be protecting Joshua.332 For example,
the social worker failed to act 333 even though she saw a series of unexplained
injuries to Joshua, a classic indicator of child abuse, and observed cigarette
burns on him, another common sign that is easy to confirm with medical
diagnosis. 334
The MCCY explained how the structure of the state's child protective sys-
tem interacts with the etiology of child abuse. The universally adopted model
"preempt[s] society's response to the abusive family"; 335 in law and in practice,
the child protection agency becomes the sole source of services to the abused
child and the family, displacing other institutions in society. Police, hospitals,
other social service agencies, *the child's school, and her church "are all inhibited
from acting, because all believe that the social service agency is in charge." 336
The result can be serious for the abused child, because this preemption exagger-
ates the isolation that makes her so vulnerable, thereby increasing the danger to
the child if agency intervention is carried out indifferently. 337 The MCCY be-
lieved that this may have happened to Joshua, citing the hospital's reliance on
their report to the protective agency to satisfy fully their responsibilities to
him. 338 Seriously flawed intervention also can increase the danger to the child
327. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 13.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 13-14.
330. Id. at 14.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 14-26.
333. The MCCY claimed that the social worker had several options but exercised none of them.
She did not obtain medical confirmation of the injuries to use as evidence to remove Joshua from the
home; she did not take the boy into emergency custody; nor did she take the case back to court. She
did not even see to it that the contracted-for services were provided to the family, including counsel-
ing for the father and his girlfriend, more frequent visits from a social workers, and daily visits from
a parent aide or protective day care. Id. at 25-26.
334. Id. at 20.
335. Id. at 27.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 27-28. Isolation is dangerous even for adult women who are victims of wifebeating.
The abuser often systematically isolates the woman and forces her to cut ties with friends and family.
Training on family violence for the Houston Police Department now includes "isolation" on lists of
"Warning Signs" and of reasons "Why Women Stay." J. Meanix-Garcia, Family Violence (April
18, 1989) (unpublished materials distributed at Houston Police Department training seminar) (copy
on file at North Carolina Law Review). My thanks to the Houston Police Department for permit-
ting me to attend this excellent training seminar. Although isolation can become a problem for adult
women, it is inherently characteristic of the condition of young children.
338. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 28.
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in other ways. 339 The MCCY noted that it is known in the profession that the
initial intervention, without adequate follow-up and treatment, may simply
"raise the abuser's sense of anxiety and intensify his feelings of inadequacy, the
same feelings that fuel the urge to attack the child." 340
The MCCY argued that the special relationship criteria should be limited
to "those who are in genuine need of special protection, such as children and
other incompetents who are known to be at serious risk of physical harm."
34
'
The relevant factors would include danger to the victim, helplessness of the vic-
tim, knowledge by the state of the threat to the victim, and the assumption of the
role of protector by the state.342
Legal custody, on the other hand, should not be dispositive. The amicus
brief properly pointed out that legal custody of a child is often a matter of "hap-
penstance, with little relation to the risk to the child."'34 3 The state may assume
legal custody of a child whom they place in relative safety with grandparents, or,
it may not have legal custody of a child at great risk like Joshua, for whom they
have nonetheless assumed life-and-death responsibility. 344 The MCCY's point
is well taken. Common practices in the child welfare field make the assumption
of custody an artificial line: the therapeutic and rehabilitative goal is to obtain
voluntary cooperation of parents, including the abuser, and to hold in reserve
the coercive power of the state whenever possible.34 5 There are also practical
reasons why this is the preferred course of action, 346 even when the child is in
danger.
339. Id. at 28-29.
340. Id. at 29-30. For another acknowledgement that ineffective intervention makes the child's
situation worse, see Texas Senate Committee Report, supra note 169, at 16-17.
Despite the posture of this case, dismissal on a motion for summary judgment before complete
factual development, Judge Posner inappropriately felt free to assume that "it is unlikely that [the
social worker's] well intentioned but ineffectual intervention did Joshua any good at all, but it is
most unlikely that it did him any harm. She merely failed to protect him from his bestial father."
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109
S, Ct. 998 (1989). Similarly, the Supreme Court implicitly assumed that fact. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct.
at 1007. The Court took the position that so long as Joshua was injured while in his father's legal
custody, the state played no role in creating the danger to him or in making him more vulnerable to
it. Id. at 1006.
341. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 35.
342. Id. at 35.
343. Id. at 35-36. For examples of children whose situations illustrate this point, see supra text
accompanying notes 155-57 (the Brown baby in the Jensen case) and supra notes 184-85 and accom-
panying text (Aleta Bailey).
344. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 36.
345. See, e.g., Edwards, The Relationship of Family and Juvenile Courts in Child Abuse Cases, 27
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 207-12 (1987). Douglas Besharov, former director of the National
Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, noted that nationally, less than 20% of the cases of "substanti-
ated" child abuse result in removal from the home to foster care. Instead, the general policy is to
seek "home supervision," unless the parents refuse to cooperate. Besharov, supra note 66, at 160 &
n.41. Conversely, foster care placements, which are overwhelmingly "voluntary" in form may not
really be so voluntary. Parents may agree because of the threat of coercive action if they do not. See
Garrison, supra note 69, at 1748 n.6; Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protec-
tion of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 237-242 (1988).
346. For example, there may be no place to put a child taken into agency custody because of a
shortage of foster homes. See Texas Senate Committee Report, supra note 169, at 66, 79, 85. Offi-
cials may lack the investigatory legal tools that are needed to deal with noncooperation by the par-
ents (for instance, to insist on physical examination of the child or entry into the home). See Hardin,
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The MCCY argued that the nature of the state's intervention in Joshua's
life, the risks that intervention caused, and the state's assumption of the role of
protector of Joshua's welfare all required the state to bear fourteenth amend-
ment responsibility for his life and bodily integrity.347 The state intervened,
took responsibility for Joshua, and preempted any other institution that might
have protected him;348 inept government action heightened the dangers facing
the isolated child.349 The MCCY concluded that the state's indifference to the
welfare of a totally helpless child for whom it has assumed the role of protector
is offensive to the fundamental values of our culture and violates the due process
clause.350 This due process argument, with its refined version of the special rela-
tionship test can be called, as the MCCY characterized it, "narrow," 351 but it is
also specific and contextual.
Instead of picturing the MCCY argument as a smaller slice of the special
relationship pie, it is more useful to extend the exploration of context even fur-
ther, in order to comprehend the constitutional values implicated. In a number
of ways, for reasons arguably good and bad, the state has used its power to treat
violence against children by their parents (or other family members) differently
from other so-called "private" assaults on bodily integrity and safety. Histori-
cally, some childsavers relied on criminal prosecution to remedy parental abuse
and neglect of children.35 2 Today, there is some renewed call for this ap-
proach. 353 By the end of the Progressive Era around 1920, however, the prevail-
Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV.
493, 497 (1988).
347. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 30.
348. Id. at 27.
349. Id. at 28.
350. Id. at 32.
351. Id. at 35 (limiting constitutional special relationships to those who are in genuine need of
special protection, such as children and other incompetents who are known to be at serious risk of
physical harm).
352. The children's anticruelty societies established in the 1870s used criminal as well as civil
law to punish abusers and remove abused and neglected children from parental custody. E. PLECK,
supra note 45, at 69. The two oldest of these organizations differed on their approach. The New
York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC), which had closer ties to the Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), favored prosecution of the parents. The Boston
SPCC, however, which drew support from both the male SPCA organizers and women active in
social reform, emphasized instead charity and casework help to children and families. L. GORDON,
supra note 45, at 34. In the late nineteenth century there was also a law-and-order movement,
headed by mostly Republican male lawyers, judges, district attorneys, and other law enforcement
officials to punish wife beaters with the whipping post. It had limited legislative success. E. PLECK,
supra note 45, at 109. Sometimes, child molestation was included in the program. One goal of this
whipping-post campaign was to stifle even louder demands for cruel punishment of lawbreakers.
The leadership was worried about vigilante action, which began in the 1870s by the Ku Klux Klan in
the South and White Caps in the Midwest. The vigilantes mostly targeted independent-minded ex-
slaves, but they also whipped child abusers, drunken men, adulterers, prostitutes, and mothers of
illegitimate children. Some judges believed that if legal institutions did not take the lead, the vigilan-
tes would prevail. Id. at 109-10. There was a strong racist and social control overtone to this move-
ment. Id. at 109, 116.
353. See, eg., Peters, Dinsmore & Toth, Child Abuse Is a Criminal Offense, in CHILDREN AND
THE LAW 161 (1988). The authors, who are associated with the National Center for the Prosecution
of Child Abuse, claim that "no conflict has caused greater dissention [sic] among professionals work-
ing on behalf of abused children than the use of criminal prosecution as a response to child abuse."
Id. The National Center opposes both decriminalization and separate standards for intrafamilial
sexual abuse: "there is absolutely no legal or moral justification for ignoring cases where the acts of
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing model clearly had become preventive rather than punitive.35 4 Starting
around 1900 specialized juvenile courts or other separate family law tribunals
were established to handle certain categories of people rather than to punish
criminal offenses: "The basic goal of these courts was to preserve the family, act
in the best interests of the child, and offer a curative rather than punitive ap-
proach to family problems. ' 355 Beginning in 1910 courts of domestic relations
physical or sexual abuse are committed by a family member, while strangers are treated as criminals
for committing similar acts." Id. Especially focusing on sexual abuse, the authors noted that a
number of community interests are served by criminal prosecution: it establishes that the child is the
innocent victim and the perpetrator is the one who did wrong; it "validates the victims' and society's
sense of fairness" that the older person has no right to violate or exploit the weakness of children; it
educates the community that child abuse is wrong and so may serve as a deterrent; the court has the
power to order offenders into a treatment program to modify deviant sexual or other abusive behav-
ior, thus reducing the likelihood of recidivism; criminal prosecution produces a criminal record
which, unlike social service records, will follow the offender from state to state. Id. at 165.
Although the Center recognizes that prosecution is not a panacea, they contend that it recognizes
that the offenders are accountable for their misdeeds and that children are as entitled to protection
under the law as adults. Id. For a discussion of the increased public cries for tougher abuse laws
and of the substantial increase from 1980 to 1984 in the number of criminal cases involving abuse of
children in Los Angeles County, see Patton, Forever Torn Asunder: Charting Evidentiary Parame-
ters, the Right to Competent Counsel and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in California Child
Dependency and Parental Severance Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 302 (1987) Patton be-
lieves that criminal prosecution for child abuse (including sexual abuse) in Los Angeles County "is
no longer a remote possibility, it is probable." Id. at 305.
Some of the recent campaigns for recriminalization uncannily resemble the SPCCs of the 1870s.
For example, Justice for Children (JFC), a child advocacy citizens group established by a former
assistant district attorney in Houston, Texas, is developing a court-watch policy in order to influence
prosecutors and judges in favor of criminal prosecution of child abusers. A member of the group
saw some parents who were sending their three-year-old into heavy traffic to solicit money and
reported it to authorities. JFC continued to play an active role in ensuring that the parents were
prosecuted under a provision of the Texas Penal Code that creates a misdemeanor for abandoning or
endangering a child, and were asked by the criminal court judge whether or not the proposed plea
bargain in the case was acceptable to the organization. JFC NEWSLETrER, July 1989. This inter-
vention by JFC seems quite similar to the even more comprehensive role played by the SPCCs in
initiating prosecutions. The most influential figures in child welfare work, however, continue to
oppose calls for recriminalization of child abuse. See, eg., Besharov, supra note 66, at 164-65.
It is not clear what to make of the political meaning of the voices speaking up for recriminaliza-
tion of child abuse. Feminists have yet to develop an analysis of child abuse. But see LAHEY, Re.
search on Child Abuse in Liberal Patriarchy, in TAKING SEX INTO ACCOUNT: THE POLICY
CONSEQUENCES OF SEXIST RESEARCH (1984) (Canadian feminist discussion of research on child
abuse). Peters, Dinsmore, and Toth implicitly accept the feminist-derived conclusion that Freud
was wrong about childish sexual fantasy and that widespread serious sexual exploitation of children
exists. See Peters, Dinsmore & Toth, supra; F. RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: THE SEXUAL
ABUSE OF CHILDREN (1980). In general, however, this movement seems to be a relatively conserva-
tive one, related to more general victims' rights and crime control concerns. In the 1980s the chief
political preoccupations seem to be crime and drug control. For the role of victims' rights ideology
in Burger Court criminal decisions, see O'Neill, The Good, the Bad, the Burger Court: Victims'
Rights and a New Model of Criminal Review, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 369-71 (1984).
Even efforts to reform child protective services sound the theme of crime control: the dedication of
the StaffReport on Child Protective Services in Texas to the Texas Senate Committee on Health and
Human Services, which calls for reforms in social services rather than for recriminalization, states:
"The children we fail to protect today will possibly be the adults we protect ourselves from to-
morrow." Texas Senate Committee Report, supra note 169, at i, 20.
354. L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 60-61; E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 126.
355. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 126. The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in Chi-
cago; within 20 years all but 3 states had them. Id. at 126. There was also a general decrease in
emphasis on child abuse and child "cruelty" itself. Id.
On the juvenile courts, see A. PLATr, supra note 45, and Fox, supra note 45. For a critique of
recent changes in the juvenile court system that criminalize its internal structure and therefore en-
sure that juveniles get the worst of all possible worlds (adult criminal treatment without adult crimi-
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with legal authority over family crimes such as domestic assault and nonpay-
ment of child support, emerged as the adult extension of the already-established
juvenile courts.35 6 Historian Elizabeth Pleck found that "family court judges
believed they were helping to decriminalize family violence." '357
This decriminalization of family violence also characterized the modem
reawakening of interest in child abuse that began in the 1960s and led to the
nationwide establishment of child protection social service agencies in the 1970s,
including the Wisconsin system at issue in DeShaney.358 Looking back in 1982,
Douglas Besharov, the first director of the National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect, noted that the experts who called for the establishment of specialized
child protection agencies had a commitment to nonpunitive, therapeutic re-
sponses to child mistreatment.35 9 The system that became universal and that
channels child abuse complaints to such agencies rarely seeks criminal prosecu-
tion. Nationwide, in 1978 less than five percent of substantiated cases of child
abuse resulted in criminal prosecution. 360 Officials undertook criminal prosecu-
nal court procedural protections), see Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for
the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 272-76 (1984).
356. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 136.
357. Id. at 126, 137; see also L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 69-72 (noting the reinterpretation of
cruelty and adoption of prevention as watchword of social work after WWI).
358. See, eg., Paulsen, supra note 65, at 692 (discusses the "shortcomings in the application of
the criminal law to cases of child abuse"). Criminal prosecution destroys any hope for a continuing
family life and is appropriate only in severe cases, "cases which indicate that further harm may be
done to others, cases which call for vengeance (if that call should ever be heeded), or cases which so
disturb the community's sense of security that the events cannot go unremarked." Id. (emphasis
added). Even if it was not possible because of the danger to leave the child in the home, Paulsen
recommended that the removal not be accomplished by criminal means:
The publicity of the case is likely to damage the reputations of both parent and child. A
conviction carries with it no social services. Merely beginning a prosecution is likely to
mean the end of the chance to improve a child's home situation. Parents are nearly always
resentful of the proceeding, and the hostility thus engendered makes casework with the
child's family all but impossible. Moreover, a criminal prosecution is a clumsy affair. The
defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and a criminal trial is subject
to a great many rules of evidence that are grounded in policies other than the pursuit of
truth and the punishment of crime when crime is found. For example, the rules adopted as
part of the effort to deter police misconduct or protect the privacy of communication be-
tween husband and wife will naturally impede the successful prosecution of abusive par-
ents. An act of child abuse is not likely to take place openly, and when it does, neighbors
are often unwilling to testify.
Id.
In 1978, 29 of the states that had already enacted mandatory reporting legislation specifically
proclaimed the nonpunitive intent and desire to preserve the family of these child abuse statutes.
Redden, supra note 321, at 34.
359. Besharov, supra note 66, at 156; see also Hardin, supra note 346, at 593-94 (purpose of a
civil child protection proceeding is not to punish the parents but to safeguard the child; parental
rights may be preserved even when there has been "reprehensible" conduct toward the child).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently decided that social workers must also give Mi-
randa-type warnings when they are acting as law enforcement officers. Cates v. State, 776 S.W.2d
170, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Randy Burton, founder of the Houston-based Justice for Chil-
dren, has criticized Texas' Child Protective Services for deciding that workers should not give the
warnings, but instead should eschew any law enforcement role. Prosecution of Child Abusers Being
Jeopardized, Houston Chronicle, Aug. 16, 1989, at B 11, col. 1.
360. Besharov, supra note 66, at 159-60 (citing U.S. NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING (1978) 36, Table 28
(1979)). But see Patton, supra note 353, at 302 n.19 (238% increase in criminal cases involving
abuse of children in Los Angeles County from 1980 to 1984).
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tions only in cases of severe brutality such as homicide, serious assault, torture,
sexual psychopathology, or forced starvation. 361
By decriminalizing child abuse, the state in a sense creates an unusual de-
fense to the crime of child abuse, at least for the majority of cases, which are
unprosecuted. In our legal system as well as in others, an adult person cannot
"consent" to a criminal assault against herself, consent does not constitute a
defense to the criminal charge.362 The state, however, withdraws certain kinds
of criminal assaults by parents against their children from the criminal justice
system in order to realize the rehabilitative goals of the child protective system
and to preserve the integrity of the child's family. One could say that the state
"consents" to the assault when it acts in loco parentis and, it is hoped, in the best
interests of the child who needs protection, decriminalizes the abuse, and pre-
serves the family unit. At the least, the state in effect consents to a defense or
waives prosecution for the otherwise criminal offense. In diverting most child
abuse away from the criminal justice system and into child protection agencies,
therefore, the state has used its power affirmatively to put children in a very
different position from any other victim of assault.
The diversion of child abuse from the criminal justice system, moreover, is
but one example of the ways in which state law treats children differently from
other victims of violence. At one time husbands and fathers were privileged to
discipline their wives and their children physically.3 63 Interfamilial tort immu-
nities, moreover, protected parents from civil suits by their children whom they
had injured negligently or intentionally.364 The tort immunities are rapidly dis-
appearing today. 365 Although the law no longer explicitly authorizes husbands
to "chastise" their wives, the parental prerogative to inflict physical punishment
on their children remains. 366 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
361. Besharov, supra note 66, at 160.
362. Cf Rosenberg & Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Seif.Incrimina.
tion, 63 N.Y.U.L. REv. 955 (1988) (discusses the Jewish law ban on self-incrimination as part of a
larger philosophy that one's life is not one's own to give away through confession to crime, a kind of
suicidal consent). Anglo-American law had a related doctrine that a person could not consent to a
criminal act against herself. Id. at 1037. Consent to an assault on one's person is also not a defense
in Jewish law. Id. at 1037 n.298.
363. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *432-33; see State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 488, 489-90
(1886) (traditional view that there is no criminal liability for parents who administer disciplinary
beatings of their children); see also Olsen, supra note 291, at 1506 n.31 (noting that modem courts
apply different standards in torts of physical harm when defendant is victim's parent).
364. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at
904-10 (5th ed. 1984); Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect: Part P" Historical Overview, Legal Matrix
and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293, 339 (1972) (in 1972 most states still clung to old com-
mon-law rule of parent/child tort immunity).
365. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment j (1979) (notes that the move of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to abrogate parent/child immunity, Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122
N.W. 2d 193 (1963), has been followed by a "substantial minority" of other jurisdictions). The
Reporters approved of this "clear and accelerating trend." Id.
366. Professor Frances Olsen points out that although a modem court might allow tort recovery
for serious physical injury caused by a parental discipline, courts nevertheless apply a different stan-
dard because the defendant is a parent. Olsen, supra note 291, at 1506 n.31; see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.08 (1)(a) (1980) (sanctioning use of force by parent against a child for the purpose of
safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 &
comment d (1975) (parental privilege of discipline broader than that of others).
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placed its stamp of approval on the practice of schools using corporal punish-
ment on children in loco parentis.3 6 7 In 1977, well after the pediatric reawaken-
ing and the nascence of federal and state laws to prevent abuse, the Court
decided in Ingraham v. Wright 368 that although children have an historic liberty
interest in avoiding corporal punishment, that interest is also "subject to histori-
cal limitations. '369 The Ingraham Court noted that "reasonable" corporal pun-
ishment traditionally was considered justified, and that the laws of most states
continued to take that view. 370 As a result, the Court concluded that "under
that longstanding accommodation of interests, there can be no deprivation of
substantive rights as long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the lim-
its of the common-law privilege. '371
Formally and informally the legal system (police, prosecutors, judges, and
legislators) regards victims of intimate violence, children and also women,372 in
a different light than victims of stranger violence. With respect to wifebeating,
the battered woman's movement challenged that differential treatment. The clas-
sic book of the movement in the United States, first issued in 1976, was Battered
Wives. 373 In it, Del Martin spoke of the nationwide pattern of police refusal to
respond to the battered woman's call for help. 3 7 4 At every level, women met
delay and diversion in their effort to seek recourse from the legal system. For
example, in 1962 the New York legislature transferred wife abuse cases from the
jurisdiction of the criminal courts to the family courts, where civil procedures
apply. The harsher penalties of the criminal law were replaced by civil proce-
dures and protective orders.3 7 5 Justice Joseph B. Williams, administrative judge
of New York City's Family Court explained the purpose of the change: "The
367. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977); L. WALKER, supra note 306, at 149; D. GIL,
supra note 306, at 10 (notes that violence against children was still in 1970 "a widely sanctioned
phenomenon in American society"). Gil used corporal punishment in schools as an example, and
found it interesting that several state legislatures enacted laws permitting teachers to use corporal
punishment at the same legislative session at which they enacted a law mandating the reporting of
physical abuse of children. Id. at 10 n.6; see Cohen, Freedom from Abuse: One of the Human Rights
of Children, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 601, 606, 612 (1986). Attorney Cohen, a United Nations
Representative and Consultant, noted that the use of corporal punishment in schools is not univer-
sally accepted internationally. It is largely confined to "a handful of countries which were once
occupied by England or were part of the United Kingdom." Id. at 612.
368. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
369. Id. at 675.
370. Id. at 676.
371. Id. The Court went on to decide that the child had a significant interest in adequate proce-
dural safeguards to minimize the risks of wrongful or excessive corporal punishment, but that such
an interest was satisfied by the existence of postdeprivation state tort law remedies in Florida. Id. at
676-682.
372. For some evidence of a factual link between wifebeating and child abuse, see P. CHESLER,
supra note 306, at 55; D. MARTIN, supra note 305, at 23; L. WALKER, supra note 306, at 27-28.
373. D. MARTIN, supra note 305. Martin attributes the beginning of the movement to the work
of Erin Pizzey in England. Cf E. PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR
(1974). Pizzey is an activist who started the first advice center in London in 1971, which later
developed into the influential Chiswick Women's Aid. D. MARTIN, supra note 305, at 6. In 1979
Lenore Walker issued her classic study of the psychology of battered women and the coercive tech-
niques batterers use in their relationships with women. See L. WALKER, supra note 306.
374. D. MARTIN, supra note 305, at 96; see also L. WALKER, supra note 306, at 26-27 (battered
women do not believe that the police are effective in checking the violence).
375. Id. at 104.
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Family Court Act is not geared with punishment as a primary objective ....
We're trying to stabilize the family."' 376 Martin and the battered woman's
movement she represented, however, questioned this goal. She was scathing in
her criticism of a system that forces a woman seeking protection or trying to
escape from her violent husband to rely on a system intent upon "stabilizing"
her family.377 We have learned from the battered women's movement that
wifebeating is about power. 378 The veil of privacy and autonomy drawn over
the family, moreover, has been "invoked to remove some individuals," such as
battered women, "from the public guarantees of these liberties. '379 "[O]ne must
ask: whose privacy? whose liberties?" 380 The late nineteenth-century growth in
state protective intervention in families chronicled by Gordon reflected that
''one man's loss in privacy was often another's (frequently a woman's) gain in
rights."
38 1
After 1976, contemporary women's movement activists resorted to the
courts and state legislatures to demand an end to official reluctance to intervene
in family violence. 38 2 Thurman v. City of Torrington38 3 was the most successful
of the lawsuits challenging differential police treatment of domestic violence.38 4
Tracey Thurman and her son alleged that the Torrington, Connecticut police
department violated their right to equal protection of the laws when they ig-
nored or rejected Tracey's many attempts to file complaints against her es-
tranged husband, who was threatening them with death and maiming. Charles
Thurman was under a court order to stay away from his wife and child.3 85 The
police department, however, refused to take seriously Tracey Thurman's com-
plaints about her husband because this was not violence between strangers, but
376. Id. at 105.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 26-44; see also L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 3, 292 (family violence emerged from
power struggles in which family members were contending for often scarce material resources). For
the coercive techniques (physical, sexual, economic, familial, and social) used by batterers, see L.
WALKER, supra note 306, at 72-184.
379. L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 294.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. The public rediscovery of wifebeating began in 1974 through efforts of activists such as
Laurie Woods and Majory Fields, who developed a critique of the police refusal to respond to do-
mestic violence calls. They began to bring class action suits. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 185-87.
The establishment of women's shelters legitimized the issue of wifebeating, and the radical feminist
influence waned and was replaced by the growth of a bureaucracy. Id. at 190. By 1976, some states
began to pass new laws on spouse abuse, such as funding for shelters, improved reporting, repeal of
interspousal immunity for torts, or more effective criminal court procedures. Id. at 192. By 1980
most states had followed. Id.
383. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
384. Thurman is also one of the cases cited by the Third Circuit in support of an affirmative duty
of protection in its child protection case. Estate of Bailey ex rel. Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d
503, 510 (3d Cir. 1985).
In addition to a substantial judgment for the plaintiff, Thurman is no doubt also responsible for
a significant change in Connecticut state law, the passage of the Family Violence Prevention and
Response Act. See Family Violence Prevention and Response Act, Pub, Act No. 86-337, 1986
Conn. Acts 775 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1986
& Supp. 1989)); cf The Women's Advocate: Newsletter of the National Center on Women and
Family Law, January 1987, at 1, 6-7.
385. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1525.
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rather "domestic" violence, all in the family.38 6 In the end, police default per-
mitted Charles Thurman to attack and seriously injure his wife.387 The district
court held that the affirmative duty of police officers to preserve law and order
and to protect the personal safety of persons in the community applied equally
to women threatened by those with whom they have had a domestic relation-
ship, as well as to other members of the public. 388 If the police were on notice of
the threat to Tracey Thurman and her son, then they had an affirmative duty to
protect them too, and police inaction deprived Tracey and her child of their
constitutional rights. 3 8 9 The Thurman case exposes the context of family vio-
lence policy. It closely resembles paradigmatic civil rights cases in which a vic-
tim of violence or harassment sued state officials for failing to prevent the
harm.39 0
This Article does not raise the context of the differential treatment afforded
children who are victims of domestic violence or discuss the Thurman case in
order to argue that DeShaney should have been grounded on equal protection
instead of due process. The DeShaney Court easily conceded that the state may
not selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities, but
observed that no such argument was made by the parties.39 1 There may be ra-
tional, arguably even compelling,392 reasons for treating children assaulted by
their parents differently from other classes of victims of violence. Family pri-
vacy is a real concern. It can be important to preserve family integrity in the
face of state officials who may be too eager to exert social control over families
that are different in class, ethnicity, and racial background from their control-
lers.393 Studies have demonstrated that serious legal intervention in the form of
an arrest can reduce recidivism in wife-battering.394 When the legal system
386. Id. at 1526-27. The complaint alleged that the Torrington police consistently afforded less
protection when the victim was either a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend or a
child abused by a father or stepfather. Id. at 1527.
387. Id. at 1526.
388. Id. at 1527. The court noted that the defendants made no effort to defend their differential
treatment of women who were the victims of domestic violence. Id. at 1528. It commented, how-
ever, on some justifications that might have been offered. At one time English common law did
sanction such disparate treatment. A husband had legal authority to physically discipline his wife
within certain limits-the so-called rule of thumb. This male marital prerogative, however, no
longer merited legal support. Id.
389. Id. at 1527.
390. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
391. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.3.
392. Modem equal protection analysis in effect recognizes three standards of review of legislative
classifications. The Court will give deferential review to ordinary social and economic legislation
that affects neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, upholding any classification that is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state purpose and that is not wholly arbitrary and irrational. If,
however, a fundamental interest or suspect class triggers strict scrutiny, the state must offer a com-
pelling reason for the classification. These are rarely found. Some of the cases involving illegitimacy
and gender have been reviewed more closely, according to an intermediate standard that requires a
showing of a closer fit with a more substantial state interest. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 263,
§§ 16-1 to 16-59 (discussing model of equal protection and levels of review).
393. See L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 28-29; Areen, Intervention between Parent and Child: A
Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 888 (1975); Burt,
supra note 319, at 1305-06. But see L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 291-99 (criticizing simple model
of social control).
394. Buel, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 215-16 & n.16
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takes the battering seriously, it undermines the batterer's belief that his assaults
on his wife are his own private business, tacitly condoned by the society at
large. 395 No comparable studies or analyses exist for child abuse, and the dy-
namic may be somewhat different. 396 There are also practical difficulties of
proof that make it easier and therefore perhaps more desirable to proceed civilly
in child abuse cases rather than criminally.397 Finally, children are always in
someone's custody,398 and it seems reasonable to prefer the custody of a rehabil-
itated family to state custody through foster care and an incarcerated parent.399
The differential treatment of child abuse and its equal protection resonance,
however, fortifies the due process conclusion. Children have a special status,
which means that they get both less 4°° and also more4° 1 than adults receive
(1988) (studies in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Newport News, Virginia; and Hartford, Connecticut).
The social scientists who authored the Minneapolis study have been criticized for prematurely pub-
licizing their results. They have recently been defended in an article that notes the powerful impact
release of the study has had on police department practice. Sherman & Cohn, The Impact of Re-
search on Legal Policy: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & Soc'v REV. 117,
141 (1989). My thanks to my colleague Joe Sanders for drawing this debate to my attention.
395. See Recent Development, Judging Domestic Violence, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 275, 277,
281 (1987).
396. Studies of police behavior with respect to child abuse are just beginning to be done. See
Willis & Wells, The Police and Child Abuse: An Analysis of Police Decisions to Report Illegal Behav.
ior, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 695 (1988).
397. See Hardin, supra note 346, at 520, 530, 534; Parker, Dissolving Family Relations: Termi-
nation of Parent-Child Relations-An Overview, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 555, 560-61 (1986); Paulsen,
supra note 65, at 692.
398. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
399. After a period of enormous growth in removals of abused children from their homes, there
was a reassessment of this policy, in part prompted by federal legislation in 1980. Adoption Assist-
ance and Child Welfare Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 103, 94 Stat. 500 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 627 (1982)); see Garrison, supra note 69, at 1760.
Experience showed that children themselves were strangely resistant to removal from even a
"bad" home. Parker, supra note 397, at 572-73 (quoting Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Ne-
glected Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of
Children in Foster Care, and Terminations of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 644-46 (1976)),
Foster care also was very expensive for the state. Garrison, supra note 69, at 1754. Influential critics
such as Joseph Goldstein, of Yale Law School, Albert J. Solnit, Professor of Pediatrics at Yale
University, and Anna Freud, the Director of the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic in London, called
for a policy of minimal intervention. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9-10, 135-37 (1979).
400. Child abuse is largely decriminalized; parents are privileged to discipline their children
physically; and public institutions-schools-may inflict reasonable corporal punishment. See supra
notes 358-67 and accompanying text.
The Court has held "in a variety of contexts that 'the power of the state to control the conduct
of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.'" Carey v. Population Servs., 431
U.S. 678, 692 (1976) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)); see also Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (three reasons the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated
with those of adults are: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical deci-
sions in an informed mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing"). For
example, juveniles, because they are already always in someone's custody, are uniquely subject to
preventive detention. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 265. In the juvenile courts, they are not entitled to the
same right to trial by jury that adults enjoy. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-50 (1978).
401. Children are the object of legislative and judicial solicitude that has created protective
structures of one kind or another. Michael Grossberg has traced the nineteenth-century develop-
ment of the "best interest of the child" standard by which judges asserted their right to intervene in
that most private of spheres when it was necessary to protect the child. M. GROSSBERG, supra note
296, at 234-307. The reforms of the Progressive Era implemented a number of protective ideas-
from child labor legislation to compulsory schooling to the establishment of the juvenile court sys-
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from our legal system. In a sense, it is a quid pro quo:402 the chief justification
for the other-than-equal approach to child abuse is that it represents a better
way to protect children than the alternatives that are available to all victims of
violence alike. Although it may be justified and there may be no equal protection
violation when the state decriminalizes child abuse in the name of family reha-
bilitation, surely that exercise of great state power means that there is a liberty
interest at stake when the state defaults on the alternative. The state's constitu-
tional duty to protect Joshua, therefore, arose from more than the special rela-
tionship that it had with him. It also derived from the state's affirmative use of
power that imposed a special legal status on him, increased his isolation and
vulnerability to abuse by his father, and left him only one avenue of protection-
the protective services agency. If that agency so departed from its function as to
arbitrarily and irrationally fail to protect Joshua, then it violated the due process
clause of the Constitution.
The 1980 political reaction of right-wing conservatives to the success of
domestic violence activists in gaining access to federal funds further suggests
that the context of power in the family is a salient one. The interposition of the
state between violent family members and their victims aroused opposition in
the name of family integrity and autonomy. Wifebeating became an issue of the
women's movement in the early 1970s. By 1976 the first state laws on wife
abuse, including funding for shelters, improved reporting, and repeal of inter-
spousal immunity from torts were passed.4° 3 In the late 1970s activists began to
lobby for repeal of the marital rape exemption. 4° 4 In 1978 the United States
Civil Rights Commission held hearings on battered women4° 5 and in 1979 Presi-
dent Carter established an Office of Domestic Violence.4° 6 The political reac-
tion followed swiftly: conservative Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and S.I.
tern. Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 8-9 (1986). Most pertinent, all 50 states have created elaborate social service struc-
tures, supported by the coercive powers of the law, whose sole function is to protect children from
abuse and neglect. See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
The Court has recognized some constitutional rights that children may exercise autonomously,
most significantly in the area of contraception and abortion. See, eg., Carey, 431 U.S. at 693. The
Court, however, rarely has afforded children greater autonomous constitutional protection than
adults. Justice Brennan unsuccessfully argued in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), that children
should receive greater procedural protection in a mental commitment because the consequences of a
mistake at this stage of their lives were so serious. Id. at 627-28 (Brennan, concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (undocumented alien school-aged
children in Texas may not be denied a free public education; although education is not a fundamen-
tal right and undocumented aliens do not constitute a suspect class, the law must be reviewed more
closely because it "imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for
their disabling status").
402. The juvenile procedural cases implicitly rest on this principle. The presumed benefit to the
child from the informality and flexibility of the juvenile justice system justifies the loss of formal
criminal procedural rights. See, eg., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. Critics, however, have observed
that sometimes the juvenile gets the worst of all worlds: she loses the procedural protection but
gains very little from the juvenile justice system. E.g., Feld, supra note 355, at 142; see Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
403. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 192.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 195.
406. Id. at 196.
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Hayakawa of California led congressional opposition in 1980 to increased fund-
ing for domestic violence, condemning the intrusion of the federal social service
bureaucracy into family matters that properly were more local concerns. 40 7 A
New Right coalition campaigned against the legislation as part of their general
attack on feminism and other changes that were breaking up the family.408 Lob-
byists warned that the pending legislation would prevent parents from spanking
their children.4 9 and that giving federal aid to battered women's shelters would
promote divorce and intrude on the privacy of the family.410
In 1979 Senator Laxalt of Nevada introduced the so-called Family Protec-
tion Act,411 drafted by Karl Moor, executive director of the Moral Majority. 412
Although the bill never had a serious chance to pass, its provisions are instruc-
tive. It sought to eliminate federal expenditures designated for child abuse pre-
vention; to amend the definition of child abuse to exclude corporal punishment
by a parent or parental designate; and to stipulate that no federal law, grant,
program or directive could broaden or supersede existing state laws relating to
spousal abuse.413 Finally, after he took office in 1981, President Reagan closed
the Office of Domestic Violence. 414
Child abuse and wifebeating are not identical problems. Clearly, however,
there is a significant linkage, as illustrated by the conservative political defense
of the family. There are significant factual connections as well. In the DeShaney
case itself, one of the signs that should have made the agency suspect continuing
abuse of Joshua was his father's beating of Marie, the girlfriend who lived with
him.415 Power, the legally sanctioned relations of dominant and subordinate
within the family, makes the government's protective default particularly sus-
ceptible to a due process analysis. The function of the Bill of Rights is to redress
imbalance and protect the weak (political minorities) against the tyranny of the
strong (majorities).4 16 Children have no political means to redress the legally
407. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 196; J. Zeitlin, Domestic Violence: Perspectives from Washing-,
ton, in WOMEN IN WASHINGTON: ADVOCATES FOR PUBLIC POLICY 263-75 (1983).
408. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 197.
409. 38 CONG. Q. 2719 (Sept. 13, 1980).
410. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 197; Domestic Violence Conference Bill to Go to Senate for Final
Vote. Right Wing Targets Legislation for Defeat, SANENEWS: A NATIONAL NEWSLETrER ON BAT-
TERED WOMEN, Oct. 1980, at 1.
411. S. REP. No. 1808, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
412. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 197-98.
413. S. REP. No. 1808, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
414. E. PLECK, supra note 45, at 198.
415. Massachusetts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 23-24. In their recommendations for
improving the disastrous condition of Texas' child protective services, the staff of the Texas Senate
Committee on Health and Human Services acknowledged the interrelationship between child abuse
and wifebeating. They were critical that there is no statewide policy in Texas recognizing that the
presence of abuse of the mother is a high risk indicator for child abuse, and noted that the National
Woman Abuse Prevention Project (a national task force of family violence experts funded by the
Office of Victims of Crime in the United States Department of Justice) recently developed a protocol
for child protective service workers to intervene more effectively in cases in which there is both child
abuse and abuse of the child's mother. Texas Senate Committee Report, supra note 169, at 60-61.
416. In the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), the post-Lochner Court conceded that special circumstances may justify closer and more
solicitous judicial review. When there is prejudice against a discrete and insular minority and the
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and culturally sanctioned power relationships that can put their very lives in the
balance.
The Court need not engage in radical innovation in order to recognize that
a due process right was at stake in the DeShaney case. The bright line of affirm-
ative versus negative duties, assuming one exists in the Constitution, had already
long since been breached by other decisions of the Court, such as Estelle. It is
unsurprising, in view of cases like Stanley v. Illinois,4 17 to find liberty interests
implicated in family relationships. The context of domestic violence and state
child protection policy, moreover, provides a specific and solid basis for an un-
derstanding of the due process nature of the claim.
Moreover, the Court already has recognized that there is a protected liberty
interest in bodily integrity and personal security.418 Because of this, the Seventh
Circuit, in White v. Rochford,4 19 a 1979 opinion that was not overruled even by
the conservative panels that followed in the 1980s,4 20 had no difficulty deciding
that police officers who arrested an uncle on the Chicago Skyway, and then left
the three minor children who were with him in the abandoned car on the side of
the highway, violated the due process clause.42 1 Unlike the Supreme Court in
DeShaney, the court of appeals was not deterred by "the tenuous metaphysical
construct which differentiates sins of omission and commission." 4
22
political processes cannot be relied upon to protect its members, a more searching judicial inquiry is
appropriate. In another recent substantive due process case, Justice Blackmun reminded the Court:
[T]he very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissi-
tudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life,
liberty and property ... may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
election.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3077 n. 11 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)).
417. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unmarried father cannot be deprived of custody of his children with-
out due process of law).
418. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977) (although school children have a liberty
interest in personal security protected by due process, existing state remedies for excessive corporal
punishment in schools is the only process that is due); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
315 (1982) (institutionalized retarded man with the mind of an 18-month-old child has a liberty
interest in personal security protected by the fourteenth amendment).
419. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
420. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing White);
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing
White), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
421. White, 592 F.2d at 382 (7th Cir. 1979). While driving along the Chicago Skyway, a busy,
limited-access highway, with three minor children in the car, an uncle was stopped and arrested by
the police for drag racing. Although the uncle pleaded with the officers to take the children with
them to the police station or to a phone booth so that they could contact their parents, defendants
refused. Instead, they left all three children in an abandoned car on the side of the highway. The
children were finally driven out of the car by the cold, and crossed eight lanes of traffic, wandering
the freeway at night until they found a telephone to call their mother. Their mother, who had no car
to retrieve them, called the Chicago Police Department, which again refused to help. By the time
the children were rescued by a neighbor, they had suffered mental pain and anguish and the five-
year-old had experienced an asthmatic attack that resulted in a one-week hospitalization. Id. at 382.
422. Id. at 384. If the police intentionally discharged children under their care on the Chicago
Skyway in inclement weather without any rational justification, the court argued, that surely would
have intruded on the minors' right to personal security and implicated due process. Police indiffer-
ence to the fate of the children in White, constituting gross negligence or reckless disregard of their
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The Seventh Circuit utilized a due process standard in White that first was
expressed by the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California423 in 1952. The due
process clause prohibits state conduct that "shock[s] the conscience." 424 The
Court held in Rochin that pumping a suspect's stomach to acquire evidence vio-
lated the due process clause.425 Today the fourth amendment presumably
would apply to this kind of abusive police investigation, perhaps supplanting
other constitutional analysis.426 The White court, however, was correct in rec-
ognizing that Rochin's substantive due process framework retains contemporary
vitality.4 27 This method for identifying state actions that are fundamentally un-
fair or that shock the conscience no doubt would garner little support from
Judge Posner, author of the 1987 DeShaney opinion in the Seventh Circuit, 428 or
those Justices of the Supreme Court today who seem to be embracing a straight-
ened formalism429 in constitutional thinking.430 It would be premature at best,
safety, and leading to injury, seemed to the 1979 panel of the Seventh Circuit no different in kind.
Id. at 384-85.
423. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
424. White, 592 F.2d at 383.
425. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
426: In Graham v. O'Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989), the Court held that claims that law en-
forcement officials have used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
seizure of a person are properly analyzed under the fourth amendment's objective reasonableness
standard. Id. at 1867. The Court, however, did not decide whether the fourth amendment continues
to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of excessive force beyond the point
at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins. A substantive due process analysis may be appli-
cable to that situation. Id. at 1871 n.10.
Rochin was decided before the Court ruled that the guarantees of the fourth amendment were
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1963) (identical standards to be applied to fourth amendment
claims against federal or state governments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665 (1961) (exclusionary
rule applicable to fourth amendment claims made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (fourteenth amendment incorporates the
fourth amendment).
427. White, 592 F.2d at 385; see Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Consti-
tutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201, 204 n.10 (1984). The authors concede that the legitimacy and
contours of substantive due process are very controversial, but note that the Supreme Court nonethe-
less continues to rely on the doctrine. Id.
428. Judge Posner held that the state's failure to protect people from private violence or other
mishaps not attributable to the conduct of its employees is not a deprivation of constitutionally
protected property or liberty interests. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812
F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). Although the state may have failed in its
attempt to rescue Joshua, it was not complicit in the beatings administered by the boy's father. Id. at
302. Judge Posner therefore found DeShaney distinguishable from White, in which the state arrested
the uncle and therefore caused the injury. Id. at 303.
429. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
430. For example, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), which upheld application
of California's irrebuttable presumption of paternity of the husband to defeat the biological father's
efforts to establish paternity, Justice Scalia expressed his view of the sole permissible method for
deriving fundamental liberties protected by the due process clause. He would recognize only liber-
ties that are deeply rooted in history and tradition, in the very specific form that is asserted. Id. at
2341-42 (Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering an opinion, in which Rehn-
quist, CJ., and in all but note 6 of which O'Connor, J., and Kennedy, J., joined). So, for example,
because history and tradition considered the "unitary family," typically the marital family, sacro-
sanct, a liberty interest arose for that kind of relationship only, and did not extend to this biological
father who had stepped forward and was called "Daddy" by the little girl. Id. at 2342 n.3 (Scalia, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and in
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however, to say Rochin's vision of due process,43 1 with its room for evolving
standards ofjustice,432 is now entirely irrelevant. 433 The context of child protec-
tion, moreover, ensures that judges are not left "at large" 434 to fill the contours
of the due process clause with concerns more redolent of tort liability than con-
stitutional duty.
B. The Razor's Edge
The DeShaney majority offered a defense for the otherwise indefensible in-
difference of the Wisconsin child protection agency, and perhaps also for its own
refusal to recognize a constitutional interest. The Court noted that if the DSS
had moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they could
have been charged with improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship,
all but note 6 of which O'Connor, J., and Kennedy, J., joined). The method is a highly formal one
that relies on a simple canvass of what the prevailing view has been in the distant past.
Interestingly, only Chief Justice Rehnquist went the full mile with Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion. Justice Scalia lost conservative Justices O'Connor and Kennedy on his most doctrinaire
statement in footnote 6 about substantive due process methodology. Id. at 2344 n. 6 (Scalia, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and in
all but note 6 of which O'Connor, J., and Kennedy, J., joined). He insisted that the key to principled
constitutional decisionmaking was to inquire very specifically whether the right of an adulterous
natural father received traditional protection, rather than the more generic relationship of parentage.
Id. General traditions, he argued, merely "permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's
views.... [A] rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition, is no
rule of law at all." Id. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, withheld their approval from
footnote 6. They refused to "foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of
historical analysis." Id. at 2347 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Although Justice Stevens con-
curred in the result in Michael H., he did not accept Justice Scalia's analysis at all. Id. at 2347
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, which also garnered
the votes of Justices Marshall and Blackmun, explicitly rejected Justice Scalia's due process method-
ology and indeed centered its attack on the exclusively historical approach. See id. at 2349-51 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice White's separate dissenting opinion also did not accept the
constitutional straightjacket, but relied on prior cases recognizing a liberty interest of a father in his
relationship with his child to resolve this case. Id. at 2360 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice
Brennan is correct in his observation that only two members of the Court fully endorsed the new
methodology. Id. at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
431. In his Rochin majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter spoke about certain standards of justice
that are either "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental,'" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)), or are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). He denied that the absence of "formal exactitude, or want
of fixity of meaning," when dealing "not with the machinery of government but with human rights,"
left courts without any guidelines. Id. The words were symbols that were fleshed out by the gloss
given by history or by the process of judgment, as it falls "differently at different times and differ-
ently at the same time through different judges." Id. at 170. Judges were not left "at large" by the
"vague contours" of the due process clause to appeal to natural law. Id. at 170-171. Rather, there
were limits derived from the nature of the judicial process. That process is characterized by:
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly
and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims .... on a judgment
not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of
change in a progressive society.
Id. at 172. For a competing view of due process as incorporating only those rights explicitly named
in the Bill of Rights, see Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175-77 (Black, J., concurring).
432. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170-72. The appeal to the perspective of time is not unique in constitu-
tional jurisprudence. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (evolving standards of decency
make deliberate indifference to inmate's serious medical needs a violation of the eighth amendment).
433. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 427, at 204 n.10.
434. Roehin, 342 U.S. at 170-71.
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"charges based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the
present charge of failure to provide adequate protection. '435 This is the "razor's
edge" that Judge Posner warned about in his opinion in this case for the Seventh
Circuit:
To place every state welfare department on the razor's edge, where if it
terminates parental rights it is exposed to a section 1983 suit... by the
parent and if it fails to terminate those rights it is exposed to a section
1983 suit by the child, is unlikely to improve the welfare of American
families, and is not grounded in constitutional text or principle. 436
The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney does not center on the razor's
edge policy issue. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist formally stated a syllogism
about negative liberties, affirmative duties, and general governmental services
and draws a bright line based on custody.437 Nonetheless, the concern with the
razor's edge, that is, the balance between the concededly constitutionally pro-
tected interest in family privacy and integrity and the state's duty to intervene in
an abusive family, must be dealt with in any contextual analysis. The razor's
edge predicament is also relevant to a question that the DeShaney Court never
reached:438 What state of mind is necessary to make out a due process
violation?439
The parent-child relationship unquestionably is safeguarded by the due pro-
cess clause of the United States Constitution. In 1972 the Supreme Court ruled
that a father who had lived with his three children for eighteen years, but never
married their mother, had a substantial liberty interest in retaining custody of
his offspring.440 After the mother's death, the state could not presume him unfit
and could not deprive him of custody without first affording him a hearing.44 1
A number of other cases have established the constitutional importance not
only of a parent's right to retain custody, but also of the parental prerogative to
make decisions on behalf of their children without state intrusion into the fam-
ily's privacy and autonomy.44 2 Even when the child's individual rights may ap-
435. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
436. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir, 1987),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
437. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
438. Id. at 1007 n.10.
439. This question also was left unresolved by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986),
and its companion case, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986), in which the Court deter-
mined that ordinary negligence is insufficient to state a fourteenth amendment due process violation,
but left open what other standard, such as gross negligence or deliberate indifference, might suffice.
440. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
441. Id. at 656-58.
442. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 613 (1979) (parents may commit children to mental institu-
tions without an adversarial hearing as long as some neutral decisionmaker, such as a physician,
reviews the commitment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (state may not require
Amish children to attend school beyond the eighth grade in contravention of their parents' sincere
religious beliefs about how best to raise their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (statute requiring all Oregon children to attend public schools exclusively unreasona-
bly interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (state may not make it a
crime to teach children a foreign language); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982)
(higher burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence required before state may terminate par-
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pear to conflict with parental authority, the Court often gives a wide latitude to
the integrity of the traditional family structure. In Parham v. J.R.,4 4 3 for exam-
ple, the Court acknowledged that children have a significant liberty interest at
stake when their parents decide to commit them to mental institutions.44 4 Be-
cause of balancing considerations, however, this liberty interest did not entitle
the children to an adversarial hearing before commitment. 445 "Western civiliza-
tion" holds a concept of "the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
minor children." 446 Parents generally have the right to make difficult decisions
for their children. The Court was willing to assume that parents generally do
act in their child's best interests.447 It was unwilling to accept the "statist" no-
tion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases
just because some parents might abuse that authority.448 Thus, although some
medical decisionmaker was required to review the commitment, a formal pro-
ceeding was not necessary, in part because it would intrude too much on the
parent-child relationship. 449 Justice Stewart emphasized in his concurring opin-
ion that "it has been a canon of common law that parents speak for their minor
children. So deeply imbedded in our traditions is this principle of law that the
ent/child relationship based on allegations of neglect). But see Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (appointment of counsel for parents not required in every termination of parental
rights suit).
The tension between parental rights of guardianship and control over their children and chil-
dren's individual rights, as asserted by minors who are mature enough to make reproductive deci-
sions on their own, was drawn sharply in the contraception and abortion cases. In Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), for example, the Court invalidated a Missouri statute
that required parental consent for a minor's abortion, unless it was necessary to save the young
woman's life. Id. at 74. The Court rejected the argument that the veto power would strengthen the
family unit, which they found was already fractured by the disagreement over the decision. Id. at
75. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979), the Court decided that when the state does seek
parental consent for the abortion of an unmarried minor, it must also provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby authorization may be obtained. Although the constitutional rights of children gener-
ally cannot be equated with those of adults, abortion choices require a special sensitivity to the
minor's right to make decisions. Id. at 642. In Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493
(1983), however, the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring parental consent, but which
did provide an alternative judicial bypass procedure. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the
Court upheld a Utah statute that required parental notification, when feasible, as applied to an un-
emancipated girl living at home, on the grounds that it served important considerations of family
integrity by providing parents with the opportunity to counsel their children. Id. at 411. By con-
trast, Justice Marshall observed in dissent that the ideal of the supportive family may not be fulfilled
in reality and therefore is not enough to override the pregnant minor's fundamental individual right
to privacy. Id. at 437 (Marshall, J., dissenting). With the Supreme Court's recent decision in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), any balance that arguably was reached in
these cases involving minors in particular certainly will be upset by the Court's invitation to the
states to impose additional regulation on the abortion decision generally. See id. at 3056-58. The
Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 29, 1989, in two cases involving notification of
parents of minors seeking abortions. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 854 F.2d 852
(6th Cir. 1988), prob. juris noted, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th
Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240.
443. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
444. Id. at 600.
445. Id. at 606-13.
446. Id. at 602.
447. Id. at 602-03.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 610.
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Constitution itself may compel a State to respect it. ' '4 50
The concern for family privacy reflected in these cases has a valid basis.
Especially in view of the historical linkage between poverty and state regulation
of the family,451 it is all too tempting for state bureaucrats and legislators to
impose their own (white middle-class) norms on the varieties of human experi-
ence in this most intimate and important relationship. It is troubling that after a
swing in the other direction, 452 the Court again seems willing in recent years to
countenance majoritarian regulation of nonconventional intimacies.45 3 Influen-
tial commentators Anna Freud, Joseph Goldstein, and Albert Solnit have ar-
gued that outside intervention in family autonomy can do psychological harm to
children who see their parents' authority undermined.454
450. Id. at 621 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
451. In Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), for example, the Court demonstrated its greater
willingness to condone intrusions on the privacy and autonomy of financially dependent families.
For discussions of that linkage, see R. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY 223-91 (1970); Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 756-60 (1964). In Wyman, the Supreme Court approved
warrantless home visits by caseworkers as a condition of continued receipt of AFDC funds for poor
families, refusing to characterize these visits as fourth amendment searches and finding them "rea-
sonable" in any case. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318. The Court justified these visits, which were both
rehabilitative and investigative in character, in part on the grounds that they were necessary to
protect the dependent children receiving assistance. Id. at 317-18. Justice Douglas' dissent con-
demned this warrantless invasion of the home of a poor person dependent on government largess.
Id. at 331-32 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He questioned whether the same standards would be applied
to an affluent cotton farmer receiving benefit payments for not growing crops, and denounced the
obvious class bias involved. Id. at 332-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
For an extended critique of Wyman and a contrast between it and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), in which the Court recognized some formal procedural protections in juvenile delinquency
programs, see Burt, supra note 319. Professor Burt points out that although the Court was willing to
look behind the ideals to the realities of the juvenile justice system, it simply assumed, without
examination, that the beneficent purposes of the welfare home visit, including protection of the child,
were likely to be accomplished. Id. at 1262-65.
The state's greater willingness to regulate the intimate lives of the poor can also be seen in
efforts on behalf of abused children. The earliest child protection laws, which provided for appren-
ticeship of children, were designed to lessen public expenditure on poor relief and to exert social
control. Areen, supra note 393, at 894-96. The first lawsuits seeking to hold public officials responsi-
ble for failing to protect children were criminal indictments against local law officials who appren-
ticed children to cruel masters and ignored the dangers about which they knew or should have
known. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Coyle, 160 Pa. 36, 45, 28 A. 634, 636 (1894) (upholding convic-
tion for neglect of their duty against three directors of the poor who apprenticed a seven-year-old to
a cruel master who killed him with maltreatment).
Linda Gordon has shown how the Massachusetts SPCC was established as an upperclass effort
to exercise social control of Catholic working-class immigrants. L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 28-
29. For example, one of the campaigns that concerned the Boston SPCC in its early years was the
desire to get beggar children or children apprenticed to organ-grinders off the streets so that family
life would conform more closely to the middle-class ideal. Id. at 37-42.
Twentieth-century removals of children from their homes on the grounds of abuse or neglect
and "voluntary" foster placements of children also reflect an apparent skewing in favor of poor
families. See Areen, supra note 393, at 888-89 n.7, 911; Garrison, supra note 69, at 1752; Parker,
supra note 397, at 565 (30,000 children removed each year, mostly from poor families).
452. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (invalidating city zoning
that prevented grandmother from living with her grandson); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (invalidating ban on distributing contraceptives to unmarried).
453. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia law criminalizing
consensual homosexual sodomy); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 (1989) (upholding
state's irrebuttable presumption of the husband's paternity, and refusing to recognize liberty interest
of biological father in relationship with his child, who was the product of his adulterous relationship
with a married woman).
454. J. GOLDSrEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 399, at 9-10. Although they oppose
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Family privacy, however, can also be an instrument of oppression to those
trapped within it. Gordon has shown that the weaker members of late nine-
teenth-century working-class families, chiefly the women, wanted and sought out
the SPCC's intervention.455 Thus, the enthusiasm for state regulation of neg-
lectful or abusive families was not strictly a middle-class maneuver, "nor was it
on balance disadvantageous to poor women." 456 In other words, state interven-
tion in the family to protect children is a two-edged sword. The state's role also
has been two-fold: on the one hand, the power of the state has been used to
enforce existing patriarchal power relationships by upholding parental preroga-
tives such as physical punishment and by promoting family privacy and integrity
through the decriminalization of family violence. On the other hand, however,
the state has intruded into family privacy and autonomy in order to establish a
child protection agency with significant powers of investigation and removal.
This does not mean, however, that the state sits on a razor's edge, narrowly
balanced between the accepted constitutional rights to family privacy and the
due process right to protection that Joshua DeShaney unsuccessfully sought to
establish. I am not sure that it would matter.even if the balance were really so
precarious. The mere clash of rights surely is no reason to refuse arbitrarily to
recognize one of them at all. 4 57 In any case, the razor's edge metaphor is mis-
leading because the state has a broad band of discretion to act or refuse to act,
which permits the judiciary to arrive at a principled balance of rights.
C. Getting Off the Razor's Edge: State of Mind
The answer to the razor's edge dilemma lies in a state-of-mind requirement
for the constitutional violation. In Daniels v. Williams,458 a case concerning an
inmate's slip and fall on prison stairs, the Supreme Court ruled that the state
cannot deprive a person of due process of law through acts or omissions that are
intervention in most cases of neglect, the authors would intervene strongly in cases of serious abuse,
terminating parental rights and quickly reconstituting a new permanent family for the child. Id. at
71-75. For criticisms of this theory, see Garrison, supra note 69, at 1763-65; Parker, supra note 397,
at 567.
455. L. GORDON, supra note 45, at 296.
456. Id. at 297. Gordon is therefore critical of some feminists who find little to choose between
the older private patriarchy, which put women under the control of an individual man, and the new
"state patriarchy" of the welfare state, which transfers that control to the state. Id. at 371 n.4. She
uses the term "patriarchy" in its historical sense, "referring to a family form in which fathers had
control over all other family members-children, women, and servants." Id. at 55-56.
Gordon does not accept the liberal view developed by E.A. Ross in 1901, and Talcott Parsons
and his followers in the 1940s and 1950s, which viewed social regulation by the state as a sign of
progress, and the replacement of family functions such as socialization by professionals, as benefi-
cent. But she also questions the contrasting pessimistic view, advanced since the 1930s by both
Marxists and conservatives, which condemns professional intervention in the family. These interpre-
tations are lacking because they fail to bring a gender or generational analysis to bear on the prob-
lem. Id. at 293.
457. See, eg., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (rejecting prior censor-
ship when sixth and first amendment rights clashed). In Stuart a judge had imposed a gag rule on
publicity to make it possible to impanel a fair jury in a small town that was the scene of the murders.
My thanks to colleague David Dow for suggesting this line of cases.
458. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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merely negligent.4 59 Since then it has been clear that all fourteenth amendment
due process claims will require a state of mind more culpable than negligence,
but, unlike other constitutional provisions, 460 the Court has not yet established
the requisite standard. 4 6
1
The DeShaney plaintiffs claimed that the misconduct of the Wisconsin DSS,
however designated, went far beyond negligence and was sufficiently aggravated
to establish section 1983 liability.462 They argued that using this extreme mea-
sure of misbehavior would ensure the exclusion of the host of routine mistakes of
judgment by government officials, but preserve a cause of action for a genuine
abuse of the power of the office itself.463 This would allay the concerns ex-
pressed in Daniels and in its companion case, Davidson v. Cannon,464 about trivi-
alizing the due process clause by applying its guarantees to unintended loss of
life, liberty, or property rather than to oppressive abuse of government power.465
The plaintiffs believed that the Seventh Circuit's fear about the razor's edge
was misplaced. First, the protective agency had many options short of a too-
hasty and perhaps unconstitutional termination of parental rights, none of which
459. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the Supreme Court
resolved a question that it had evaded several times before: based on its legislative history in the
42nd Congress, the Court concluded that section 1983, unlike its criminal counterpart, did not im-
pose any statutory state-of-mind requirement. Id. at 534. The Civil Rights Act afforded relief when-
ever states violated federal rights, whether by reason of "prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or
otherwise," that is, regardless of state of mind. Id. (emphasis added). Concurring Justice Powell
warned that this ruling would open the pathway to many more such lawsuits than the Court contem-
plated or thought desirable, id. at 551, and he sought a constitutionally based decision that would
limit this effect. Id. at 548 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
A few years later, the Court concluded that Justice Powell had been right. In Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 474 U.S. 327 (1987), the Court reaffirmed its holding about the section 1983 statutory lan-
guage and intent, but it reconsidered the issue of the content of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
330-33 The Court held that the due process clause, which prohibits states from depriving any citi-
zen of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, incorporates its own state of mind re-
quirement: "We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of
an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property." Id. at 328. Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion noted that historically the due process guarantee applied to deliberate
decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. He found this
consonant with the "traditional and common-sense notion" that the famous clause was a shield
against oppressive abuse of government power. Id. at 331. Lack of due care, for example, by the
prison official whose carelessness caused inmate Williams to slip and fall, on the other hand, is
something else again. Justice Rehnquist found this conduct is no more than a failure to measure up
to the conduct of a reasonable person and that to equate such conduct to a "deprivation" would be
to trivialize the principle of due process of law. Id.
The Daniels Court declined the invitation to specify whether something more than simple negli-
gence, but less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, would be sufficient
to trigger the protections of the due process clause. Id. at 334 n3. In a companion case, Davidson v,
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), the Court applied the same principles to a claim that prison officials
failed to protect an inmate from an anticipated assault. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347-48.
460. An eighth amendment claim, for example, requires proof of deliberate indifference to an
inmate's serious illness or injury. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). For a claim of racial
discrimination under the equal protection clause, proof of invidious discriminatory purpose is re-
quired. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
461. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007 n.10; Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3.
462. Petitioners' Brief, suprti note 3, at 29-34.
463. Id. at 30.
464. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
465. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 30.
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it chose to exercise.4 66 The plaintiffs asserted that most child protection work,
on the other hand, is either competent or merely poor or negligent, and therefore
would not be actionable under the extreme misconduct standard.4 67 Thus only
a tiny fraction of agency decisions would be subject to potential liability-those
that are "utterly beyond the Pale"; only when a "deliberate refusal to act, in a
sphere specifically entrusted to them, is so profound that it violates the commu-
nity's sense of outrage and would be generally perceived as fundamentally wrong
or unfair."4 6
8
State of mind standards, like bright lines based on custody, generally are
not the proper foundation for distinguishing due process violations from ordi-
nary torts.4 69 The analysis of constitutional duty in the child protection and
family violence context provides a sounder basis. A state of mind requirement,
however, may be a means to balance the constitutional concerns at stake: on the
one hand, there is a constitutionally protected interest in family integrity and
privacy, but on the other hand, the child victim within the family also has an
interest of constitutional dimension in her safety. A standard that requires a
substantial deviation from the appropriate exercise of judgment in child welfare
work ensures that protective agencies have a broad band of discretion for their
sensitive work. At the same time, however, such a standard does not ignore, as
the DeShaney decision did, the due process values at stake when government
fashions a comprehensive decriminalized child protection system, but fails to
protect a child it knows to be in mortal danger. With a rigorous standard of
culpability, the dreaded razor's edge is merely chimerical. 470
The DeShaney litigants offered varying formulations of the more-than-neg-
ligence standard: plaintiffs were sure that the conduct at issue met either a gross
466. Id. at 32. For example, the agency could have taken the child to a doctor for a medical
exam; it could have sought a court order requiring the family to cooperate; it could have sought
foster home placement; it could have enforced the contract they made with Randy DeShaney; it
could have insisted that the enrollment in Head Start go forward as planned; it could have notified
Joshua's mother about what was going on. Id.
467. Id. at 32-33.
468. Id. at 33-34.
469. Justice Blackmun also makes this point in his dissent to Davidson. Although he joined in
Daniels, because a commonplace slip and fall does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring), he contended that negli-
gence, if it "permits anticipated inmate violence resulting in injury, or perhaps leads to the execution
of the wrong prisoner," does implicate the due process clause. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 350 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
470. There is a certain irony in Judge Posner's dire warnings in the appellate decision in
DeShaney. Judge Posner was concerned about the Scylla of constitutional liability for moving too
soon to terminate parental rights, and the Charybdis of civil rights accountability for moving too late
in the DeShaney case. In an earlier case, Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Ellis v. Judge of Putnam Circuit Court, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982), however, he experienced no
difficulty in controlling liability for overeager state intervention in family relationships. Judge Pos-
ner held that adoption into a new family without notice to the grandparents, who had ably cared for
the children and who were cut off from visitation as a result, was not a violation of due process so
long as there were some state remedies that the grandparents could have exercised along the way.
Id. at 514-15. This is an unusual application of the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543
(1981) (although inmate had been "deprived" of his "property" by prison officials who lost his hobby
kit, the existence of post-deprivation state tort remedies for this random and unauthorized action
meant that the deprivation was not without "due process of law"), to a deprivation of a liberty
interest in family relationships.
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negligence, deliberate indifference, or willful and wanton standard; government
defendants urged that if any basis was found to hold them accountable for failing
to protect children like Joshua, an extremely stiff version of "deliberate indiffer-
ence" should be required. 471 Lower courts also have embraced deliberate indif-
ference, modelled on Estelle's eighth amendment criterion, or something similar,
in child protection cases.472
The facts alleged in DeShaney should be sufficient to establish deliberate
indifference: the social worker actually knew and documented "in detail that
471. Brief For Respondents, supra note 311, at 31. State officials viewed this test as requiring
conduct that "deliberately and purposefully disregarded the constitutionally protected rights of an-
other," and as identical to the eighth amendment standard adopted in Estelle. Only in this way, the
defendants argued, could the Court ensure that a proper distinction was made between the decision
not to devote limited resources to a particular task, on the one hand, and a decision to oppress
particular individuals, on the other. In their view, only the latter constituted the abuse of govern-
ment power encompassed within the due process clause. Id.
The DeShaney defendants referred to the Daniels language about the due process clause having
been historically applied to "deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life,
liberty or property." Id. at 30 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331). They further concluded that "gov-
ernment simply cannot attempt to oppress without an intent to do so," id. at 31, a formulation that
would seem to go rather beyond both Daniels and Estelle. See id. at 32 (describing purposeful or
deliberate government action as the touchstone of Daniels and Davidson). They also described the
conduct at issue in their case as clearly less culpable than that found insufficient to establish liability
in Davidson for the failure to protect the inmate from assault: in the Davidson case, "'[flar from
abusing governmental power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression, Respondent Cannon
mistakenly believed that the situation was not particularly serious and Respondent James simply
forgot about the note.' Certainly nothing worse can be said of Respondents' intentions in this case."
Id. at 34 (quoting Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348).
472. See Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (1lth Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989). The Eleventh Circuit sitting en bane reinstated a claim by a foster child
that alleged that the state agency was deliberately indifferent or grossly negligent in its failure to
protect the child. Id. at 793.
For a case decided before Daniels and Davidson, see Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social
Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 783 (2d Cir.) (Doe II) (Second Circuit upheld a verdict against the foster care
agency based on jury instructions requiring "deliberate indifference."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983). Even if a case that intervened between the two Doe appellate decisions, Youngberg v. Ro-
meo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), established a new test of "substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment," id. at 323, the jury instructions were adequate. Accord-
ing to the Doe 11 court, the Youngberg formulation, if applicable at all, constituted a gross negligence
test that would be easier than deliberate indifference to meet. Doe 11, 709 F.2d at 790; see also Estate
of Bailey ex rel. Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 1985) (child not in state custody
states claim against agency based on conduct rising to level of "deliberate indifference, reckless disre-
gard, or gross negligence"). The Bailey court stated:
We stress that an error in judgment, an unforeseeable tragic event, a good faith but mis-
informed professional decision, or mere negligence will not suffice to impose liability ....
[To the extent that plaintiffs rely on the professional practices of the [child protection
agency] to prove gross negligence, they will, of course, have to sustain the burden of show-
ing that these practices are so far below the minimum accepted and generally prevailing
professional standards as to permit the fact finder to infer deliberate or reckless indifference
or unconcern or callous disregard for Aleta's safety.
Id. at 508.
Cf Sowers v. Bradford Area School Dist., 694 F. Supp. 125, 126 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (high school
student who went to teacher's house on school business and was assaulted by him states a claim
based on the school's reckless indifference to its responsibility to protect her), aff'd, 869 F.2d 591 (3d
Cir.), vacated sub nom. Smith v. Sowers, 109 S. Ct. 1634 (1989); Riddle ex rel. Brewster v. Innskeep,
675 F. Supp. 1153, 1162 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (correct standard is gross negligence or deliberate indiffer-
ence in noneighth amendment failure to protect claim by juvenile who was released from custody but
was still attending county habilitation school where he was stabbed by an inmate of the center),
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seems almost eerie in light of her failure to act upon it"473 that an unreasonable
or pervasive risk to Joshua's safety existed.474 The agency and the social
worker, moreover, had the sole authority, the means,475 and the statutory man-
date4 76 to do something about that danger. Their substantial departures from
accepted4 77 social work practice in intervening in abusive families placed the
dependent four-year-old Joshua at greater risk. Joshua was not injured by one
sudden and hard-to-predict outburst. Appropriate intervention at several junc-
tures could have rescued Joshua before the cumulative effects of ongoing abuse
caused severe brain damage.47 8
In the posture of the DeShaney case, we do not know why the social worker,
who seemed to care about the child, did not act to protect him, but instead only
documented Joshua's danger in eerie4 79 detail. If the reason was related to
faults in the Winnebago County child protective system as a whole, surely there
is a good reason to impose constitutional liability on the government that em-
ployed and constrained her. In many states, child protection agencies have seri-
ous structural480 problems that amount to a virtual scandal. 481 Despite
statutory mandates to investigate child abuse reports within a specific time, the
473. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
474. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
475. See supra note 333 for the possible actions by the agency, and its failure to exercise any of
those options.
476. Statutory mandates can play an evidentiary role in establishing the requisite state of mind.
The Doe I court suggested that dereliction of mandatory duties, such as reporting suspected abuse,
demonstrated deliberate indifference. The more specifically the statute mandated the particular ac-
tion, the greater its value as proof of deliberate indifference. Whereas another failure to act may be
fairly attributed to the exercise of judgment on how best to handle the situation, nonfeasance of a
mandated duty cannot be explained in that way. Doe I, 649 F.2d 134, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1981).
477. The amicus Massachusetts Committee for Children and Youth contended that social work
standards are well established, particularly when specific statutory duties are involved. Massachu-
setts Committee Brief, supra note 170, at 14-15. Vincent DeFrancis, an attorney and Director Emer-
itus of the Children's Division of the American Humane Association, notes that the professional
standards in the field of child abuse and neglect that have been promulgated by organizations such as
the American Humane Association, the Child Welfare League of America, and more recently, the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, are widely accepted. DeFrancis, Liability for Inade-
quate Services, in MALPRACTICE AND LIABILITY IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERvIcEs 2 (Holder &
Hayes eds. 1984).
478. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 3, at 7-8.
479. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
480. Cf. Robertson, supra note 95, at 120-22. In prison assault cases in the lower courts, the
primary model accepted is one of "structural" reasonableness. The duty of prison officials to protect
inmates is satisfied if there is evidence of systematic compliance with certain structural attributes of
prison security, such as the posting of an adequate number of trained guards.
481. The Texas system may be a good example. See Texas Senate Committee Report, supra note
169. The Senate Committee's findings included: (1) there is widespread dissatisfaction and turnover
among employees of the system because the agency is top heavy with administrative employees,
leaving front-line staff with no promotional opportunities, and apparently excessive caseloads and
unnecessary paperwork, id. at 5-10; (2) the agency is afraid to get rid of bad employees, id. at 10; (3)
decisions "not to remove a child from a dangerous environment may be based on the lack of a
suitable alternative placement, such as a foster home," id. at 11; (4) the same relatively small propor-
tion of children have been rehnoved from abusive homes in the last few years, even though there is
evidence that the agency is dealing with an increasing number of cases with more severe abuse, id. at
5; (5) the agency leaves bad foster homes open because there are not enough homes available and it
cannot afford to close them, id. at 13; and (6) the high incidence of repeat offenders reported to the
system may partly result from practices that close out cases prematurely, doing no good but arousing
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agency may never investigate.4 82 A recent report in Texas found that forty-nine
percent of all confirmed cases of child abuse were closed shortly after the investi-
gation, due to "staff shortages. ' 4 8 3 Closure may be based on inappropriate fac-
tors such as the unwillingness of the family to cooperate with the service plan or
the unavailability of services or foster home placements.484 Systemic deficien-
cies may exist due to underfunding, understaffing, or failure to train properly,
even in the face of the agency's knowledge of the dangerous results for the chil-
dren in their care. Courts have granted injunctive relief to classes of foster chil-
dren subject to the same kinds of deficiencies in protecting them as children not
in legal custody.485 In other words, the governmental agency may be responsi-
ble for structural problems that irrationally expose arbitrarily selected children
to mortal danger. The reasoning of the DeShaney majority, however, excludes
these children, too, from constitutional protection.
The appropriate state of mind requirement and the evidence needed to sat-
isfy it should be developed in the specific child protection context. It may be
the ire and scorn of parents, who see that nothing happened and therefore conclude that officials are
powerless to intervene, id. at 16.
See also Mushlin, supra note 345, at 209 (discussing the acute and widespread problems in
foster care systems-an integral part of the overall child protective services-which threaten the
safety of children in foster care). A report by Marian Wright Edelman, distinguished president of
the Children's Defense Fund, concluded in 1979 that the foster care system was a "national dis-
grace." Id. at 212.
482. See, eg., Texas Senate Committee Report, supra note 169, at 5. Many of the cases never are
investigated at all, with sometimes fatal results.
483. Id. at 4. The Department's Regional Information and Performance Report for Fiscal Year
1988 showed that the agency left the child in the home in 70% of confirmed abuse cases, when
ongoing services and supervision would be required; only half of those cases, however, received the
necessary services. Id.
The Committee reported one instance in which a baby boy in El Paso died as result of cerebral
tissue softening. There had been an earlier abuse report on the child that reflected a fractured skull
and head and facial bruises. The agency confirmed the abuse, but a supervisor administratively
closed the case due to staff shortages. El Paso County Attorney Joe Lucas requested that the Texas
Attorney General's office investigate this and other mishandled cases. Id. at 2-3. Testimony before
the Senate Committee showed: "Every day confirmed cases of child abuse are being closed leaving
children in potentially dangerous homes without any further monitoring and without providing any
services which could possibly alleviate the abusive or neglectful situation." Id. at 4. The Committee
concluded that
there are children whose abuse was reported as required by law, whose abuse was con-
firmed by an investigation, and whose situation indicated a need for further monitoring and
assistance. No caseworker was assigned, no one monitored the child, no services were
provided to attempt to help the family, and nothing was done to address the resulting
psychological damage to the child.
Id. at 5.
484. Id. at 11.
485. See L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding preliminary
injunction to redress deficiencies in Maryland's federally funded foster care program that placed
children at substantial risk of severe harm from abuse), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 816 (1989). Cf.
Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 326 (D. Mass. 1982) (preliminary injunction granted to bring
Massachusetts Department of Social Services into compliance with federal Social Security Act re-
quirements for foster care system concerning service plans and periodic review, in order to prevent
irreparable harm to children from abuse and neglect), aff'd sub nom. Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d
504 (Ist Cir. 1983).
Due to the philosophy and problems of the child protective system, it is often fortuitous




useful, however, to consider what deliberate indifference, for example, has come
to mean in another context--cases alleging that prison or jail officials failed to
protect inmates or detainees from assault by other inmates or from their own
suicidal impulses. By the close of the 1960s the federal judiciary could no longer
reconcile their previous "hands-off" policy with what they were learning about
the shocking conditions of prison life, including overcrowding, disease, arbitrary
discipline, and violence by staff and by other prisoners. 486 In order to establish
deliberate indifference as a constitutional violation, the lower federal courts48 7
developed a two-part inquiry that required proof that a pervasive risk of harm
existed and that the officials failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent prison-
ers from intentionally harming others.488 Courts sustained actions based on a
pervasive risk of harm when inmate violence was commonplace in general, or
affected an identifiable subgroup of inmates, or when prison officials had prior
knowledge of an isolated assault.489 Some, but not all, lower courts have con-
cluded that the Supreme Court's recent cases, Davidson v. Cannon490 and
Whitley v. Albers,491 now require a more rigorous proof of lack of reasonable
care to avert the harm.492 Nonetheless, federal judges have continued since
1986 to deny summary judgment motions and to uphold jury verdicts, especially
when officials departed from such fundamental basics of prison administration
as proper investigation and classification of the inmate population.4 93  Prison
assaults raise different issues than child abuse. Prisons house many violent of-
fenders confined in close quarters for penal purposes. Whitley clearly demon-
strated that official decisions about protecting inmates merited much greater
deference when made in the press of quelling a prison riot.4 94 Official responsi-
486. Robertson, supra note 95, at 103.
487. The Supreme Court has approved the principle that the state has an affirmative duty to
protect those individuals it involuntarily incarcerates. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
488. Robertson, supra note 95, at 113.
489. Id. at 113-19.
490. 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (negligent failure to prevent anticipated assault on inmate not a depri-
vation of due process).
491. 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (in the context of a prison riot, more than deliberate indifference must
be shown in an eighth amendment prison security and safety claim; "obduracy and wantonness"
characterize an eighth amendment claim). Three Justices of the Court dissented from denial of
certiorari to a similar case involving prison unrest that was short of a riot. Dudley v. Stubbs, 109 S.
Ct. 1095 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). They wanted to apply the
heightened Whitley standard, which they characterized as acting "maliciously and sadistically," to
this situation as well. Id. at 1097.
492. See Roland v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 764, 769 (6th Cir. 1988) (after Whitley, when eighth
amendment violation occurs in context of an assault on an inmate, defendant's conduct must be
"obdurate" or "wanton"); Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 415-16 (10th Cir. 1988) (wanton and
obdurate misconduct of prison officials). But see Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 801 (7th Cir.)
(deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2832 (1988); Morgan v. District of Columbia (Two
Cases), 824 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Whitley standard inapplicable to this case, involving a
fight in an overcrowded jail, but not a riot).
493. See, eg., Roland, 856 F.2d at 765 (homosexual rape; perpetrators who were members of
homosexual pressure gang allowed to be trusties and to roam freely); Walsh, 837 F.2d at 792 (de-
fendants did not screen inmate before assigning cell, and put dangerous gang member with gang
tattoo on him in same cell with target of gang violence); Morgan, 824 F.2d at 1050 (dangerous
psychotic allowed to roam at large in prison population instead of going into special, although over-
crowded unit for those with mental problems).
494. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
bility for inmate safety, moreover, is a necessary corollary of the deprivation of
liberty, but it is not the primary function of prisons.
Child protective services, on the other hand, exercise less direct control over
the conditions of (parental) custody, but their sole purpose is to protect children.
Rather than the need to maintain control over volatile offenders that character-
izes the inmate assault cases, the countervailing concern in child protection is
the interest in preserving the child's family. It remains to be seen what specific
kinds of misconduct tip the balance in favor of liability in abused children's
cases. The lower federal courts have only just begun to hear the kind of shock-
ing evidence of endemic problems that mobilized them to respond to prison vio-
lence. The Supreme Court, however, has cut off future case-by-case
development of a meaningful standard of deliberate indifference in the child pro-
tection context, with its impenetrable custody line.495 The DeShaney facts and
the many substantial departures from child welfare practice alleged certainly
raise the likelihood of deliberate indifference. As the social worker in DeShaney
said, "I just knew the phone would ring some day and Joshua would be
dead."
496
V. CONCLUSION: POLICY CONCERNS
Child protective services is a system under enormous pressure.
Caseworkers, who are typically poorly paid women, have to go out each day to
do a very hard job, often without the resources to do it right. I have been told
that it feels the same as if the police were expected to do their jobs without guns.
Child protection professionals are extremely frustrated, their morale is low, job
turnover is high, 497 and they feel increasingly vulnerable to legal action.498
Increased liability for child protection workers, therefore, raises serious pol-
icy concerns. Douglas Besharov, the former director of the National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect, has warned that even as things stand now it is hard to
recruit and retain people into this poorly paid field and that fear of legal liability
can immobilize decisionmakers. 499 He also believes that social worker liability
is unfair.50° Social workers can be blamed for whatever they do:
They can be blamed if they report suspected child abuse, and they can
495. It has left open the possibility that such a standard may be developed for children in foster
care. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006, n.9.
496. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
497. See, eg., Texas Senate Committee Report, supra note 169, at 6-7.
498. Douglas Besharov, former director of the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, has
written a book, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 71, which reports on what he sees
as an alarming and growing trend to increased social worker liability of all kinds. Although still
infrequent, criminal prosecutions are more common. Id. at 1-2. He noted that the indictment of a
child protective worker in Queens, New York, created a "'riptide of concern among social work
professionals.'" Id. at 14. Malpractice claims against child welfare workers arc rising, id. at 3, and
more state and federal lawsuits are being brought. Id. at 3, 14-15. Besharov concedes, however, that
it "is all too easy to spin horror stories" and to exaggerate the legal vulnerability of social workers.
The cases he describes in his book are the "exception" and he believes that, at most, only 1-2% of
active social workers ever get sued. Id. at 14.
499. Id. at 137.
500. Id. at 15.
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be blamed if they don't. They can be blamed if they remove a child
from parental custody, and they can be blamed if they don't. They can
be blamed if they return a child to the home; and they can be blamed if
they don't.5 0'
Blaming social workers, however, is the wrong social policy.50 2 It may be hard
to predict which child will be killed or seriously injured.5 0 3 Besharov empha-
sizes that blaming the worker is particularly unfair when "many child protective
tragedies are the inevitable result of inadequate funding," aggravated by recent
federal budget cuts.5 4 Poorly trained social workers with too many cases feel
pressure to clear cases and do not stop to discover the facts.50 5
It would be far better to "blame" the system rather than the social work-
ers50 6 and to impose liability for due process violations on the government that
makes child protection policy and exercises control over its employees.50 7 That
will be difficult to accomplish, however, under current Supreme Court doctrine
of section 1983 municipal (government) liability. Federal and state governments
may not be sued for money damages at all, 50 8 and municipalities may be found
liable only if the execution of their custom or policy can be proven to have
caused the deprivation of federal rights.50 9 In recent years, the Court has inter-
501. Id. at 17.
502. Id. at 130. Besharov concedes, however, that the fear of liability has some favorable impact
on professional behavior, and that social workers should be held accountable for misconduct. Id. at
132-33.
503. Id. at 133.
504. Id. at 134.
505. Id.
506. Besharov favors good-faith immunity for the individual child protective workers. Id. at
152-55. Defendants sued under section 1983, however, already enjoy so-called good-faith immunity
pursuant to a standard that offers them almost the same benefits conveyed by absolute immunity.
See Oren, supra note 42, at nn.170-97 and accompanying text. I argued that the clearly established
law standard of good faith immunity adopted in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982),
is tantamount to absolute immunity because it abolishes the traditional procedural distinction be-
tween the two doctrines. Under the new rule, defendants may be granted summary judgment at an
early stage of the litigation whenever they can show the judge that at the time of the incidents in
question, there was no controlling legal precedent based on facts that closely resembled the alleged
misconduct. After 1982, qualified good faith immunity and absolute immunity in civil rights law
share a single purpose: both are designed to abort litigation at the earliest possible moment, with
virtually no factual development.
507. Many commentators with substantial practical expertise in the child protection field would
prefer to see agencies rather than workers held liable for inadequate and harmful services. E.g., D.
BESHAROV, supra note 71, at 156; see P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS 98 (1983); DeFrancis, Guest Editorial, 8 NAT'L CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES
NEWSL. 2 (1979). Douglas Besharov, however, opposes agency liability, too, as deflecting public
attention from the real issues of inadequate financial and political support for child protection. D.
BESHAROV, supra note 71, at 159.
508. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (state may not be sued for money damages in
federal court under section 1983); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312
(1989) (states are not "persons" suable for money damages in state court under section 1983). By its
terms, the statute refers only to actions taken under color of state law. The Supreme Court has
created a damages remedy analogous to section 1983 that is available against federal officials. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Congress, how-
ever, has not amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to permit constitutional tort suits against the
federal government itself. See Oren, supra note 42, 1000 & n.268.
509. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Recent decisions of the
Supreme Court make municipal liability an increasingly tough standard to meet. See Oren, supra
note 42, at 995-1000 & nn.245-65.
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preted the civil rights law in a way that further restricts both individual and
governmental liability, rather than reallocating responsibility from the former to
the latter.510
Recently, in City of Canton v. Harris,511 the Court finally conceded that a
city's failure to train its police force to constitutional standards is actionable
under section 1983. Canton required proof of "deliberate indifference" for this
statutory5 12 element of causation. The Canton standard promises to be difficult
to satisfy.5 13 It is not yet clear how lower courts will interpret the new require-
ments with respect to police training, and it is even less clear how the courts
could translate these requirements in the child protection area. Nonetheless,
some of the structural problems in child protection services discussed in this
Article,5 14 such as a policy or custom of arbitrarily closing cases due to staff
shortages, should provide a basis for establishing municipal liability when the
system subjects a child to a pervasive and substantial risk of harm and injury
results. 5 15
State child protection agencies are grievously defaulting on their responsi-
bilities and are not protecting children from serious harm.5 16 There may be
ways to attack the problem other than imposing constitutional tort liability, such
as criminal indictments, newspaper scandals, state tort law, or political shake-
ups. Change often seems to come, however, from an interplay of many pres-
510. See Oren, supra note 42, at 995-1000 & nn.245-65.
511. 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
512. The degree of fault necessary to prove the underlying constitutional violation may or may
not be the same as that required to prove the section 1983 statutory element of municipal causation,
City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 n.8 (1989). In Canton the Court observed that it had
never ruled upon the requisite state of mind for a denial of medical care to a detainee in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
513. The Court offered an uncomfortably narrow example: if the city knows "to a moral cer-
tainty" that police officers will have to arrest fleeing felois and arms them with guns to accomplish
this, but then fails to train them at all on the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force,
this need is so obvious that the failure can be characterized as deliberate indifference to constitu-
tional rights. City of Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1205 n.10.
Three Justices believed that the evidence adduced in Canton could not meet the standard, and
they would have dismissed the case without a remand. Id. at 1207 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Their gloss on the Canton ruling is that when municipal liability is predi-
cated upon a failure to act, deliberate indifference means the "functional equivalent of a decision by
the city itself to violate the Constitution." Id. at 1208. They also emphasized the necessary close
causal relation. Id. In other words, they reiterated the importance of the difference between action
and inaction in statutory municipal liability doctrine, in much the same way that DeShaney sharply
distinguished acts and omissions for purposes of the underlying constitutional violation. These
members of the Court have for some time attempted to establish a nearly absolute line between
municipal policies that were unconstitutional in and of themselves, and policies, such as inadequate
training, which were not unconstitutional but led to constitutional violations. See, e.g., City of
Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 270-72 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of
certiorari).
514. See supra notes 480-85 and accompanying text.
515. Compare the endemic problems in child protection to the prison assault and medical treat-
ment cases, which involved systemic faults. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678
(1 Ith Cir. 1985). In Anderson the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld ajury verdict for a pretrial detainee who died after ingesting drugs. Id. at 685-86. He was alone in a
cell in a coma for some time after jailers became aware of a potential problem. The jury cleared the
individual defendants but found that the municipality was responsible, apparently because of its
policy of understaffing the jail. Id.
516. See D. BESHAROV, supra note 71, at 51-75.
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sures.5 17 The issue, moreover, is not which is the best legislative policy in the
child protection field. Rather, faithfulness to the constitutional system is re-
quired. Most of all, the answer to the policy concern lies in the nature of the
constitutional right at stake--due process in the context of family violence and
child protection. Having set the trap, through its monopolization of child pro-
tection in the hands of a social service agency and through its toleration and
even endorsement of the physical power parents may exercise over their chil-
dren, the state may not be excused from constitutional accountability on the
pretext that the abusive parent formally retained custody and therefore sprung
the trap by himself. At stake are the child's most precious constitutional
rights-her personal security, her liberty, and even her life.
517. Even infamous state prison systems show signs of healthy change since the 1960s and the
end of the "hands-off" policy of the federal courts. Robertson, supra note 95, at 150-55.
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